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Abstract 
This study, speculative., theoretical and interdisciplinary in orientation. 
examines some key concepts employed in the field of musical performance. 
primarily but not exclusively as exemplified by pianistic practice and solo piano 
performance. It is organised as a series of essays, each of which concerns itself 
with a central term. The introductory chapter interleaves discussion of 
theoretical issues (including the nature of theory itself) with reviews of 
exemplary recent studies which approach the topic of performance from 
different perspectives, such as the rigorously analytical or the institutional. It 
concludes that this range of materials and perspectives is both symptom and 
cause of fragmentation in music-academic performance studies. The four 
subsequent chapters both diagnose and confirm this state of affairs in more 
detail, dealing in turn with the notions of the practice, performance and 
interpretation. In a final concluding section, these strands are reviewed and 
supplemented. The essay on the practice details origins and recent usage in 
musicology before turning to a particular theory of the practice proposed by 
Alasdair Macintyre. It examines the interaction of musical performance and 
ethics in the guise of virtue theory, concluding with two case studies (on 
memorisation and competitions). The diversity of definitions of performance 
across different disciplines is the subject of the following chapter. It argues that 
musical performance has an ontologically distinctive processual character, 
whose fluidity is contained (or 'framed') at different levels. The essay on 
interpretation treats this concept contrastively. Interpretation is viewed as a 
stored mental product, a representation akin in important respects to other 
musical representations, such as notation or recording. The conclusion re- 
examines the notion of crisis in relation to art music performance. Alongside 
tentative conclusions,, some new materials (relating to musicianship and 
musicality) are discussed. 
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Chapter One: Topics and Approaches in Performance Studies: a 
Brief Introduction to the Literature 
Within the discipline of musicology there is a growing field called 
performance studies. This dissertation is a contribution to it. Two questions 
immediately arise: what kind of activity is performance. and what significant 
contributions have been made to the study of it? 
The first thing to be said is that the discipline of performance studies per 
se is most closely associated not with music but primarily with the theatre and 
what has emerged out of performance art and happenings. Typically, attention 
in these fields has been paid to the issues of gender, politics, boundary 
experience and testing received ideas of what art can be. ' The term performance 
studies when applied to music - or at least when used by musicologists - refers 
to a rather diffuse mixture of musical subdisciplines, approaches and concerns. 
While the study of performance has a long history in criticism and pedagogy, it 
has in recent decades gained impetus from the historical authenticity 
movement. ' The question the historical authenticists posed was roughly this: if 
we are to accept that the score does not provide sufficient information for an 
authentic performance of music, what other information could be deemed 
relevant? Serious academic argument, sometimes overheated, eventually 
produced a consensus of sorts, that the issue of correct, 'authentic' interpretation 
and performance was complex and not immediately resolvable. Where there was 
some agreement was in acknowledging, following Richard Taruskin, that the 
role of the performer had been undervalued, underexamined and 
'A useful overview of the field is provided by Marvin Carlson's Performance: a Critical 
Introduction (London: Routledge, 1996). This study is referred to at greater length in chapter t: 1 tn' 
three. On performance art RoseLee Goldberg's Performance Arr ftom Futurism to the Present 
(London: Thames and Hudson, Second Edition 1988) is a seminal text. The Twentieth Centill-Y 
Performance Reader, edited by Michael Huxley and Noel Witts (London: Routledge. 1996) 
provides a wide-ranging interdisciplinary selection of texts. zn t) 
I 
- The history of the authenticity movement has been traced by Harry Haskell in The Early 
Ilusic Revival: a Histoty (London: Thames and Hudson, 1988) and Howard Mayer Browii, 
'Pedantry or Liberation" A sketch of the Historical Performance Movement', in Authenticiti, 
and Earli- Music, ed. Nicholas Kenyon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
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undertheorised. ' Old issues were raised with a fresh urgency and new questions 
came to be asked. What exactly do performers do and how do they come to do 
it? Is performing an activity underpinned by a thoroughgoing rationale. or a 
merely subjective heuristic? What of other factors, such as risk. or audience 
behaviour? 
These questions have begun to be asked more systematical ly, but in this 
introduction I wish to look briefly at just a handful of attempts to come to cyrips 
with the role of performers and performance. The field of writing that is at least 
tangentially relevant is vast, of course. The whole raft of pedagogical treatises, 
biographical studies, memoirs of great performers, critical reviews and 
journalism - the net can be cast impossibly far and wide - clamours for 
attention and smaller portions of it could indeed form the basis for a rather 
differently focused academic study than this one. My emphasis will be 
theoretical, the mode speculative. I have narrowed the subject matter to planistic 
practice, which has both advantages and drawbacks. One argument in its favour 
is that it poses the theoretical problems in a particularly pure form and can serve 
as a paradigm case for performers in general. ' On the other hand. there may 
indeed be compelling reasons not to generalise from the pianist to, for example, 
the conductor or orchestral player. ' This is an issue I will have to put to one 
side. In any case, pianism provides me with a convenient framework, skeletal 
rather than substantial, for a discussion of conceptual issues. 
Inevitably, then, I am forced to be ruthlessly selective in what follows. 
In this opening chapter I have chosen to examine a cross-section of texts on 
performance. Most date from the recent past. They include an exemplary study 
from the field of piano pedagogy; a doctoral thesis on a closely related topic, 
written roughly twenty years ago, and a selection of texts which hint at the 
The kev collection of texts is Kenyon, Authenticity and Early Ihisic. Richard Taruskin's 
writings on this topic are collected in Text and Act. - Essays on Music and Performance (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995). 
' See Stan Godlovitch, Musical Performance. - .4 Philosophical 
Study (London: Routledge, 
1998), p. 12, and John Lazarus, 'Rethinking the Concert: A Fresh Approach to the Solo 
Instrumental Recital' (unpublished doctoral thesis, York University, 1978), p. 2, for a similar 
rationale. 
For discussion of this issue, see Edward T. Cone, The Composer's JolCe (Los Angeles: I 
Berkeley, 1974) and Carl Dahlhaus, 'Der Dirigent als Statthalter'. Helos Neue Zeitschriftfi-ir 
Ifitsik, 2-1 
(1976), p. 370-3371. 
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variety of approaches to be found in more recent writing. The texts I have 
chosen to discuss will hopefully capture something of the range of flavours 
available in discourse on performance. 
My point of departure is, however, methodological. GiN, en that this 
research does not concern itself with data collection and analysis. but rather 
with the nature of concepts surrounding and informing performance studies, my 
initial move will be to consider the genre of 'theory'. 
Theory 
As George Steiner points out, the history of the word theory displays 
elements of duality which suggest on occasion self-contradiction. ' He notes in a 
brief historical sketch that an earlier meaning (not of course the 'original" 
7 
meaning) of the word was tied to close unflinching observation. 
Theory is inhabited by truth when it contemplates its object 
unwaveringly and when, in the observant process of such 
contemplation, it beholds, it takes grasp of the often 
confused and contingent ('vulgar') images, associations, 
suggestions, possibly erroneous, to which the object gives 
rise. ' 
Something of this earlier sense has been resurrected in recent usage, as we shall 
see. 
In the meantime, however (Steiner dates this from the mid-seventeenth 
century), another meaning of theory has emerged which now overshadows the 
former. This is the sense in which the word is applied to science: the devising of 
speculative but testable hypotheses which cohere and mutually reinforce. This 
scientific sense of theory was elaborated on by (among others) Descartes, Kant, 
and Karl Popper, who pared down scientific method to a dependency on the 
' George Steiner, Real Presences (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), p. 70. 
71 have true theory of death when I contemplate a skull. ' Sir Thomas Browne, quoted in 
Steiner, Real Presences, p. 69. 
' lbid, p. 69. 
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core concept of falsifiability. ' Steiner's argument is that theory in this sense can 
only in very limited ways and on very few occasions find application in 
literature and the arts. (The kind of exceptions he allows are 'structuralist' 
analyses following Saussure, the Russian Formalists and Jakobson. ". ) Notabl-N 
he allows music theory an exceptional status as the 'complex and intermediary 
case'. 11 Music theory is an established discourse of antiquarian origin, and 
'theory' in music is indeed a rather different genre. 12 More generally, when ,, -, -e 
encounter theorising in the discourse of the arts, what we are dealing with is not 
a series of testable hypotheses with potentially predictive power, but a 
description of what has already occurred. " Where Steiner objects to theorising 
is in the arena of meaning, which he wishes to render immune from functional 
explanations: 
The absolutely decisive failing occurs when such 
approaches seek to formalise meaning, when they proceed 
upwards from the phonetic, the lexical and the grammatic 
to the semantic and aesthetic. " 
His reason for denying the validity of functional, or what might better be called 
6reductive' explanations rests on a particular ontology of art he wishes to 
defend, underpinning the overall argument of the book, which is that human 
creative activity is mimetic of God's creations. Steiner's ontology of art is 
'A standard introduction to Popper's work is Bryan Magee, Popper (London: Fontana, 1973), 
in which the second chapter deals with the issue of scientific method. Of the numerous primary 
sources, Popper's essay 'Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge', in Karl 
Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 215-250, Is 
exemplary. 
'0 Steiner, Real Presences, p. 80-8 1. Steiner mentions Barthes's study S/Z as a successful recent 
example of such 'scientific' literary-theoretical writing, 
" lbid, p. 75. 
12 A sample of recent thought in the field is to be found in Theoril, Analysis and Meaning in 
Alusic, ed. Anthony Pople (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
Steiner, Real Presences, p. 77. 
lbid, p. 81. Steiner, in addition to voicing this anti-reductionist stance, proposes that we think 
of meaning as a 'trace'. Arguments about the application and acceptability of reductionism are 
widespread across both the sciences and the arts. A clear example from the field of science is 
Jerry Fodor's reviexN,, of Stephen Pinker: How the Mind Works and Henry Plotkin: Evolution in 
. 11ind, entitled 
'The Trouble with Psychological Darwinism', in London Reviciv of Books, 
January 2-1,1998, p. 11-133. See also David Barnett, The Perfortnance of, 11usic. - A Studi, in 
Terms ofthe Pianqforte (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972). p. 1 1, for a similar argument with 
similar consequences. (This book is discussed in some detail below. ) 
II 
presented as a definition, poetically rather than analytically formulated, in tune 
with its underlying - or rather, proliferating - message: 'I would define 
literature (art, music) as the maximalisation of semantic incommensurabilitv in 
respect of the formal means of expression. "' If function is taken to be the 
intentional linking of causes to effects, then clearly this is as far removed from a 
functional definition of art as possible, a harking back to nineteenth-century art- 
religion, 'art for art's sake'. 
Yet how are we to classify an essay such as Steiner's? It is certainly 
critical, but is it criticism? It is perhaps precisely the kind of theorising which 
Steiner himself rails against in the opening pages of Real Presences, where he 
proposes as a thought experiment the prohibition of secondary texts. Jonathan 
Culler would be happy on his part to include Steiner's work under the umbrella 
term theory. Generically, it belongs to that body of work which Richard Rorty 
describes as follows: 
Beginning in the days of Goethe and Macaulay and Carlyle 
and Emerson, a new kind of writing has developed which 
is neither the evaluation of the relative merits of literary 
productions, nor intellectual history, nor moral philosophy, 
nor social prophecy, but all of these mingled together in a 
new genre. 16 
Culler also makes the Steinerian distinction between senses of theory (as 
testable proposition versus speculation) and makes it clear that the kind of 
theorising engaged in in the humanities - call it 'critical' or 'literary' - is of the 
speculative kind. His brief discussion of examples of theorising draws attention 
to two key ideas, which might be crudely described as the constructive mapping 
of reality through the coining of new words, or redefining of older ones, and 
their systematic application in discourses. His examples here are Foucault's 
analyses of sex and homosexuality and the drawing out of patterns of thought by 
Derrida, such as the 'logic of supplementarity', or that 'the idea of the original is 
created by the copies, and that the original is always deferred - never to be 
Steiner, Real Presences, p. 8-3. 
Rorty is quoted by Jonathan Culler in Literary Theory. - .4 Fery Short Introduction 
(Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1997), p. 3. Such writing might be termed 'higher criticism'. 
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grasped'. " The structure of the research I present here is on one level the result 
of posing a typical 'theory' question: what does x (performance, interpretation, 
musicianship) mean? Or following Foucault's genealogical approach, how has it 
come to mean x? A complementary question I pursue depends on definition. If x 
means (definition), what are the consequences of this? We have seen Steiner's 
move to define art and how this ties in with a certain distaste for theory. (It is 
arguably also predicated on a conservative theory of the canon. ) Here, then, is 
Culler's commentary (he does not award it definition status) on what theory is. 
Notice how Culler, in this introductory text, avoids the poetic voice of Steiner, 
or the complexifying mode of, say, Eagleton or Jameson: 
1. Theory is interdisciplinary - discourse with effects 
outside the original discipline. 
2. Theory is analytical and speculative - an attempt to 
work out what is involved in what we call sex or language 
or writing or meaning or the subject. 
3. Theory is a critique of common sense, of concepts taken 
as natural. 
4. Theory is reflexive, thinking about thinking, enquiry 
into the categories we use to make sense of things, in 
literature and in other discursive practices. " 
To this he adds that 'theory is intimidating', because it is endless, driven by 
cycles of upstaging and eclipse. Culler's emphasis on how theory derails 
common sense assumptions constantly points towards how texts mean, or their 
function in creating a certain sense of reality, or constructing a subjectivity. His 
contention that the theorists you will want to read - or feel able to forget - will 
'depend on who "you" are and who you want to be"' is one which Nicholas 
Cook, whose work will be the subject of discussion on several occasions, 
endorses in his theorising about music. 
As points 1-4 of Culler's commentary suggest, theorising performance is 
no easy matter. Before proceeding with my own theorising, let me review some 
other attempts to do so. 
Culler, Literary Theory, p. 12. 
lbid, p. IS. 
I bid, p. 16. 
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Review: (1) Pedagogy meets Performance Theory 
The pedagogical treatise is a more elusive genre than initial appearance 
suggests. Is the performer to study the treatise merely in order to perfect a skill? 
To learn to play (more) beautifully? To interpret notation accurately'. 1 To 
supplement the inadequacies of notation? Or to acquire 'tricks of the trade'? 
Although pedagogical works typically concern themselves with hov, - to achieve 
a desired effect, they may or may not bolster this with systematic argument on 
the effect's behalf 
David Barnett's book entitled The Performance of Music, published in 
1972, tackles both the how and why of interpretation and is aimed at both a lay 
and a professional audience including 'students of psychology, philosophy and 
aesthetics'. 20 Yet I think it would be fair to attribute to it a primarily pedagogical 
purpose: it never deviates far from the question of how to play the piano. 
(Barnett himself was a solo pianist and academic. ) The purpose of the book is 
'to inquire into the intricate relationships among the three modes of 
participating in musical experience' and Barnett adds that 'while there is indeed 
an order of priority... all three are equally important. ' 21 What he seems to mean 
by an order of priority - his view is not quite clearly expressed - is at first blush 
apparently not a hierarchy, as this misleadingly suggests, but that the natural 
sequence of events is fixed in the order composer-performer-listener. Barnett 
claims that performance requires fresh attention. He suggests that the reputation 
of the performer worsened significantly in the inter-war years, quoting a 
glowing review of Paderewski's playing from early in the century and 
contrasting it with these later grudging remarks by Hindemith: 'Once we accept 
the performer as an inevitable necessity in spite of his basic dubiousness, we 
may as well try to determine what properties make him estimable. 22 
" Barnett, David, The Performance of Music. - A Study in Terms of the Pianoforte (London: 
Barrie and Jenkins, 1972). The quotation is from the dustjacket notes. 
2' Barnett, The Petfiormance of Music, p. 2. 
'2 lbid, p. 4. Barnett quotes from Paul Hindemith, .4 
Composer's World, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 195-2), p. 133. See also the remarks of Barnett's teacher Marc 
Pincherle quoted on p-224 (endnote 8), who seems to have been influential here. Pincherle 
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Barnett's story of the performer's loss of status entails a corresponding 
rise in the fortunes of the historical musicologist. who audited a performance for 
its authenticity, the music psychologist, who set about demystifying technique 
and presentation and, later, the analyst, who claimed a determining role for 
structure in performance. He clearly abhors the narrow concentration on skill 
acquisition and problem-solving this implies. When Barnett says that 'the 
deference to the composer was forced and self-conscious and resulted in a 
substitution of artificial effect for natural expression' he echoes Adorno"s 
comments on Toscanini,, though without invoking a central Plank of his 
argument: the fetishisation of detail which access to recordings encourages. 23 
Barnett's definition of performance makes a decisive Steinerian move: 
Musical performance, then, is an effort, an attempt by one 
or more players to interpret the musical composition on the 
basis of its script or score. A performance is not the score 
but simply one idea of it. Since no two performances are 
alike,, there are as many ideas of the score as there are 
performances. " 
From this it follows that it is 'important for each listener to form his own 
opinion', and we can take the performer to be a special instance of the listener 
here. " Unfortunately, Barnett does not follow this line of inquiry further. In 
other words, performance is a celebration of semantic incommensurability - 
different performers seeing different and potentially contradictory things in the 
same music - and the point of a performance, ethically speaking, is the 
celebration of individual difference, of individuality. Not even the composer 
who performs his own works (such as Rachmaninoff) can claim special status: 
'It is the possibility of finding new meanings in works of the past that makes 
wrote at length on this subject in The World of the Virtuoso, trans. Brockway (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1964). 
2, ' Barnett, The Peýformance of Music, p. 5 (quotation). Theodor W. Adorno, 'On the Fetish 
Character of Music and the Regression of Listening' (19-338), in The Essential Frankfurt School 1 1. ) Reader, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Urizen Books, 1978), p. 270-299. 
2' Barnett, The Performance of, I fusic, p. 10. 
2' Barnett, The Perforinancc of Ifusic, p. 11. His example is of Wagner's varied reactions to 
Beethoven's Ninth symphony on different occasions. 
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them a heritage. "" In other words. this is a justification for a work's inclusion in 
the canon. To this definition Barnett adds a second: notation is 'the art of 
detailing the process of composition in written symbols' . 
2' his point being that 
notation is never merely a set of bare instructions, because each element in the 
system is multivalent. This nicely parallels Steiner's point that 'a sentence is 
always more' (than the sum of its constituents). 28 
The bulk of Barnett's enterprise is consumed in countering the radical 
relativism that all this implies, the implication that all performances are equally 
plausible. In Steiner's terms, then, he has to examine the constraints the 'formal 
means of expression' impose. This he does by breaking down the performer's 
task into three elements, each of which is always evident in performance. (In 
passing he makes an important distinction between performance and mere 
playing . 
29 ) This analysis is rather cumbersomely entitled 'Performance as the 
Synthesis of Categories of Method'. The categories are (1) knowledge of 
musical context; (2) training in structural analysis; and (3) muscular control of 
the instrument . 
3' For each of these areas, he selects what he regards as a key 
figure and proceeds to describe their partial contribution to the synthesis. So, in 
reverse order he presents the work of Tobias Matthay (1858-1945) on technique, 
Alfred Cortot (1877-1963) on context and Heinrich Schenker (1868-1935) on 
harmonic/voice-leading analysis, an interestingly varied (by nationality) choice 
of near contemporaries whose work straddles the era of late Romanticism and 
early Modernism. 
The implicit contradiction between the idea of a central purpose in a 
composition - something that can be discovered by analysis - and the need to 
allow each individual performer a personal approach sets up a tension which 
Barnett is constantly at pains to resolve .3' An early point of confrontation is 
his 
discussion of the 'canon of appropriateness', where a performer's choices are 
26 Ibid, p. 11. 
21 Ibid, p. 12. 
21 Steiner, Real Presences, p. 82. 
2' Barnett, The Petformance of Music, p. 22. 
Ibid, p. 29-54. 
Ibid. The idea of the 'central purpose' is discussed on p. 19. This is an idea with wide 
resonance. For a strikingly similar formulation, see Jonathan Dunsbý's discussion of 
Rachnianinoff's concept of 'culmination' in Peýfbrming Music: Shared Concerns (Oxford: 
16 
compared to a chess player's: obedient to rules but driven by a need to succeed. 
to 'win'. However, performance is not a game (or at least, not a zero-sum game) 
and there are no laws, winners or even moves, in the clear-cut sense of 
irrevocable, recordable events such as those that make up chess. This discussion 
is embedded in a passage which attempts to elucidate the relationship between 
music and life, which Barnett includes on the grounds that 'context' is only 
allowable as a contribution to performance insofar as it is demonstrably related 
to music. The solution for Barnett is that 'the two worlds are related because 
both undergo selection and arrangement according to the same principle', this 
being the sense of appropriateness. " 
[Man] neither requires nor desires from music 
representation of the actual world. He looks to music for an 
orderly, non-contradictory arrangement according to the 
canon of appropriateness. Thus, context in music does not 
refer to the actual world but to the orderly arrangements 
that are suggested to man by the actual world. They 
become possible in music because its materials lend 
themselves readily to the detection of similarity and 
contrast. 33 
A number of assumptions are being made here that are open to question. 
Is there really a 'central purpose' in every musical composition? Barnett glosses 
this phrase as the striving of the composer for 'variety within unity', and 
maintains that contrary to popular belief in the case of some composers (he 
refers specifically to Schubert), this is always discoverable. " Furthermore, the 
status of context depends on an aesthetic theory which links contextual 
information to music convincingly. Does appropriateness, in Barnett's sense, 
really do this? I take him to mean that there is a discoverable logic to the way 
we negotiate our way through the world and the way music is constructed. But 
what sort of logic is musical logic? Sometimes it seems to be Mi's logic, 
sometimes Schenker's and at other times an argument in favour of the primacy 
Clarendon Press, 1995) p. 93-4. 
32 Barnett, The Performance of Music, p. 5 8. 
33 lbid, p. 57. 
14 Barnett, The PerlOrmance of Music, p. 19 for his reference to 'variety within unitý' and p. 225 
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of a putative 'original' within a genre. It depends which analysis you read bv 
him. The concept of appropriateness, though highly suggestive. seems too ill- 
defined as it stands to bear these burdens successfully. 
Later in the book Barnett proposes the term salience (which is applied in 
turn to different parameters of sound) as a condition of appropriateness. Natural 
salience is 'the extent to which nature has endowed the musical materials with 
readily perceivable characteristics'. " It turns out that individualised 
interpretations can come to achieve equal validity in this scheme because of a 
degree of tolerance musical materials display. For example, triplets are 
recognisably triplets even when the first note is considerably longer than the 
second or third: but at some point, one kind of material collapses into another. 
36 This represents the limit of its tolerance. Barnett presents this idea as an 
elaboration of (and improvement on) Carl Seashore's theory of derivation. " But 
here too, a question arises out of the notion of musical materials as 'natural' 
(e. g. the octave), a question to which Adorno has given a profound and 
perplexing turn . 
3' Barnett's shrug of qualification attempts to patch over the 
lurking contradictions: 
In all of the four categories of pitch, duration, intensity and 
timbre, then,, the composer and performer have at their 
disposal musical material that has already been selected for 
its advantages to salience. The effect of this selection in 
advance is to confer universality on musical materials, at 
least as far as Western music is concerned. " 
Let me attempt a summary of Barnett's theory. Its fundamental concern, 
beyond rehabilitating the performer, is to reconcile the integrative demands of 
the composition with the widest possible variety of performance approaches. 
for the discussion and analysis of Schubert's E flat Impromptu, D. 899. 
lbid, p. 107. 
In deciding exactly where to draw the line we encounter the 'sorites' paradox. I return to his 
idea in chapter four, in a discussion of the concept of musical ineffability. 
37 Barnett, The Performance of Music, p. 103- 107. 
Max Paddison, . 4dorno's Aesthetics of Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), chapter 
Barnett, The Peifi)rmance of, lfusic, p. 109 (his italics). 
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Somehow, the performer has to justify her status as coauthor. " Barnett's view is 
work-centred, or at least work-orientated; the work is a bounded, unified object 
made up of identifiable musical events which constitute a discoverable 
structural unity. It is a certain tolerance between the constituents (natural, gi\'eil) 
that allows the performer space to 'individualise' an interpretation. In short. 
even though Barnett is a structuralist, he manages to find room for the 
authenticity of the performer, whose interpretative choices are free within the 
constraints imposed by the laws of nature, as mediated by the relationships the 
composition contains. 
The spotlight is hence very much on the work and its interpretation. 
Nonetheless, a number of avenues remain unexplored. In his theory. there is 
little to distinguish interpretation from performance, for example. And the 
listener remains a cipher who is never really problematised, for all her professed 
equality: '[T]he appropriateness of his [the performer's] rendition will depend 
upon how successfully... he relates the score's potential for salience to the levels 
of awareness in the listener. "' Practically all the discussion -a brief section on 
the performer and listener notwithstanding - is of the former. 42 Even in the final 
chapter, ('The Definition of Musical Talent') the issue of the listener, and by 
implication the social context of sounding performance, is only touched upon 
obliquely. Here Barnett discusses 'conversance with idiom', the knowledge of 
style that the performer acquires as a student in a metaphor that is strenuously 
linguistic. " Behind this lies an uncritical acceptance of a 'communication' 
model of musical performance, in which notions of semantic content and 
translation naturally find a home. Somehow the social setting recedes as Barnett 
links composition and performance ever more closely, and his concluding 
comments rather contradict his earlier claim that composer, performer and 
listener are equally important. Consider these comments: 
Here Barnett follows Collingwood in asserting the creative, quasi-authorial role of the II 
performer. See Barnett, The Performance of Music, p. 17. 
41 Ibid, p. 188. 
42 lbid, p. 196-201. Here he deals NNith the notion of redundancy, advisin"D the performer not to 
ernphasise the obvious, or play to the gallery. 
41 lbid, p. 202. 
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[C]omposition and performance are efforts of the 
individual to relate experience to himself. 
Within the total activity of music, there is greater gain to 
understanding from performing than from listening and 
greater gain from composing than from performing. " 
So perhaps the composer is primary after all. This denial of the listener 
is implicit in Barnett's definition of performance quoted above, which ignores 
context and assumes that performance entails a quasi -1 ingui stic notion of 
communication. If communication is successful. ) the role of the listener is 
straightforwardly reconstitutive. For all its initial strenuous appeal to performer 
freedom, Barnett's theory occupies a social vacuum; and perhaps this is no more 
than we should expect of a book written by a pianist and which, whatever its 
assertions to the contrary, is addressed primarily to would-be pianists. 
It may seem that I have been unduly critical of Barnett's ambitious 
work. However,, many of the themes he touches on will reappear in the course of 
this study and it is very much to his credit that his analyses raise so many 
recurring issues. He is above all accurate in his overall diagnosis of a crisis in 
contemporary performance practice. For all his ingenuity, however, a deeper 
appreciation of the nature of this crisis eludes him. 
Two Metaphors - an Interlude 
How can we best describe a complex network of relationships? Barnett's 
study addresses the individual performer in a quasi-pedagogical context. It is a 
book about how performers (should) perform works. His theory tells us almost 
nothing about audiences and the concert experience itself In other words, it 
largely ignores a substantial segment of the performance experience: music"s 
reception in the concert situation is viewed as neutral. 
As a way forward, I suggest we distinguish between two broad 
approaches to performance theory, which I will label 'integrative' and 
'di\, ersiýying'. The integrative approach can be thought of as follows: 
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performance is a position in a closed system containing a limited number of 
other positions (such as interpretation, or ritual). which are in a state of balance. 
Any shift in emphasis or change in intensity in one or another element forces 
the system to rebalance itself internally. This steady state might alternati", -Cly 
take the form of a regular oscillation between positions. Freud's theory of mind 
is such a closed system, based on a 'hydraulic' metaphor of pressures, breaches 
and containers, or layers; Barnett's, by implication, is too. The final extension 
of this metaphor in theory would be the First Law of Thermodynamics (you 
cannot add or subtract from the total sum of energy the universe contains. only 
change states). As a metaphor it invites us to think in terms of closed systems 
and closure tout court. 
The alternative metaphor - of diversification - sees performance as a 
potentially more or less complex activity, where the links to other positions can 
increase numerically, as well as in intensity. The underlying metaphor here is of 
an ecology (of a biological or environmental system), in which barriers (spatial, 
chemical) can both be breached and newly created, where the stability of the 
system depends on interactions which fluctuate in their complexity. This is a 
metaphor of proliferation (or possibly extinction too). For example, Steiner's 
ontology of art proposes that great works are, exegetically speaking, 
(ecological': the relationships they contain are potentially infinitely various. 
However, the work itself is a bounded object and as such potentially the 
member of an integrated, closed system. (A canon might be thought of in this 
way. ) On the other hand, Popperian scientific theory might be viewed as 
integrative: a (provisional) attempt to stabilise meanings and reduce ambiguity. 
Parodying Steiner, we might define theory as the minimalisation of semantic 
ambiguity in respect of the formal means of expression. Relativism can in turn 
be seen as the consequence of the inadequacy of each metaphor taken alone: in 
integrated systems all values are absolute, whereas an diversifying, expanding 
ecology proposes that all values are relative. A further dimension of this 
metaphorical contrast inight be between state-orientated and process-orientated 
44 lbid, p. 221 and p. 22121 respectively. 
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analysis, and it is such terms that I will later analYse the concepts of 
performance and interpretation. 
The immediate post-war period - what Eric Hobsba,,. ý-m calls the 
'Golden Age' (1947-73 )45 - was marked by cultural stability. and in some 
respects particularly amenable to description as an integrated. closed system. 
Barnett and John Lazarus, whose work I will consider next, are united in their 
vision of musical life gone stale, in need of re-evaluation. " They combine 
description of a conservative system with premonitions of radical change. They 
both wish to rethink the performer's role. The conclusions they come to are 
oddly different. 
Review: (2) Rethinking the Concert 
John Lazarus's PhD thesis entitled 'Rethinking the Concert: a Fresh 
Approach to the Solo Instrumental Recital' (1978) starts from a conviction that 
'the concert-going experience, by contrast with the part it once played in a 
creative musical experience, is largely unsatisfactory, and has to some extent 
been replaced by mass diffusion through mechanical means. ' 47 Of the three 
assumptions made here, it is the central issue of the concert-going experience 
which deserves immediate attention in this context. The innocent desire to 
diagnose a commonly felt ill which Lazarus shares with Barnett leads in quite 
different directions because Lazarus and Barnett attend to - and neglect - 
different nodes of the performance complex. This is immediately obvious from 
Lazarus's title. Where Barnett's humanist emphasis is on the attainment of self- 
knowledge and the expression of individuality, Lazarus looks beyond the 
individual to music's place in society. 
His argument in summary is this. Contemporary concert life (in the 
1970s) lacked intensity. Audiences were passive and uninvolved. The reasons 
were to be located in the social structure of concert life, in particular its nature 
4S Eric Hobsbawrn, . 4ge of 
Extremes: The Short Twentieth Centutj, 1914-1991 (London: 
Abacus, 1994), p. 8. 
4' Barnett, Thc Petformance ofilfusic, p. 2. 
" Lazarus, 'Rethinking the Concert', p. (I). introduction. 
as ritual. Therefore the roles of performer and listener needed rethinking. He 
proposes that we think of the performer as a 'leader' and goes on to compare the 
role of the performer in a variety of musical worlds - rock, pop, jazz, blues. 
folk,, entertainment - and concludes that the folk music culture is a suitable role 
model for art music practice, because it evinces the best (by which he means the 
most harmonious, most interactive) community values. He describes this 
relationship as 'circular', as opposed to the 'triangular' relationship of the art 
music concert. The three points of the triangle are composer, performer and 
listener. Circularity signifies for Lazarus what we might call a 'feedback loop' 
and signals heightened audience engagement and more successful 'leadership' 
on the part of the performer. In other words, for Lazarus process (as opposed to 
stasis) becomes a social ideal. The audience and the performer are members of a 
community and musical performance is, at its best, a quasi -religious, devotional 
experience, which takes the individual beyond mere self-awareness. 
The study aspires on one level to the status of social science - it includes 
a substantial questionnaire and qualitative assessment of its results" - and it 
does not shrink from making recommendations, which I will quote at some 
length: 
It is worth recording the simple devices which could be the 
guidelines for performers wishing to operate step by step 
with practical innovations, for while these are, on their 
own, by no means radical, together they forge a new 
approach to the concert. We summarise here the details of 
the suggestions made: to talk to the audience; to engage in 
(weekend) courses in which discussion and performance 
alternates; to adopt a more practical clothing on the 
platform, or clothing that feels 'right' for the music played; 
to insist on community-oriented seating so the audience is 
aware of itself, to by-pass the platform; to reject the 
microphone systems; to gather a scattered audience at the 
front; to play requests; to improvise; to surprise with 
changes of programme and to juxtapose unlikely works; to 
encourage the audience to ask questions and to make 
41) comments... 
These are suggestive, rather than conclusive, a matter of some embarrassment to the author. I 
33 
Perhaps Lazarus deserves congratulation for his foresight here: many of these 
ideas have in fact been adopted in the last two decades and the motive has 
indeed been to break down barriers between audience and performer. (He is 
wrong about the use of mediating technology. however, which has been 
embraced rather than rejected. ) But these recommendations emerge from a 
number of misconceptions, the most fundamental of which is concealed in the 
contrast between triangularity (=bad) and circularity (=good). ý' The majority of 
Lazarus's recommendations are at the expense of the composer and the Nvork 
and his theorising rather skates over its central importance. Of course the work, 
particularly the nineteenth-century conception of the autonomous abstract 
instrumental piece, occupies a central position in conventional concert life. It is, 
in a concrete sense, its raison d'&re. Art music performers are akin to curators 
in what has been called 'the imaginary museum of musical works'. 5' The rituals 
of concert life exist partly to neutralise the intrusions of context. They are a way 
of policing the museum. Tinkering with the barriers (let alone breaking them 
down completely) obviously threatens the work and its autonomy. Here Lazarus 
confronts a paradox: no matter how well the performer plays (=leads) she 
cannot control audience response, or at least become aware of doing so, because 
the audience has almost no performance options itself, and can only acquire 
them at the risk of obliterating the music (in the form of the work). Lazarus's 
more radical recommendations ('play requests', 'make comments') strike a note 
of absurdity because they fail to acknowledge the central role of the work 
concept in concert life. 
I would identify a second weakness in this study, this time 
methodological: it is a failure to define key terms closely enough for them to be 
of assistance in analysis. A comparative approach, with reference to social and 
historical elements, founders because key concepts simply emerge unreflected 
upon into the text. Too often, Lazarus adopts a simplistic dialectical approach 
listing advantages and disadvantages, without really clarifying what is being 
Lazarus, 'Rethinking the Concert', p. 214-5. It) '0 His ideas about the relative roles of performer and listener and the communication model the,, r 
entail are also open to attack. 
5' Lý dia Goehr, The linaginat-y 11usewn qf Alusical WOrks: an Essay in the Philosop4v (? I'Music 
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evaluated. " So when he claims (prescriptively) that 'a true ritual should be an 
embodiment of community', " we search in vain for clarification of what 
community is, beyond a woolly sense of simultaneous presence engendered by 
concert attendance, and the words resonate emptily. What is missing is a 
concept of the practice. While there is nothing to suggest a role-based analysis 
of the concert is doomed, the concept of leadership is as needy of definition as 
the other terms used here. Ritual, too, is under-defined, in spite of lengthy 
commentary, and much is made of the concert's origins in church traditions. 5' I 
sense an underlying desire on the author's part to simplify, harmonise and 
intensify the concert experience, to overcome listener-alienation under the 
auspices of a (God-inspired? ) leader-performer. To argue that 'the problem 
which bedevils all involved in a concert is to maintain that balance between 
composer and performer' is potentially fruitful; but to continue that this 'at one 
time, was no problem at all' is no more than the wishful thinking of a 
creationist: it underlines a subtext of quasi-religious loss and a need for 
salvation. " And as I think Lazarus is aware, all this contrasts strangely with the 
increasingly distant, ironic appreciation of performance in the last quarter of the 
century. 
Rethinking the concert entails rethinking its key concepts and defining 
them more closely. What exactly is performance, where does it fit, and into 
what? Lazarus sees his task as 'building a picture of the concert', while at the 
same time being aware of the open-endedness of a contextualising study. " So 
admittedly any answers will be provisional. But there is much to take issue 
with, both in the approach - with its lax, easy-going dialectic - and in some of 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992) deals with the origin and proliferation of the work concept. 
52 Lazarus, 'Rethinking the Concert'. Ritual is for example 'creative' and 'destructive' (p. 91); I 
the chapter on recording contrasts the listener's loss with the listener's gain (p. 122-129); and :Dt: ý 
there is the model of the good circle versus the bad triangle I have already mentioned. 
Lazarus, 'Rethinking the Concert', p. 94. Z: I 54 lbid, chapter 4, p. 77-106. This linking of concert life to religious ritual has an oddly 
prescriptive feel. The connection one might expect to figure most strongly - between music and C) 
'Kunstreligion' - is only touched upon in passing, 
ý' lbid, p. 95. My emphasis. 
5' lbid, p. 1-2: 'Factors removed from actual performance have helped shape the perfon-ner's 
role: the economics of performance, the range of people to xvhom performance was accessible, 
and who involved themselves in it, the need of audiences for special excellence. The list gets I 
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the central assumptions. The problem in analysing performance is certainly tied 
to an increasing complexity: Lazarus's comments in his introduction make this 
clear. The idealistic invocation of a past utopia does not do it justice. 
Definitions and Identities 
I believe Lazarus's analysis founders not because of a lack of ambition, 
or of speculative imagination, but initially through imprecision. There are two 
issues here: the first is the matter of definitions, the second that of style. 
Consider the former in relation to Edward Said's cultural criticism. The 
central argument of his influential book Orientalism is that the West's power 
over the Orient functioned through an act of imposition, where the West defined 
and represented to Orientals what they were and then, in self-fulfilling 
prophecy, took this as their alibi in exercising power over them .5' The act of 
defining is fundamental, then, because it identifies an essence, which 
underwrites an attitude, which in turn upholds power relations. Said is 
describing a tight, unbreakable hermeneutic circle. Essence, in this incarnation, 
is an invisible,, intangible quality, not amenable to further analysis, conveniently 
to hand for those in power who require justification for oppressive behaviour. 
This argument can operate on many levels - political, racial, linguistic, aesthetic 
- and in Said"s exemplary formulations, the tie to a counter-notion of 
performance is crucial. Performance is invoked as a way of avoiding closure, of 
avoiding the kind of circular argument outlined above, which fixes or 'reifies' 
meaning into (habitual) interpretations which support a status quo. Here, in 
Said's preface to Richard Poirier's The Performing Self, is his argument in his 
own words, applied to literature: 
Everything about Poirier's work... conclusively illustrates 
how inadequate a basis for politics, aesthetics and 
philosophy is the mere luxuriating in a fixed identity which 
longer as the implications of performance are grasped, and as we will see, as its ever-renewed I 
umbilical cord with the society in which it takes place is analysed. ' 
57 Edward Said, Orientalism. - Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin, first edition 
1978, revised edition 1995). 
26 
so much criticism tends to become. To be, to remain in the 
position of a professionalised know-everything critic, for 
example, is only to lose touch with what you don't know 
[ 
... 
]. The point isn't to be one thing... but to understand the 
pleasures and accomplishments of what one isn't. 
Literature is a 'field of energy', not a magistrate's court or 
a closely guarded fiefdom. Poirier's attack on identity 
politics is really an indictment of what people do not 
experience if, instead of looking at linguistic performance, 
they take language at face value; if they seriously believe 
that words and objects are in stable contact with each 
other; if their own professional expressions of piety and 
awe, of groups or ethnic particularity, come instead to 
stand for real piety and real awe, real identity, real 
particularity, which in fact have to be forged and reforged 
constantly. 5, R 
Here we glimpse for the first time how a notion of performativity can be 
used to stake out a world view. Actions speak louder than words, certainly, but 
Said is pointing beyond this to the evanescence of word and deed, and hence to 
the impossibility of more than provisional identity. " Reforging, reshaping, 
reliving: all this points to the importance of historical change at the expense of 
the analytical act, which must nonetheless receive its due. For as Peter Novick 
says, Said 'seemed to be trying to have it both ways by denying the existence of 
a "real" Orient, and savaging Orientalists for misrepresenting it. "' In other 
words, the act of definition must occur somewhere,, even if not explicitly; or at 
least a text must entail definitions which avoid ambiguity, or the result may be 
self-contradiction. 61 
" Richard Poirier, The Performing Se4f- Compositions and Decompositions in the Languages of 
Contemporary Life, foreword by Edward Said (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, second 
edition 1992), p. xii. 
'9 Incidentally, the sense in which Poirier's selves 'perform' is a rather different one from that 
which occupies me here. His is a literary performance in which the word, already a reification 
of meaning, can nonetheless function processually. So it is through energy (p. xxiii) and the 
excesses of parody (essay 2) and above all the idea that 'the first artwork for an artist is the 
shaping of his own personality' (Norman Mailer, quoted on p. 102) that the literary performance 
takes shape. References here are from Poirier, The Performing Seýf 
60 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical 
Prqfession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 563. 
I take up this problem again in chapter three in my discussion of performance. Poirier and t 
Said's literary conceptions of performance operate within a reifyincy s%, stem - natural Ian-ua, ), e , I: ) ý 1: 1 C) 
while claiming nonetheless to be resolutely devoted to processual change. The question is: 1: 1 It) how far is this a problem when the conception is transferred on to musical performance" 
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The paradox this critique hides is visible again v, -hen viewed in 
epistemological terms. Is relativism inevitable? A definition claims to identifý- 
similarities between events (objects, processes, performances, segments of 
reality ... ) and words already contain within them this Platonic sense of a general 
category. One might say that a word is a kind of micro-definition in itself, or 
even a kind of micro-theory. But definitions - and with them. objective 
knowledge - become impossible, if we allow that the most significant thing 
about the past is the fact that it can never re-enact itself" Anyone who claims 
this is imposing a definition, or rather an anti-definition, a radical scepticism. 
Richard J. Evans comments: 
If all knowledge is relative, if it is impossible to give an 
accurate summary of a discourse without at the same time 
projecting one's own reading onto it, then why should we 
not give to the work of Barthes, or Derrida, or Jenkins, or 
Ankersmit,, or White any significance that we wish to give 
it? [ ... ] In practice, even the most extreme deconstructionists do not really accept that their own 
theories can be applied to their own work. " 
As meaning is deferred, commonalities are not merely lost: new ones are 
potentially created. The time scale within which the change or 'slippage' of 
meaning operates is critical, too. Language retains enough stability to reflect on 
its own process of meaning shift. In other words, the debate about whether 
meaning is an essence or construction cannot in this context at least be resolved. 
What the academic faces is that the act of definition is an inescapable fact, 
carried out (hopefully) in the full awareness that this act is performative and, as 
such, a provisional construction. " 
As already implied, definitions need not be explicit. This raises the 
question of style, and with it genre and discipline. In one respect, the framework 
I have chosen for this study is familiar from works like Critical Terms, for 
LiterarY Stittly, whose editors asked a range of eminent theorists to 'do theory. 
62 Richard J. Evans, In Defence of Histor. 1, (London: Granta, 1997), p. 112. 
63 Evans, In Defence qf Histotý7 3 , p. 2'1. 
Of further interest here is Taruskin's discussion of scholarship and artistry in relation to 
performance, in Text andAct, p. -I 1 -33 1. 
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by considering a term prevalent in literary discourse, examining its history'. " 
The result is an analysis of a cluster of related terms which. hardly surprisingly. 
given the number of authors, fail to harmonise. (In consequence. it does not 
really matter what order you read them in. ) One is immediately struck by the 
range of tone. Contrast the high serious academicism of Judith Butler on 
'Desire', the relaxed review-journalese of Louis Menand ('Diversity'). or the 
analytical thrust of Barbara Herrnstein Smith (Nal ue/Evaluation'), for example. 
It is instructive to compare the latter pair in the act of definition: Menand adopts 
a tone of flat colloquialism, whereas Herrnstein Smith pursues a highly 
organised dissection of the OED's definitions of 'value' and *worth'. " Menand 
is concerned to link the 'fact' of diversity to a paradox about American culture, 
what he perceives as its 'uniform diversity', the inherent conformism of a 
certain kind of individualism. In other words, his analysis is geographically and 
temporally localised, and to that extent, specific and relative. It makes a 
provisional, particular point. Herrnstein Smith attempts to unpick a more 
problematic term by examining entailment and metaphor - looking as it were 
inwards, rather than outwards - and specifying senses of the word. " To this 
extent she aligns herself stylistically and methodologically with analytical 
philosophy. 
The differences in style I locate here reinforce the distinction I made 
above between 'steady-state' integrative theorising, and a processual, 
diversifying approach. The difference - ultimately one of emphasis - lies with 
the attitude towards semantic stability. With this in mind, let me now turn to an 
analytical philosopher's approach to the question of performance, to see what 
kind of definition it yields. 
Critical Termsfor Literary Study, eds. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago: II 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 3. Simon Frith, in Performing Rites. - On the Value 
Polmlar Alusic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) attempts something alone, similar lines. It) 1b 16 Lentricchia and McLaughlin, Critical Terms for Literary Study. Menand comments that 
... Diversity" is a term with no essential philosophical, political or aesthetic content. It simplý 
states a fact... ' (p -31 
316). 
6' Lentricchia and McLaughlin, Critical Terinsfor Literary Study, p. 18 1. 
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A Philosophical Parenthesis: Godlovitch's Performance Model 
Stan Godlovitch's recent study entitled Musical Performance. - A 
Philosophical Study is the product of a discipline - philosophical aesthetics - 
which has flourished in the English-speaking world (particularly America). 68 
Those working in this field have usually trained as analytical philosophers. 
They aim to lay down definitions by specifying necessary and sufficient 
conditions and testing these by looking for gaps in logic and, above all, by 
speculating about borderline instances. They also try to map new areas of 
experience by proposing new distinctions and terminology. In this endeavour, 
intuition plays a significant role. The speculation often takes the form of 
'thought experiments' which propose unusual conditions and analyse their 
outcomes. These 'what-if scenarios have a distinguished record in areas where 
actual experimentation is severely handicapped. These, then, are Godlovitch's 
tools and they are employed with some skill in the first fifty pages of his study, 
which considers in turn the constituents of performance - 'sounds, agents, 
works and listeners' - commenting on such important sub-aspects as intention, 
skill, constraints, continuity, interpretation, ritual, and audience attention, 
making many illuminating distinctions in the process. The definition (or, rather, 
model) he finally arrives at 'traces out a series of conditions necessary for 
successful performance' though he remains, he says 'uncommitted to their joint 
sufficiency': 
PI is a model performance only if PI is (or involves): 
-a datable sound sequence (that is, sonic event), 
- immediately caused by some human (-like) being, 
- the immediate output of some musical instrument, 
- intended to be caused at a specific time and place, and in 
a specified manner, 
- the exercise of skilled activity, 
- the outcome of appropriately creditworthy physical skill, 
- an instance of some identifiable musical work, 
- intended as an instance of such a work, 
Stan Godlovitch, Musical Performance. - A Philosophical Studi, (London: Routledge, 1998). 
Incidentally Godlovitch, like the aestlietician Stephen Davies, whose work I will refer to 
elsewhere, is from New Zealand. 
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- successful as a constraint model of such a work, 
- intended for some third-party listener. 
- presented before some third-party listener, 
- listened to by some third-party listener exercising active 
concentrated attention. " 
As is immediately obvious, this model is intended for the traditional 
concert situation and as such is very much the kind of analysis a lawyer might 
produce of a concept. It makes no claim to a wider application by trying to draxN, 
parallels with performance in other areas of culture, nor does it seriously 
consider the history of relevant institutions. What it does do - with considerable 
deftness - is to spray a kind of fixative onto the event we are familiar N\-ith and 
draw out its structure. 
Consider once more for a moment Herrnstein Smith's approach. It might 
seem unduly naive: why stoke the analytical engine with materials from a 
dictionary? After all, lexicographers only try pragmatically to exemplify typical 
past and present usage. In the case of value/worth, her aim is to make us aware 
of the circularity of some acts of definition and the danger., on arriving back at 
the point of entry to claim (or imply) that something just 'is'. (Said pointed to 
precisely this danger, too. ) I turn now to another example to pursue the 
argument further. Peter Kivy, in his analysis of the concept of authenticity, 
makes the point that philosophy is often a process of renewing the past, because 
the major questions all have a history of answers. His claim that (musical) 
authenticity is an exception to this is, I believe, false in a way which throws 
light on the limitations of Godlovitch's essay: firstly, the philosophical literature 
on the subject, understood broadly, is vast (including distinguished 
contributions from Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Adorno, among others); the fact 
that it is not 'philosophical' in Kivy's sense simply indicates a problem of 
relevance, or narrowness of focus. Secondly, the mere fact of a word's existence 
in a dictionary is enough to guarantee it a philosophical history of sorts - though 
not perhaps a recorded one - and Kivy's analysis, like Herrnstein Smith's. 
begins with a bald quotation from a dictionary from which he proceeds to 
" Godlovitch, Musical Performance, p. 49. 
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construct a detailed, highly suggestive and original analysis. " Godlovitch would 
have us believe that his model is built up from point zero, even dispensing with 
the aid of a dictionary entry. " But both he and Kivy share in their analytical 
stance an obliviousness to history" or to work in other disciplines. If the search 
for a final authority in an analysis does not rest on precedent (from the historv 
of a relevant discourse), inevitably it is sought elsewhere. Godlovitch looks 
inwards, while acknowledging obliquely the normative aspect of language: 
In trying to expose the intuitive roots in each condition, I 
have at times stretched or departed from intuition by 
attributing to certain conditions a more integral role in 
performance than colloquy [i. e. accepted usage] demands. " 
Within psychology the danger of reliance on intuition and introspection have 
long been recognised. " In intellectual terms, the former may amount to no more 
than accumulated unexamined prejudice. 
The conclusion I would draw from this is that however sharp the 
analytical tools employed are, there is no way in which an examination of a 
concept (expressed in language) can operate outside a hermeneutic circle. Both 
the history of a concept and its logical deployment have a part to play in 
refining our understanding of it. Different disciplines choose different 
emphases, with the analytical philosopher inclined to disregard historical 
factors. 
In the light of this, let us assume that there is something to be gained by 
widening the focus, in a bid to outmanoeuvre ingrained habits of thought. 
" Peter Kivy, Authenticities. - Philosophical Reflections on Musical Performance (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995). His claim about the history of musical authenticity is in the 
preface, p. xii. The dictionary definition he uses as a starting point for analysis (p. 3)) Is taken 
from the Oxford English dictionary. 
" Godlovitch, Musical Performance, p. 13, 'Constituents of Performance'. 
72 This is something Max Paddison draws attention to in his review of Kivy: Authenticities in 
British Journal of Aesthetics, 36 (1996), 330-3 )32: 'What this book does, quite remarkably, is to 
bring us to the limits of its own particular style of writing aesthetics, leaving us both impressed 
bv its thoroughness within its own terms of reference and at the same time bothered b\ its 
e\, ident lack of a theory that can give a satisfying account of the frequently evoked notion of 
context" - social, cultural or historical. ' (p. 332) 
7, Godlovitch, Musical Performance, p. 49. 
G. Butler and F. McManus, Psychology: A 1'ery Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
Unk, ersity Press, 1998), p. 4. 
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Another way of doing so might be to ask a question Godlovitch's methodology 
tends to conceal: why should an analytical philosopher have produced a study of 
musical performance now? What makes this a timely concern? 
Review: (3) The Concert 
The recent upsurge of interest in performance certainly needs accounting 
for, as in its turn does the emergence of performance art as a genre in the 1960s. 
Previous writing on performance was often anecdotal and impressionistically 
descriptive. " Given the current emphasis on theory, we might fruitfully ask why 
performance was not central to previous theorising about music, and what stood 
in its place. 
Over most of the last century, and certainly until quite recently, the 
academic study of music has tended to be identified with the history of musical 
works. Prominent and influential figures in (particularly German) musicology, 
such as the critical theorist Theodor Adorno and Carl Dahlhaus elaborated 
work-centred theories. In doing so, they were building on a long tradition of 
like-minded thought; unfortunately, performers and performance tended to be 
marginalised. 76 The institution of the concert was the stable locus operandi; as 
" There is an extensive field of social music history which deals with performance, along with 
performance criticism. Here are some suggested points of departure: Readin in the History of ZD gs 
Music in Performance, ed. Carol MaClintock (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979) 
for a selection of source texts; Frederick Dorian, The History of Music in Performance: the Art 
qf Musical Interpretation ftom the Renaissance to Our Day (New York: Norton, 1942), which 
maps the emergence and development of 'perfon-native' interpretation up to the generation of 
Hindemith and Stravinsky; and Arthur Loesser, Men Women and Pianos: a Social History 
(London: Gollancz, 1955), devoted specifically to the piano. A useful work in the more 
scholarly field of notation and its interpretation by performers is Clive Brown, Classical and 
Romanlic Performing Practice, 1750-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
76 One commentator puts it like this: 'Music history was until now understood primarily as the 
history of works, styles and composers. Its extension to embrace the history of sounds through 
investigating "performance practice" is a more recent, praiseworthy achievement. For music I history is also the history of listening, the history of the [listening] public. ' ['Musikgechichte 
wurde bisher vomehmlich als Werkgechichte, Stilgechichte, Komponistengechichte verstanden. Z: ) 
Die Erweiterung zur Klanggechichte durch die Untersuchungen zur 'Aufführungspraxis' ist 
eine neuere, rbhmliche Errun-enschaft. Doch Musikcrechichte ist auch Gechichte des H6rens, 11) 11-: 1 
Gechichte des Publikurns. '] Hans-Werner Heister, Das Konzert: Theorie einer Kulturform in 
two volumes (Wilhemshaven: Heinrichshofen, 1983), p. 30 (my translation). Heister quotes here 
frorn Kurt Blaukopf, 'Werktreue und Bearbeitung. Zur Soziologle der Integritat des Z: ) b It) 
musikalischen Kunstwerks', Schriftenreihe 'Musik und Geselischaft' 111, Herausaeber Kurt 11: 1 
Blaukopf, (Karlsruhe, 1968), p. 350. See also Carl Dahlhaus, Foundations of 11usic Histoty, 
3-) 
the electronic age brought about changes in music reception, Adorno was above 
all concerned with defending the hegemonic position of the work within a 
complex network of relationships - composer, listener, performer and setting at 
the levels of production and consumption - and Dahlhaus in turn problematised 
the writing of history per se and the particular problems of historiography when 
applied to music. " Tied to this project was his theorising of the autonomy of 
music - emerging out of the nineteenth-century idea of 'absolute music' - and 
the central role that Werktreue ('fidelity to the work') had come to play in this. " 
Dahlhaus traced the emergence of work autonomy from the late eighteenth 
century to the post war age and it was one of his pupils - Hans-Werner Heister - 
who undertook a more detailed exposition of the concert (in the 1970s, at the 
same time as Barnett and Lazarus). All three were motivated by a similar sense 
of crisis. Heister reports: 
Only with the 'crisis' of the concert, now clearly in 
opposition to the new [technischen] media, does the 
category begin to lose its self-evident nature, to break 
down. This, in line with a more general move towards 
increased 'metatheoretical' reflection on the significance of 
musicological terminology, leads to more intensive 
consideration of the concept of the 'concert'. 
[Erst mit der 'Krise' des Konzerts, dem in Gestalt der 
technischen Medien evident andere Formen 
gegenübertreten, beginnt die Selbstverständlichkeit der 
Kategorie zu zergehen. Dies, wie überhaupt eine verstärkte 
4metatheoretiche' Reflexion der musikwissenschaftlichen 
Terminologie, führt zu intensiven Bemühungen auch um 
den Begriff des 'Konzerts'. ]` 
This shift from text to context, from work to setting, notably retains its concern 
with objects and events - with structures - rather than with individuals and 
trans. J. B. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) for a detailed exposition 
of this issue. The seminal secondary text on Adorno's aesthetics of music is Max Paddison. 
A dot-no 's .4 esthetics of 
Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993 )). It) It) Paddison, Adorno's Aesthetics of Music, chapter five, and Dahlhaus, Foundations of W11sic 
Histon -. 
78 Carl Dahlhaus, The Idea qf. Absolute Music, trans. Roger Lustig (Chicago: University of 
Chicap Press, 1989). 
7' Heister, Das Konzert. vol. 1, p. 27, (mý translation). 
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narratives. It stays away from subjectivity and particularity. In this sense it is 
only logical to study the concert, rather than the performer. 
Heister inherited a Hegel ian/Marx i st methodological apparatus - the 
dialectic, with its tensed binary oppositions and 'sublations' ('Authebungen') - 
along with the remnants of the tradition and vocabulary of idealism. This is 
something he is well aware of. 'O For all its abstraction, Heister's prose largely 
avoids the occasional obfuscations of Adorno, and his study is a carefully 
organised structure in which concepts are introduced in orderly fashion. There is 
even a suggestion of circularity in the format, which Heister highlights. " The 
most important of the binary oppositions - like them or not82 - Heister works 
with is the 'systematic' versus the 'historical', which draws on a distinction with 
deep roots in German musicology (as well as paralleling Saussure's distinction 
between the synchronic and the diachronic respectively"). Das Systematische is 
my plea for clarity of definition writ large. Heister's study as a whole is divided 
into four large sections, each of which sets up a dialectic, the point of which he 
summarises as follows: 
The real,, essential logic - historical and structural - of the 
concert itself and its development is in the end the 
foregrounding and maintenance of a balancing act 
[Schwebezustand] which (following Adorno) could be 
called 'suspension' [Einstand]: the ideal of balance 
between a paradoxically unified integration of the visual 
and the (dominant) audible as behavioural modes... 
[Die historisch wie strukturell eigentliche und wesentliche 
Logik des Konzerts selbst und seiner Entwicklung ist 
schliesslich die Herausarbeitung und Bewährung eines 
Schwebezustands, der (mit einem Begriff Adornos) 
'Einstand' heissen kann: das Balance-Ideal einer 
'0 Heister, Das Konzert, vol. 1, p. 19-21, where he comments on the datedness of the method, 
noting wryly that his Marxist-inspired utopianism will not be to everyone's taste. 
lbid, p. 40. Section D in vol. 2 returns to reconsider some of the materials of section A. 
82 Dunsby, Taruskin and a whole raft of 'post-structuralist' thinkers who associate them with 
structuralism tend not to. It is instructive to read Taruskin's collection Text and Act with this in 
mind, as John Butt in his penetrating review has, pointing up the contradictions and paradoxes 
Taruskin's conceptual world contains: John Butt, 'Acting up a text: the scholarship of 
performance and the performance of scholarship' (review of Richard Taruskin: Text andAct), 
Ear4v Alusic (May 1996), 323-332 
"' For a simple exposition of Saussurian structuralism, see Culler, Literary Theory, p. 57-60. 
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widersprüchlich-einheitlichen Integration von Sehen und 
(dominanten) Hören als Verhaltensmodalitäten ... 1 
84 
Heister's Hegelianism does not take on board Adornian 'negatiVe 
dialectics'; it is of a more traditional nature. " The concert emerges as the 
product of a series of elaborate checks and balances that serve to create stabilit\,. 
There are four sections in his study. The first concerns itself with the concept of 
autonomy and its concrete realisation in the concert. The second deals with the 
conflicts that have arisen historically in creating and upholding the institution of 
the concert as a site of universally valid values; the third looks at individual 
freedoms and dependencies (economic, artistic) and examines the commodity 
character of music. " The final section examines the concert ritual at a more 
detailed level and includes discussion of the work concept. 
I cannot hope to do justice to all aspects of this compendious work here, 
nor would it be entirely appropriate: its focus is, as I have intimated, an 
objectified notion of the concert and Heister's ambition is to situate the concert 
in a concrete utopian moment in society. (The paradox this description contains 
is indicative of the method. ) This takes him into detailed analyses of social 
relations, an area which lies beyond the scope of this study. It is a moot point 
whether the concert really is adequately captured in Heister's notion of an 
abstract category where the concrete and the ideal meet. 
Heister's analysis, like Barnett's, assumes work-centredness. Theorising 
the concert as the receptacle of a musical work in a sense prejudges the issue. 
Let me quote Said again at this point: 
... the 
Hegelian tradition... presumes an inescapable 
historical teleology that incorporates everything in its 
relentless forward path. This I find unacceptable [ ... ]I shall 
briefly suggest an alternative based on a geographical or 
" Heister, Das Konzert, vol. 1, p. 22. 
85 The contrast between Heister and Lazarus is very noticeable, the one methodological 
ly 
solicitous, the other over-relaxed. For a discussion in Heister of the leadership thesis/metaphor, 
see 
DasK017--01, vol. 1, section C 6.3. 
16 About which Heister has subsequently written: 'Music in concert and music 
in tile 
background: two poles of musical realisation% in Companion to Contemporat-v Musical 
Thought, vol. 1, eds. John Paynter. Tim Howell, Richard Orton and Peter Seý 111our 
(London: 
Routledge, 1992) p. 46-7 1. 
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spatial idea that is truer to the diversity and spread of 
human activity. Even if we confine oursel,,,, es to 'Western' 
classical music, what is impressive about musical practice 
in all its variety is that it takes place in many different 
places, for different purposes, for different constituencies 
and practitioners, and of course at many different times. To 
assemble all that, to herd it under one dialectical model is - 
no matter how compelling or dramatic the formulation - 
simply an untrue and therefore insufficient account of N,, -hat 
happens. " 
Although these practices diverge strongly, Said would, I think, argue that his 
concept of perfbrmance can be employed across the cultural divides, 
transcendentally. What unites the diversity of practices is the fact that they all 
contain performances. In other words, we may conclude that a performance does 
not necessarily require a concert, though the reverse might be true. 
Review: (4) Musicking 
What I hope is emerging is a sense of the valency of the word 
performance. Just as an atom bonds according to the number of open positions it 
carries, so performance governs, and is governed by, a range of pre/post- 
positional options: performance of, for, by, at, in. Ultimately it is impossible to 
evade the claims of any one of these positions, though some theorists go to 
considerable lengths to deny one or another. The results can be instructive and 
salutary. 
Take the case of Christopher Small and his recent (published in 1998) 
book entitled Musicking. - the Meanings of Performance and Listening, a 
sustained attempt to elide the issue of what is performed, by emphasising the 
88 
setting, the audience and the performer. At the heart of this enquiry lies this 
question: does the performance produce the self or the self the performer? " 
" Edward Said, Musical Elaborations (London: Chatto and Windus, 1991), p. xiv-xv. In this 
passage Said is discussin--- his intellectual indebtedness to Adorno. 
88 Christopher Small, Musicking. - the Meanings of Perfortning and Listening (New Hampshire: 
Weslevan Universty Press, 1998). 
81) The problem of the nature and constitution of the self can be viewed as ý et another 
perspective oil the 'essence' vs. 'construction' debate already mentioned. Resolutions are 
Small presumes to have found an answer. For him, 'performance does not cxi. w 
in order to present musical works, but rather, musical works exist in order to 
give performers something to peýform. "' 
What this commentary does is to subordinate the issue of the content of 
a performance to the putative needs of a human being. But this simply prejudges 
a live issue. In order to smooth the path of his polemic, Small makes what he 
takes to be a bold move: he coins the intransitive verb 'to musick'. This is by no 
means the first time this verb has been invented. David Elliot has recently done 
the same thing for broadly the same reasons. " In any case, it exists in German 
as 4musizieren', a fact Small seems unaware of, but which he might take heart 
in. He defines it as follows: 
To musick is to take part, in any capacity, in a musical 
performance, whether by performing by listening by 
rehearsing or practising, by providing material for 
performance (what is called composing), or by dancing. " 
Some composers might raise an eyebrow at the arch pedantry of this gloss on 
their activity especially when Small later claims that the verb 'to musick, is 
merely descriptive and unconcerned with value judgements. " It is, Small adds, 
(not enough to ask, What is the nature or meaning of this work of music? ' 
because 'if there is no fixed and stable musical work, as is true of many 
cultures, then the question cannot even be asked. ' Instead, Small proposes we 
anything but easy to come by. Consider, for example, the highly influential work of the 
sociologist Erving Goffman. In The Presentation of Se4f in Everyday Life (USA: Anchor Books, 
1959; second edition Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969) he arrives at the conclusion that the self 
is the sum of what a person does: 'A correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to 
impute a self to the performed character, but this imputation - this self - is a product of a scene 
that comes off, and not a cause of it. ' (p. 244-5) Notice the regulative role of content in this 
definition: the self is produced by correctly staged and performed scenes. Who, we might ask, 
decides on a scene's correctness? And how? And further to this, is every-thing a 'self' does a 
performance? I will take up this theme (and Goffman's work on it) in chapter three below. 
Small, Musicking, p. 8, his italics. 
David J. Elliot, Music 211alters. - .4 
New Philosophy of Music Education (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). Elliot resolves the problem of text by reference to Richard Dawkins's 
theory of memes. See chapter four for further discussion. 
92 Small, Musicking. p. 9, his italics. 
93 Small, 11usicking, p. 9. 
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ask a more interesting question: 'What does it mean when this performance (of 
this work) takes place at this time, in this place, with these participants. ", 94 
His book is an extended answer to this question. Firstly. it assumes that 
ýeveryone is musical"' and that 'everyone's musical experience is valid'; ` that 
the primary meaning of music lies in the relationships its performance enacts (or 
in Said's vocabulary above, 'reforges, relives'); that there is a 'universal' 
language of gestures and ritual which define these relationships, embodied in 
the example of the symphony concert Small analyses, further, that the role split 
in the Western art music tradition (musician subdivides into 
composer/performer/listener) entails a repressive hierarchical relationship, and 
that these relationships are in some way encoded in the compositions 
themselves,, which exclude, for example the amateur. " In other words, when 
Small asks if there is 'something built into the nature of the works of that [i. e. 
Western concert] repertory which makes performing and listening to them under 
any circumstances go counter to the way I believe human relationships should 
be', his answer is affirmative. " 
As I have indicated, Small's book is in the first instance a polemic, an 
extended critique of the concert with a social -anthropological slant. " It imputes 
a sub-text to the ritual and this hidden agenda of oppression occasionally 
smacks of paranoia and conspiracy theory. 'O' The parallels between the 
symphony orchestra and other 'oppressive' nineteenth-century social forms are 
94 lbid, p. 10. 
,5 lbid, p. 207. 
96 lbid, p. 13. 
97 lbid, p. 73. His contentions suit group music-making rather better than solo playing. 
lbid, p. 16. 
An important inspiration is the work of the anthropologist Gregory Bateson. 
'Although the performance of the musical works is clearly at the centre of the event, 
nonetheless nothing that happens in this vast space is insignificant, not even such apparently 
trivial elements as the buying and giving up of tickets, the arrangement of the seating, the z: 1 :D tD al 
demeanour of orchestra and audience, the taking of drinks in the foyer, the purchase of a 
program booklet. All are essential features of the event and go towards giving it its character. If :D It, 
this were not so, if the events were concerned with the musical works and those alone, people 
\\ ould long since have ceased to go to concerts and would be happier to sit at home and listen to 
the works on records or radio. ' (Small, Musicking, p. 76. ) This is barely an argument at all: there 
may be any number of reasons why people attend concerts, and the suggestion that they are 
motivated by a wish to hear live performances of musical works is surelý the most plausible. 
Whv should the details necessarily be significant? Beyond that, it is an undisputed fact that 
most music is nowadays consumed outside the concert hall: people are happier to listen to 
works on records or radio (or portable stereo). 
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arguably all too obvious, as Nicholas Cook points out. "' The analYsis is. in my 
opinion, an instructive failure because it does not pursue the central concept of 
performance rigorously. What, I would ask, is musicking, or performing music, 
without a definition of music's content? And in a culture where the content of 
musicking has such a central role,, how can we accept a theorý, vvhich refuses to 
address the issue of musical quality? Small is aware of the dilemma and the 
book ends with a frank statement of the contradiction between the author's 
grudgingly avowed taste for certain works in the Western canon and his 
wholesale dismissal of the relationships they apparently embody. 102 
What else does Small leave out? There is a cluster of questions 
surrounding the musical work which require answers. How exactly do musical 
materials embody relationships? 'O' How are we to evaluate music" How, in turn, 
are we to evaluate interpretation of music(al) (works)? "' To what extent do 
extra-auditory sense impressions play a role in evaluations? And finally, where 
is the boundary between what is and what is not 'performed' in the culture, if 
we do not allow clearer definitions of the content (role, text ... )? If we allow 
roadies, cleaners and ushers into the performance, or describe recordings as 
performances, there would seem to be no end to the concept's application, 
which would entail a collapse of meaning. 105 
Small,, like Lazarus, has produced a theory of performance which is 
extreme in its resolute denial of text and embrace of context. It is nonetheless a 
theory which acknowledges a great deal of recent thought in and outside 
musicology. This is particularly apparent in its rejection of formalism - the idea 
... Nicholas Cook, Music. - A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
p. 79. 
102 Small, Musicking, p. 220-221. 
" Small says: '... if musicking is indeed a facet of the great unitary performance art we call 4! ) : =1 
ritual, and is thus an aspect of the language of biological communication that every living thing t: ) Z: 5 t) -ý I 
as a condition of survival, has to be able to understand and to use, then it must follow that all 
normally endowed human beings are born with the gift of musicking, no less than they are born tn tl 
with the gift of speaking and understanding speech. ' (Musicking, p. 207. ) Of the various 
assumptions here among the most tendentious are the following: that Nve can say precisely what 
music is; and that it is a 'langua-e' which can be communicated. Small's thinkin- here suggests 
above all the influence of John Blacking's well-known text How Musical is (London: 
Faber, 1976). 
Small goes to considerable lencrths to avoid discussing musical interpretation and analysis. It) t:: ) See Ilusicking, p. 215. 
Small, Alusicking: see p. 9 for his comments on ancillary staff and p. 77 on recording's 
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that music consists of abstracted sounds which constitute an autonomous 
structure and of the reverential attitude towards 'great works' that often 
accompanies it. And it is revealingly frank about its motives. Small tells us llow 
he has always felt uncomfortable with the concert tradition and the fussy rituals 
it imposes. The next text I propose to examine provides a populist rationale for 
them. 
Review: (5) The Concert, again 
I have been proposing that we view performance as a concept which 
operates within a system of related concepts, such as interpretation. ritual or 
occasion. If Small's negative reaction to the site of performance - the concert - 
is merely an extreme case of a generally felt unease, what exactly have he and 
others been reacting against? It may be helpful at this point to frame the 
discussion in terms of a modernist conception of performance (with the 
implication that we have by now moved beyond this into a post-modernist 
phase). 
Central to the modernist position is, as Barnett and Lazarus make clear, 
the privileging of composition over performance. This reaches an extreme point 
in mid century and is exemplified in comments by Hindemith and Stravinsky, 
which downgrade the performer from interpreter to executant. Lionel Salter 
sums this up neatly in his guide to concert etiquette: 'The greater the artist, the 
more faithful the interpretation. ' In other words,, the ideal performance would be 
at the vanishing point where the performer is only present to the listener as a 
cipher for the composition. For, Salter claims, 'it is the music written by the 
composer that is really important. "' 
Salter is writing in the immediate post-war years, addressing a young 
audience of potential music 'Liebhaber' which is unfamiliar with the ways of 
the concert hall. His book is the perfect source for those requiring an 
introduction to its rituals and the rationale behind them. Everything - as far as 
described as performances. 
"' Salter, Going to u Cmicert, (London: Phoenix House, 1950), quotations from p. 90-91. 
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humanly possible - in the performance setting is subordinated to the Work and 
the Composer who stands behind it: 'The Composer is the Real Star', as one 
sub-heading has it. "' Being a good concert-goer entails the folloNA- in (-, - 
- listening single-mindedly, undistracted by other activities (such as 
reading the programme note); 10' 
- not free-associating, or inventing narratives which the composer has 
not sanctioned; 'O' 
- hearing the structure of the music; "' 
- listening with both feeling and understanding, with the appropriate 
attitude of aesthetic contemplation;... 
- becoming active as a musician oneself, for example by joining a choir 
and singing. "' 
Being a good performer is about subordinating oneself to the composer's 
wishes, which in turn means foregrounding the musical thought as opposed to 
the acrobatic skills of virtuosity, having a clear mental image of the work and 
hence playing from memory, which will aid concentration and increase 
freedom... to mention but a few of the most salient points. '" 
Contradictory strands do however emerge. For example, 'it is natural to 
want to applaud if we have enjoyed a musical work, though it is sometimes 
difficult to know whether we are applauding the performer or the music (that is 
'0' Salter, Going to a Concert, p. 90. 
'0' 'Above all things, do not attempt to read while the music is in progress, feverishly trying to 
identify a theme here or a passage there which the writer mentions. It's as fatal as trying, to read 
a map while actually driving a car. ' There is something infinitely appealing about the metaphor 
of musical performance as ajourney. lbid, p. 66. 
'0' lbid, p. 59-60. 
''0 'For the moment just concentrate on recognising the backbone of the composition: the 
smaller bones, though fascinating, are not so essential, and they become more apparent as you 
get to know the work. ' Ibid, p. 75. 
'Knowledge without feeling produces merely a dry-as-dust pedant for whom (though he may t) zn 
not realise it) music will remain a closed book. Feeling alone... produces the person who ZD 
"doesn't know anything about music but knows what he likes". ' lbid, p. 142. 'In, 1 12 Salter says that '... singing is in the Englishman's blood'. (Ibid, p. 76. ) The beginning and end 
of this chapter make the point that singing is good because you get to know the works better IIIr: 1 than a mere listener would. Salter does not completely neglect the social aspect: 'Singing tý ltý 
to-ether is splendid training in the practice of music - and it's Orreat fun! ' (Ibid, p. 88). It) Ib lbid, p. 90-92 and p. 101-102. Salter mentions Toscanini's phenomenal memory for score 
details on p. 16. Note the 'override' rule: 'In the case of soloists... they have to get out of trouble 
[i. e. if they have a memory lapse] by themselves and conceal any breakdown bý their 
musicianship and quick thinking. ' (p. 10 1). 
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to say, the composer). ' 114 An important part of the concert experience is visual: 
'What are just disembodied sounds on the air [i. e. on the radio] suddenly come 
to life in the concert room in the most extraordinary way. " 15 Following the 
music requires constructing a narrative of a kind, as Salter's favoured metaphor 
of map-reading - and by implication, journeying - suggests. Again and again, 
he suggests that what we (see and) hear needs supplementing. What is 
performed is not just the musical work, but relationships between musicians, 
such as between conductor and orchestra, or accompanist and soloist. I quote at 
length his insights into the accompanist's role: 
The accompanist's attitude has to be a strange one: he has 
to immerse himself in what he is playing and, with another 
part of himself, to remain outside it - to immerse himself 
so that he can give full rein to his Playing and provide a 
stimulating partnership, and remain apart so that he can 
analyse the effect and judge what modifications, if any, are 
necessary actually during a performance. With all these 
responsibilities, he is also expected to put heart into his 
soloist if the latter is nervous. He may be feeling just as 
nervous himself - possibly more so - but were he to show 
it too there would be no feeling of confidence before the 
pair stepped on to the platform; and so accompanists as a 
class steel themselves never to show their qualms. "' 
The first part of this quotation surely applies equally to any soloist. In any case, 
what we begin to sense here is that performance is not the simple presentation of 
a work, not a mere serving up, but rather a dialogue. At the level of the 
individual this is between inside and outside, whereas at the social level it is 
between insiders - initiated musicians - and outsiders - listeners. In short, 
performance is an attitude to agency, not merely a property of it. 
lbid, p. 94. 
lbid, p. 10. Note how the conductor may on the other hand be praised for shutting out the 
visual element. 'There is one farnous conductor of the present day who stands before the 
orchestra with his eyes shut! ' (p. 101) Salter does not point out lloýN,, this behaviour exemplifies 
an attitude towards the music - one of spiritual uplift and quasi-religious disembodiment - and 
as Such becomes part of the performance. Taruskin, following, Lydia Goehr, would refer to this 
as an appeal to transcendentalism. See Taruskin, Text and Act, p. 17. 
116 Salter, Going to a Conccrl, p. 100. 
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The modernist position Salter's book argues for is about an impossible 
purity. It represents the opposite pole from Small. This points forward to some 
questions I will address below: are we dealing here with one tradition or two (or 
more)? Is the history of performance best captured in the metaphors of 
competition, a dialectic of weakness and strength, a cycle of emergence and 
decline? 
History or Histories? 
Let me propose a skeletal history. The concert, in the guise of the piano 
recital, has become a relatively stable, predictable site of activity. Its emergence 
in the nineteenth century is in essence a crystal Ii sation, as the work moves 
centre stage and pushes out improvisational genres (such as variations on 
operatic tunes), heterogeneous programming which mixed vocal, ensemble and 
novelty/acrobatic elements, and displays of athletic skill ('virtuosity') on the 
part of the pianist. Liszt is credited with the invention of the recital - the term 
was used by him in 1840 for a number of concerts in London - but the solo 
piano recital was not by any means central to mid nineteenth-century concert 
life. "' It was the next generation of pianists who firmed up a precedent into the 
genre we now recognise. Anton Rubenstein's 'historical recitals' and the similar 
projects of Bulow, Pauer, Busoni and many others in the 1860s and after were 
significant in this respect. At the same time the venues of drawing room, salon 
and concert hall each attracted different musical repertoires. For example, Pauer 
included an evening of 'drawing room music' in one of his historical recitals. "' 
Publishing houses also played their part in encouraging musicians to standardise 
their repertories by making available editions of accepted great composers. The 
rise of music appreciation and an aesthetic of music as a poetic, objectivised 
'language' (following Hanslick), a civic pride in measurable achievement and 
"' The ('anibriý_qe Companion to the Piano, ed. David Rowland (Cambridge: Cambridge 
details). University Press, 1998), especially chapters 4 and 7 (see followino footnotes for further 
Dorothy De Val and Cyril Ehrlich, 'Repertory and Canon', in Ro\N land, Canlbricýge 
('0117pant . 017 to the Piano, p. 117-1 ' 34, P. 129. 
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the emergence of a work-leisure distinction into which concert-going slotted all 
neatly contribute to this development. '" 
Kenneth Hamilton's version of this period is as follov, -s. Firstly. he 
notes: 
The golden era of Romantic pianism lasted roughly 100 
years, the famous musical duel between Liszt and Thalberg 
in 1837, and the death of Paderewski (the most highly paid 
concert pianist of all time) in 1941 being convenient, if 
slightly arbitrary, markers at either end. "' 
But his chapter is titled 'The Virtuoso Tradition', and he distances himself from 
the distinction commonly made (nowadays perhaps less so) between a notion of 
virtuosity as tasteless display versus performance as 'playing that somehow 
metaphysically exposes the soul of the music without drawing attention to 
technical accomplishment'. "' Instead, he emphasises collaboration and integrity 
in pianistic approaches during this period. "' Further to this, his discussion of 
'How They Played' concerns itself with general stylistic traits. 123 
In fact, Hamilton's discussion tends to hide the tensions between two 
different types of foregrounding: of the composition/composer, and tile 
performance/performer and how they intermingled. In discussing Liszt's 
performing practice, he points out that 'there can be little doubt that Liszt 
pioneered the art of faithfully interpreting masterworks at the same time as he 
was giving demonstrations of the art of Romantic exaggeration. The 
contradictions were fundamental to the man'. 12' The contradictions were, on 
Hamilton's evidence, fundamental to performing practice generally, but he 
offers little purchase on why this is so, or why 'the virtuoso tradition' emerged 
and declined when he claims it did (and the nervous qualification of 'slightlýý 
'" Rowland, Cambridge Companion to the Piano. See also Janet Ritterman, 'Piano Music and 
the Public Concert, 1800-1850', in The Cambridge Companion to Chopin, ed. Jim Samson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. I1 -31. 
120 Kenneth Hamilton, 'The Virtuoso Tradition', in Rowland, Cambricýge Companion to the 
Piano, p. -57-74, p. 
57. 
121 lbid, p. 57. 
122 lbid, p. 66. 
123 lbid, p. 69. Hamilton also discusses the interesting epistemological problem of the status of 
piano roll recordings as authentic performances. I 
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arbitrary markers' in the quotation above demonstrates his awareness of this). 
He concludes that 'the virtuoso tradition emphasised the uniqueness of the 
interpreter along with that of the composition', but Nvhat are we to make of this, 
beyond its surface affirmation? 
Dahlhaus provides us with a rather richer story. He sets up a dialectic 
structured around the concepts of 'virtuosity' and 'interpretation" ,ý and. in 
keeping with his view that the history of music is primarily and illost 
importantly the history of musical works, locates the rise and eventual demise of 
the virtuoso tradition in part in compositional practice. For him, 'the heyday of 
virtuosity began... in the early 1830s and ended in September 1847 when Liszt 
abandoned his career as a concert pianist. "" Liszt succeeded in integrating 
virtuoso elements into composition, by elaborating materials Dahlhaus 
varyingly describes as 'modernist', 'revolutionary' and 'primitive' - for 
example the falling tritonal theme of the Dante sonata - 'in an ever-changing 
array of masks and guises'. 127 That is to say, the material Liszt starts from is 
unamenable to the kind of thematic development and extension associated with 
Viennese classicism; large scale structure is built instead around virtuoso 
refiguring, together with such ancillary factors as 'excessive' harmonic effects, 
unusual dissonances, violent changes of key, and formal devices such as the 
combining of themes. 12' Not only does he distinguish between this 'skeletal' 
texture of composition and thematic argument; he links this explicitly to two 
tendencies in performance practice. The former allows arrangement (the pianist 
as composer), while the latter resists it. He comments: 
In eighteenth and early nineteenth-century concert halls, as 
in the opera, the virtuoso seemed to represent a musical 
culture that used musical texts as mere 'scenarios' for 
performances that focused more on the player or singer 
lbid, p. 73. 
Carl Dahlhaus, Nineteenth- Centuri ý Music, trans. J. B. Robinson (California: University of 
California Press, 1989), p. 134. See also Dahlhaus, Foundations of Music History, p. 135: '... a 
circumstance can be presented as a structure only to the extent that we regard it as impervious to 
historical change... ' 
12' Dah lhaus, A'ineteenth-Century A fusic, p. I'37. 
127 lbid, p. 136. 
129 3 6. lbid, p. 1 3 
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than on the work being played or sung. The text was a 
function of the performance - its substrate or vehicle - 
rather than vice versa, the performance being a function of 
a text which it attempted to interpret. 129 
The integration of virtuoso elements into compositional practice was, then, *part 
of a larger process that ultimately caused the virtuoso principle to be supplanted 
by the interpretation of works. "" Virtuosity lived on, but had been effectively 
sidelined. Dahlhaus is patently not interested in pursuing the history of 
virtuosity-as-performance-behaviour, having demonstrated its origins in cultural 
history and its absorption by compositional practice. For him, music history is 
music history, the history of musical works. "' Richard Taruskin has suggested 
that Dahlhaus fails to distinguish adequately between 'work fidelity' and 'score 
fidelity'; in fact he makes him if not directly responsible for, then at least 
complicit in, a downgrading of the performer to the level of 'corrupter', or even 
'deviant'. "' 
As Said suggested, the Hegelian dialectic imposes a metaphor of 
ýaccumulation' on to traditions and this may be inappropriate. His broad 
preference is for a perspective which privileges performative agency, rather than 
a reverence for tradition (for example in the form of canons). "' Lydia Goehr has 
pursued an approach which links these two concerns. Her well-known book on 
the 'Imaginary museum of musical works' demonstrates how a work-centred 
concept of performance regulates both our attitudes to music and the social 
behaviour that accompanies it, painting a picture of concert life that Small 
would surely sympathise with. She has taken her analysis of the practice of 
classical music further in an article entitled 'The Perfect Performance of Music 
and the Perfect Musical Performance'. ` Performance practice occupies a space 
129 lbid, p. 138. 
"' lbid, p. 1337. 
131 1 discuss this again in chapter three. 1 132 Taruskin, Tcxi andAct, p. II- 13. 
3 Said is also interested in the geographical location of practices, as rny previous quotation II 
shows. See Alusical Elaborations, introduction, p. xiv and footnote 87 above. 
134 Lydia Goehr, 'The Perfect Performance of Music and the Perfect Musical Performance', in 
'formations: 
a Journal of CulturelTheory/Politics, 27, (Winter 1995-6), volume entitled 
'Performance Matters', 1-22. 
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between these two (rather awkwardly labelled) ideal modes, a site XvIlere 
conflicting conceptions are acted out: 
We already know that they [i. e. the two conceptions of 
performance of the title] came to be expressed through a 
division between elite and popular forms of classical music 
practice, most clearly between the practice's orchestral or 
community-based symphonic tradition that nonetheless 
stressed the individualistic nature of aesthetic experience, 
and the individualist, soloistic or virtuoso tradition which 
nonetheless stressed the social nature of musical 
experience. But we also know that this division never 
became so sharp as to allow either conception ever to 
become wholly or exclusively identified with either 
tradition. "' 
Goehr differentiates here between 'community' and 'individualistic' traditions - 
orchestral/choral vs. solo musical performance - and explicitly maps the binary 
opposition of elite/popular onto each tradition, where 'the perfect performance 
of music' is identified with the 'solemn, sacred, serious, and sublime aesthetic 
of the concert hall and the Werktreue ideal' whereas the 'perfect musical 
performance' 'attends to the general, though elusive' dimension of musicianship 
inherent in a performance whether or not the performance is a performance of a 
work. "" Neither conception can survive on its own, and the denatured purity of 
concert life as Salter describes it is, in the end, an impossibly extreme 
position. "' What moves the practice along, in Goehr's view, is the unique series 
of challenges which individuals articulate - Glenn Gould is her (radical) 
example - and it is hence to the idiosyncrasies, the accidents - the details - of 
history that one must return. 
Talk of the 'perfection/perfectability' of the practice raises tile 
interesting further question of whether the content of a practice determines its 
telos. As Goehr presents her case we are encouraged to think of the practice as 
imperfect', driven by conflict and hence in continual oscillation: 
13 ' Goehr, 'The Perfect Performance of Music and the Perfect Musical Performance', p. 20. 
136 lbid, quotations from p. 6 and p. 14 respectively. 
"' Edward Said also describes the concert as an 'extreme' occasion in Musical Elaborations 
(title of chapter one). 
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I shall argue that it has been the imperfect character of the 
practice of classical music which has allowed that practice 
to sustain at least these two genuinely conflicting 
conceptions of perfection. Lying behind this argument is 
the thought that practices are imperfect insofar as tlieý- are 
truly critical, critical in the sense that practices surviN-e 
their self-deceptive but necessary assertions of perfection 
and of autonomy by allowing strategies of conflict. 
criticism, or resistance constantly to keep them in check. "' 
Goehr points to the deep-rooted, long-standing distinction between knowing and 
doing in human enterprise and the elitist preference for the former in classical 
music practice. "' This distinction, with its antagonistic predicates of product 
and process, will recur again and again in this study. We should remember that 
Goehr's analysis is firmly grounded in a post-Enlightenment liberal humanist 
tradition. The temptation to idealise the work and render its performance 
redundant reminds us that liberalism itself does not exist as a transcendent 
abstraction, whatever its aspirations to achieving this status: it is embedded in 
human practices. Goehr's emphasis is on the positive role of conflict in the 
practice. "' An implicit telos - the impulse to idealism and perfectability - is 
evident in her view that 'the perfect performance of music' is a renegade, the 
underdog that serves to keep the Werktreue ideal in check: 
... consider those performers who upheld the virtuoso 
tradition and brought to the public's attention the merits of 
the perfect musical performance... these performers tried to 
carve out a complex position in which they accepted the 
principle of the Werktreue ideal but resisted the most 
stringent demands of the performance conception to which 
that ideal had become most closely associated. Many 
performers thus aimed to be both great virtuoso and great 
Werktreue performers at the same time, and they did this 
by aspiring to produce a perfect performance of music as 
Goehr, 'The Perfect Performance of Music and the Perfect Musical Performance', p. 2. 
She quotes Boethius aptly on this point: 'How much more admirable... is the science of 
music in apprehending by reason than in accomplishing by work and deed! ' Goehr, 'The 
Perfect Perforri-lance of Music and the Perfect Musical Performance', p. 3. 
140 The reminder of Habermas's description of modernism as an unfinished - or rather 
U 11 fill ishable, unending - project is appropriate here. Jargen Habermas, 'Modernitv - an 
Incomplete Project', in Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (London: Pluto, 1985), p. 10- 15. 
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they aspired also to produce a perfect musical 
performance. "' 
In shom, the Werktreue ideal. whatever pluralities it harbours, has been 
dominant within this modernist view of the practice. 
In closing this section I offer a brief summary of the defining 
oppositional terms in Goehr's analysis of the perfect performance of music and 
the perfect musical performance (in each pair the initial term is orientated 
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This will serve as a useful (but incomplete) checklist for some key terms which 
will recur often in this study. "' 
Review: (6) Dunsby's Shared Concerns 
Dunsby's book entitled Performing Music: Shared Concerns, published 
in 1995, also sets up a number of binary oppositions which he is at pains to 
qualify. "' However, the architecture of his study makes these far less readily 
apprehensible. Prominent among them is his discussion (and rejection) of 
Goehr, 'The Perfect Perfon-nance of Music and the Perfect Musical Performance', p. 21-22. 
142 1 refer agrain to John Butt's parallel list of contrastive pairs in his review of Taruskin, Text Ib 
and, 4cf, 'Acting up a text: the scholarship of performance and the performance of scholarship', 
p. 3) 3 0. 
14' Dunsby has referred to his 'deep distrust of twos rather than threes' on a number of 
occasions. See 'Acts of Recall', Afusical Times (January 1997), p. 12-17 and 'Fortenotes', Music 
. -Ina4vsis, 
17(1998), 177-18 1, p. 18 1. 
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Kerman's distinction between 'doers' and 'talkers. "' This Dunsby claims is 
fundamentally misguided, for as he says at the outset, 'musicians think hard'. 
adding in clarification that 'they do not usually work in some sort of 
unreflecting musical trance. "" Performers have often been active in 
commenting on what they do and the categorisation that Kerman makes is in his 
view unmotivated, an unacceptable polarisation. It does not clarit'N'. it 
mystifies. "' The unreflecting trance later metamorphoses into an ethical 
category, the 'Ecstacy school of musical thought', against which he pitches two 
rather different terms: anxiety, attendant upon risk and what Sarah Martin, in 
her review calls the 'problem- solving approach'. "' 
There is an array of perfectly comprehensible conceptual 
problems confronting the musician - just like the lawyer, 
the doctor,, the priest, the poet - and I believe it is because 
they are constantly in play that they are not often thought 
about. "' 
And later he adds: 'There is mystery in music, but still a great deal that needs to 
be demystified. "" These conceptual problems would include acquiring the 
necessary technique, thinking about matters of history and expression, working 
through to convictions about these and so on. "' In fact, in performance, 'getting 
the right notes in the right order at about the right time is a good start. ' 151 
All this seems pragmatic enough, not a philosophical position (as he 
says elsewhere) but a sound basis for action. 15' But for Dunsby, action is fraught 
with unease: 'Anxiety and Artistry' (the title of chapter 3), shared 'concerns'... 
what is he so worried about? Well, as I suggested above, the risks performance 
entails are so central to its ontology that anxiety needs to be 'put firmly on the 
"' Dunsby, Performing Music, p. 47. The reference is to Joseph Kerman, Musicology (London: 
Fontana, 1985), p. 196. 
115 Dunsby, Performing Music, p. 7. 
146 Dunsby, Performing Music, p. 48. 
`7 Ibid, p. 29. Sarah Martin's comment is in her review of Dunsby: Performing Music and John 
Rink, ed.: The Practice of Performance. - Studies in Musical Interpretation, in Music 
Anal-I'sis, 
17 (1998), 108-121 (p. 118). 
14' Dunsby. Performing A lusic, p. 11. 
149 Ibid, p. 33 1. 
150 Ibid, p. 12). 
` Ibid, p. 7. 
152 1 bid, p. 16. 
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map early on. ' 'Music is always a risk for everyone, all the time. "" This is 
because you can get it wrong and be heard (seen, read) to have done so: 
... I shall attempt [in this book] as musicians do to steer a 
course between... the devouring monster of human 
j. udgement, and the whirlpool that threatens to engulf all 
artistic certainties in the frothing sea of contingency. 154 
In short,. his 'theory' of performance (though I doubt he would accept this 
formulation) is text-based, and stiflingly so. In an interesting aside on the 
performative aspect of writing, he comments that we all have 'flashes of 
inspiration... from time to time' but 'It's doing something about it that matters. 
"Doing something about it" is not the same as having the image, but it is what 
performers must always do. "" This 'must' is a pervasive position and the 
(opening chapters of the) book are thick with obligation (often inadequately 
met). Against this background Dunsby's point that many people - and by 
implication he aligns himself with this position - do not 'put composers, 
performers and writers into any form of destructive pecking order"" seems to 
me inconsistent, perhaps even disingenuous, for all the qualifications he 
acknowledges to the current division of musical labour. 
Elsewhere, Dunsby has drawn attention to the oddly composite nature of 
academic performance studies, commenting on a tendency towards 
fragmentation into historical, perceptual, sociological and theoretical 
subdisciplines. "' In Performing Music: Shared Concerns these different 
discourses appear more harmonious through their single author presentation 
than Dunsby might have intended (though, as he points out at the beginning, his 
wish is to address a general audience). But the final chapter of his book is a 
detailed analysis of a short piano piece by Stravinsky and is designed to 
demonstrate what performers (should? ) think about and how. While Dunsby had 
previously affirmed that there is no easy move from analysis to performance, his 
153 Ibid, pAl and p. 14 respectively. 
1 ý4 Ibid, p. 16. 
'55 Ibid, p. I--1- 
, 5, Ibid. p. -33- '5' Dunsby. 'Acts of Recall', p. 12. 
conclusions in Peýforming Music do rather point in the opposite direction: the 
kind of thinking the performer needs to do turns out to be pointedly 
analytical. "' Perhaps one can pursue this line of thought further: is Sarah \Iartin 
fair in her criticism that Dunsby appears to be driven by a need to render 
performance reliant on scholarship? This raises the issue of Dunsby's status and 
background as a musician: a highly respected pianist who opted out of a 
performing career early on, an equally respected academic with a sheaf of major 
publications on music analysis, a Schoenberg scholar of repute, he does not 
carry the weight of (conservative, modernist) Tradition lightly. 15' At the same 
time he is peremptorily dismissive of interdisciplinary approaches. His 
rootedness within the discipline(s) of musicology/theory/analysis 
simultaneously narrows the focus. "O 
Underlying this is a double bind and it forces Dunsby to hedge his bets. 
The surge in interest in performance is intimately linked to a disaffection with 
just this kind of discipline-centred conservatism. Interdisciplinarity and the 
study of performance (in the widest sense) have become established means of 
qualifying and revising exhausted approaches. 
Fragmentation and Crisis 
What I hope this introductory section has conveyed is a sense of the 
variety of reactions there have been to a widely perceived crisis in the practice 
of'musical performance. Performance studies are undeniably and irredeemably 
interdisciplinary in nature, with important contributions from academic music 
(including theory, pedagogy, psychology, history and popular music studies) 
"' See Jonathan Dunsby's earlier assertion of this point of view in, 'Guest Editorial: 
Performance and Analysis of Music', Music Analysis, 8 (1989), 5-20, (p. 7). The final chapter of 
Peýforining Music ends with frank ambivalence: see the discussion of quotations from 
Kretzschmar and Rachmaninoff in Performing Music, p. 93-94. 
'59 Dunsby's pianistic background may not be as familiar to musicologists as his academic 
work. For sorne details, see Wendy Thompson with Fanny Waterman, Piano Competition. - The 
.f 
Leeds (London: Faber, 1990), p. 11. Slorv o 
160 On interdisciplinary approaches, see Dunsby, Performing Music, p. 46. He declines to 
comment on popular music or the pedagogical field (except in passing on p. 27); and is 
pointedly unsympathetic to Jerrold Levinson's work (from the field of analytical aesthetics) in 
chapter two. 
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and neighbouring disciplines, such as analytical aesthetics, literary theory. and 
anthropology. In fact the list is very long, if not quite endless. Hence, we should 
expect to encounter materials from other disciplines. 
As a theoretical undertaking, a study of the concept of performance is 
bound to be descriptive in the Steinerian sense: practice will indeed run ahead of 
theory. 16 ' But at the same time its descriptions will require a systematic 
underpinning. If theorising about performance partakes of hermeneutics. it best 
does so with an attention to definitional logic. The binary oppositions of 
structuralism - especially the opposition of the systematic to the historical - are 
ultimately unavoidable. 
The following four chapters are arranged as follows. I begin with an 
investigation of the notion of a practice, drawn from ethics. This provides a 
social/ethical framework for the two central chapters, which discuss definitions 
of two key concepts in the field: first I look at the concept of performance, then 
interpretation. In the final chapter I return to the question of the 'crisis' in both 
the practice of performance and the ways in which it is conceptualised in 
performance studies. The emphasis, particularly in the central chapters, is on the 
systematic, as opposed to the historical. 
I would like at this point to introduce a cautionary note. It has not been 
possible in this opening chapter to present a traditional 'literature review' 
because the field, as I have conceived it, is simply too wide. More detailed 
discussions of literature will inevitably occur within the study itself, topic by 
topic. This approach has some disadvantages. In particular, each chapter will 
tend to progress from a similar starting point and this might suggest an overall 
lack of direction. The point however is to watch for the way themes - such as 
the opposition of process to product - recur, intersecting in unpredictable ways. 
The investigations I present below are also incomplete and provisional to 
varyino degrees. The essay on the practice and virtue theory could bear 
expansion to thesis length in itself. it does not pretend to achieve firm 
conclusions, particularly on the question of the relationship of ethics to the 
human imagination. What I offer there (in the two case studies I present) are 
"' Dunsby, Performing I lusic, p. 19. 
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instances of how the line of enquiry might be pursued. In the concludingi chapter 
I draw together some of the loose ends which my investigations of practice. 
performance and interpretation produce. I also briefly touch on the question of 
music's origins and the nature of musicianship and musicality. There is an 
important connection to be made here between practice(s) and the ethos that 
they embody and these discipline-specifics: there is much work to be done to 
connect threads of argument here. Finally, I would mention the difficulty 
involved in straddling the divide which separates general theoretical discussion 
from those passages which deal directly with music: it is perhaps this factor, 
more than any other which leads me to characterise what follows as preliminary 
and provisional. It should be read as an invitation and spur to further 
speculation. 
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Chapter Two: The Practice 
Part One: Theory 
Works, Occasions, Agents 
So far I have broadly distinguished between two approaches to 
performance, which could be called work-centred and occasion-centred. 
Roughly speaking, the theories of Barnett, Dahlhaus and Dunsby count as 
examples of the work-centred approach; Lazarus, Small and Heister offer 
occasion-centred analyses. Goehr has written at length on the origins and 
limitations of the work-centred approach - which, as it is now situated 
historically deserves the description 'practice' - and has proposed a dialectic 
which drives the practice forward. What I will attempt to do in what follows is 
to examine agency more closely: to look inside the performer herself Where, 
when and how does she acquire her performance strategies and values? I 
suggest we look to the concept of the practice for answers to these questions. 
The Practice in the Discourses of Musicology and the Philosophy of 
Art 
Although the term 'practice' has been in common use for generations - 
for example in the phrase 'the theory and practice of... ' - it appears to have 
entered musicology in its current more freighted sense in the late 1980s, at a 
time when the discipline was reassessing its achievements. Here is one of the 
routes I believe it took. The analytic moral philosopher Alasdair Macintyre's 
book After Virtue, which first appeared in 1981, took an arguably tired and 
diluted concept with a lengthy history in sociology (often Marxist) and 
anthropology and reinvigorated it by giving it a strong moral impetus. ' His work 
' Alasdair Macintyre, A, ficr l'irtzie (London: Duckworth, 1981 -, second edition 1985). 
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was taken up by, among others, Nicholas Wolterstorff, another analytic 
philosopher this time working in the field of aesthetics. He published an article 
which adapted Macintyre's insights to the practice of musical composition. in 
the process quoting at some length from After Virtue. 2 This piece, published in 
1987, appeared in a collection whose contributors were predominantly. though 
not exclusively, Anglo-American philosophers of an analytical bent, a collection 
intended as an introduction to music-philosophical topics. (Incidentally. 
Wolterstorff published an article which covers some of the same ground from a 
different perspective - the history of the philosophy of art - intended for 
philosophers at about the same time. ) It seems that this refurbished concept of 
the practice provoked considerable interest thereafter. For example an article 
entitled 'Art, Practice and Narrative' by Noýl Carroll which appeared in 1988 
makes transparent use of Macintyre's ideas - though without direct 
acknowledgement - in a renewed assault on the topic of defining art. ' It seems 
likely that the musicologist Lawrence Kramer's use of the term 'practice' in the 
title of his 1990 book was, if not an appropriation of Macintyre filtered through 
Wolterstorff, Carroll and others, then at least a response to a contemporary 
debate about a term newly fashionable. ' 
It is clear that Macintyre's ideas were not simply plucked out of the air: 
they made cogent sense in an intellectual climate among this community of 
American philosophers who had for some time been seeking out new ways of 
See 'The Work of Making a Work of Music', in What is Music? An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Music, ed. Philip Alperson (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1987, reprinted with updated bibliography 1994), p. 101-129. The collection also contains 
contributions by Roger Scruton and Edward T. Cone, among others. Also relevant here is 
WolterstorfFs essay 'Philosophy of Art after Analysis and Romanticism', in Analytic 
Aesthetics, ed. Richard Shusterman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 32-58. The art critic Susie 
Gablik has also drawn attention to Macintyre's work in Has Modernism Failed9 (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1984). Another article of related interest is by Robert Martin, 'Musical 
Works in the Worlds of Performers and Listeners', to be found in The Interpretation of Music: 
Philosophical Essays, ed. Michael Krausz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 119-127. 
Special issue of The Journal ofAesthetics and Art Criticism published in late 1987. 
4 'Art, Practice, and Narrative', from The Monist, 71 (1988), 140-156. Carroll's later work on 
this topic includes 'Historical Narratives and the Philosophy of Art', from Journal of. Aesthetics 
andArt Criticism, 51 (199' 3), 33 13 3-3 )26, which refers to both the Wolterstorff articles mentioned 
above, thereby establishing an indirect link with Macintyre; and the more recent Philosopki, of 
Art: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 1999), especially chapter 5. (See also 
footnote 12 below. ) 
5 LaxN, rence Kramer, Alusic as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900 (California: University of 
California Press, 1990). 
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6 theorising artistic activity. In particular. philosophers interested in tackling the 
age-old questions surrounding art's ontology found the concept of the practice 
immediately useful. No6 Carroll has recently expanded his earlier accounts of 
the history of art ontology in a way which demonstrates clearly v, -hy 
philosophers were ready to take up Macintyre's ideas. 7 Answers to the question 
'What is Arff have, he claims, provoked a series of responses over the last 
hundred years, each of which in turn has been supplanted as it proved 
inadequate to account for innovation. He distinguishes four phases in his 
historically organised narrative. These are: 
1. 'Stage one' essentialism (including Bell, Croce, Collingwood. Tolstoy and 
Langer). This approach attempts to identify the primary features of objects 
which allow them to be classified as art (such as Bell's 'significant form'). 
2. The open concept approach. This makes use of Wittgenstein's 'family 
resemblance' idea and was popularised in the 1950s by Morris Weitz in 
particular. 
3. The institutional theory of art. This exists in various versions, but was 
initially proposed by George Dickie in the early 1970s. It suggests that the 
institutions of the artworld confer artwork status on objects and processes. 
(Carroll calls this 'stage two essentialism' because although there is a 
definitional component it does not refer to internal features of artworks. ) 
4. The self-reflexive, narrative-driven practice, proposed by Carroll himself. I 
quote his words in clarification: 
Our view - of art as a cultural practice - attempts to 
negotiate through the pitfalls of previous theorizing. It does 
not foreclose artistic innovation while it does attend to the 
generative processes through which objects enter the realm 
of art. In some ways, it resembles the institutional 
approach; however, it does not claim that art is an 
institution but only makes the less ambitious observation 
that it is a cultural practice. Also, it regards the question of 
' Carroll situates himself within an Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy, one 
concerned primarily with the analysis of concepts - specifically the search for necessary and 
sufficient conditions - and their use within practices. See the introduction to his Philosoph-v of 
, -I rt (p. 2-5). ' In Philosoplýv ofArt. 
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whether an object is art as one internal to the cultural 
practices of the artworld and goes on discussing the 
coherence of that practice. ' 
Carroll points out that art is not just one but a 'cluster' of related 
practices, noting in particular the distinction between 'makers' and 'receivers'. ' 
He further points to the need for a practice to reproduce itself over time, in order 
to achieve stability. Against this, it needs a mechanism to allow change and liere 
he suggests the key is the stories a practice tells itself about what it is doing. 
New art, he says, will be judged as art according to how it repeats, aniplýlies or 
repudiates what has gone before: this is the practice as a kind of Heaelian Z-- 
conversation. " 'The unity', he says, 'of this sort of entity [he is talking 
specifically of a nation, but the argument is meant to apply equally to a practice] 
is best captured by an historical narrative, one which shows the ways in which 
its past and present are integrated. "' Carroll's argument, restated in its recent 
extended form is precisely the kind of narrative he suggests is at the heart of a 
practice's self-understanding. I provide these details of Carroll's theory as a 
foretaste of Macintyre's own account to which they are, as I hope will 
subsequently become clear, indebted. " 
So my interest in the practice in its Macintyrian (dis)guise is anything 
but novel. However W-olterstorff, Carroll and others are principally interested in 
' Carroll, 'Art Practice and Narrative', p. 143. 
9 Carroll, 'Art, Practice, and Narrative', p. 144. The distinction between 'performative' and 
critical' interpretation I will introduce in chapter four is a clear parallel within the realm of 
interpretation. See Jerrold Levinson, 'Performative vs. Critical Interpretation in Music' in ed. 
Krausz, The Interpretation of Music. - Philosophical Essays, p. 33 -60. 
Carroll, 'Art, Practice, and Narrative', p. 148. 
Carroll, 'Art, Practice, and Narrative', p. 150. 
12 The similarities between Carroll and Macintyre are striking. Here is Carroll's definition: 'The 
sense of cultural practice I have in mind here is that of a complex body of interrelated human 
activities cyoverned by reasons internal to those forms of activity and to their coordination. 
Practices are aimed at achieving goods that are appropriate to the forms of activity that ZI) "n 
comprise them, and these reasons and goods, in part, situate the place of the practice 
in the life 
of the culture. Such practices supply the frameworks in which human powers are developed and 
expanded. ' ('Art, Practice, and Narrative', p. 143. ) Here is Macintyre: , By a practice I am going 
to rnean ariv coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activitv 
throu-h which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to and partially definitive of, that 
form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and the human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. ' (4/ter Virtue, p. 187. ) 
Carroll's paraphrase shows a slight change of emphasis (there is less space for the Aristotelian 
ethic, the search for the good). 
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art ontology. I will argue that Macintyre's theory is eminentIN, suited to an 
agent-centred analysis of performance. In doing so I will be foregroundilig, the 
role of virtues,, along with skills and natural capacities. Virtue plays a central 
element of Macintyre's theorising which goes largelý, unregarded in the work I 
have discussed so far. 
The Practice in the Discourses of Musicology and Anthropology 
Musicology itself is more or less distantly related to numerous 
disciplines and practices. Ethnomusicology has always been close to 
anthropology. There have been a number of interdisciplinary studies of Western 
art music practices and institutions by anthropologists with musical training (or 
vice versa): Georgina Born's study on IRCAM is a recent example. " I have 
already commented on the work of Christopher Small who, though not a trained 
anthropologist, is equally inspired by anthropological concerns, among which 
analysis of how ritual shores up authority in society is central. Henry Kingsbury 
has published an anthropological study of the conservatory, to which I now turn. 
I have saved discussion of Kingsbury's work for now because the issues 
he raises also pertain to the Macintyrean concept of the practice I wish to 
develop later. Kingsbury's premises are, however, radically at odds with 
Macintyre's in one important respect. By examining his study before giving a 
detailed account of Macintyre's views, I hope to expose some exaggerations in 
Kingsbury's fundamentally sound approach, in order to point up the value of the 
rival account. " 
I begin with some background. It helps to know that Kingsbury trained 
as a pianist and occupied the post of Assistant Dean at a prestigious American 
music college from 1969-71, leaving 'in a spirit of confusion regarding both the 
musical and educational work I had been doing'. " His experiences as a teacher 
Georgina Born, Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez, and the Institutionalization of the 
(Berkeley: Universit"', of California Press, 1995). 
14 Henry Kingsbury. Ifusic, Talent, and Performance: a Conservatory Cultural ývsteln 
(Plilladelphia: Temple University Press, 1988). 
15 Kingsbury, Alusic, Talent, and Performance, p. 8. 
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and councillor had alerted him to gaping discrepancies between the behaviour 
and professed beliefs of musicians, especially regarding the social significance 
of 'absolute' music. He subsequently studied ethnomusicology and socio- 
cultural anthropology and the conservatory project which he undertook in the 
early 1980s was informed by methodologies he encountered in those fields. A 
revelatory experience was his reading of Edmund Leach, who proposed that 
anthropologists should abandon what Leach saw as a spurious distinction 
between ethics and aesthetics: 'Logically aesthetics and ethics are identical. If 
we are to understand the ethical rules of a society, it is aesthetics we should 
study. "' Kingsbury says of this: 
Such a formulation presented a succinct model for bringing 
together my experiences at Midland [the pseudonym he 
uses for the college he worked at]... the profound 
connection between the musicality and the self-identity of 
the music students - and the idea... that musical values 
must be understood as emanations of social and cultural 
processes. " [My italics. ] 
The tone and logic of this project will be familiar from Christopher Small's 
work. Kingsbury is inspired by an attempt to make sense of a perceived 
hypocrisy, to retell a story of his experience to himself and others that justifies 
his professional disaffection. In saying this, I do not intend to devalue his 
account by suggesting that it is merely self-serving. Rather, this narrative 
strategy is, as will become apparent, important in its own right. But I would 
question the assumption that musical values are necessarily to be understood in 
socio-cultural terms. This is surely overly reductive: it represents but one option 
among several. 
A consequence of this reductive approach is for Kingsbury to question 
what music itself is and conclude that 'rather than having a fixed and generally 
" Edmund Leach, Political Si, stems of Highland Burma: a Study of Kachin Social Structure 
(London: Athlone Press, 1977), p. 12, quoted in KingsbLlrý', Music, Talent, and Pei. -formance, 
P. 10. 
17 Kinpburý', A lusic, Talent, and Performance, p. 10. 
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understood referent in the real world, it [the word -music"] is highl. v shifting, 
and indeterminate in meaning. ý" In consequence, 
When one asks what it is that conservatory students and 
teachers are talking about when they refer to music, the 
music itself, or the actual music, one answer is that to a 
considerable extent they're talking about each other, either 
as individuals or as groups, formally or informally 
organized: they are talking about intercontextualized, 
configured social relationships. " 
This leads him to conclude that 
... musical performance (including in this the social 
relations obtaining in the performance situation: relations 
of power), musical meaning, and musical structure are 
linked in a nexus in which each aspect is both product and 
producer of the others. " 
Music is highly, but, note, not completely indeterminate in meaning; and if 
music's meaning is socially constructed - and this entails as a positive 
consequence a degree of freedom in principle to make it 'mean' what we want it 
to - this is only to a considerable extent the case. What of the remainder? 
Kingsbury does not really address the implied question about music's intrinsic 
meaning directly (except on one occasion, which I discuss below). Generally, 
then, there is very little positivity in the socially constructed meanings 
Kingsbury uncovers and no real space for any other kind of meaning to emerge. 
In other words, he paints a rather one-sided, bleak picture of conservatory life. 
Kingsbury's study is based on field work he carried out as a more or less 
disguised student observer at a well-known conservatory for one semester. " His 
book organises its material thematically, starting with background information 
such as his personal motivation, methodological issues and the problem of 
objectivity in particular. As I have already hinted, his aim is to look past the 
'music' at social structures and relationships that contextualise it: 'I tried to 
Ibid, p. 26. 
Ibid, p. 158. 
20 Ibid, p. 110. 
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observe every social interaction in terms of the question "what is at issue here? " 
to see what was being negotiated. decided, clarified, altered, maintained - what 
was in contention, in doubt. "' In the following chapters he examines the 
conservatory's physical and institutional setting; the notion of talent and the 
problematic metaphor of 'possessing' it; the teaching process itself in a 
masterclass setting; the examination ritual and the accompanying changes of 
status associated with professionalisation and membership of an elite: and in a 
final section a recapitulation of the general issues raised at the outset in the light 
of what has been said in the interim. 
When Kingsbury talks of a 'cultural idiom' or of a 'cultural systern' I 
take these terms to be roughly synonymous with the practice. 23 Its constituents 
are composers, performers, compositions, audiences, musicologists, critics and 
'highly formalised private teacher-student dyads'. 2' He comments in passing 
that this list could be considerably extended, adding that 'much work needs to 
be done if we are to understand the interplay between economic competition and 
philanthropic benefaction in musical culture'. " Kingsbury makes the useful 
point that these close teacher-student relationships, along with the tendency for 
a teacher's class to form a clique, are in direct conflict with rational 
administrative principles, which treat individuals as standardised units: '... the 
value of artistic individualism and the patronage structure that maintains it are 
in direct conflict with the principles and workings of a bureaucratic 
administrative structure' . 
2' These are again points to be borne in mind when we 
examine Macintyre's account. 
There is often a strong sense of vocation for those who choose a musical 
training, but there are by no means enough professional opportunities for 
conservatory graduates . 
2' Hence the institution is inevitably concerned with its 
self-perpetuation, the more so, since there are no simple economic justifications 
2' This was January to June, 1982. lbid, p. 20. 
22 lbid, p. 24. The catalogue of linguistic/behavioural functions here could be labelled II 'performative' within the discipline of linguistics (or pragmatics): they could be analysed as 
'speech acts'. See my discussion of this in chapter three below. 
'3 lbid, p. 17 and title, respectively. 
'4 lbid, p. 17-18. 
25 lbid, p. 183 ), endnote 4. 
21 lbid, p. 337 (the final point of his four point summary of the chapter). 
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for its existence. What it tries to inculcate in students are not necessarilv skills 
of use in a 'career', but rather an ethos of individualism: Kin(i y argues that , sbur,, 
the attachment students have to individual teachers encourages an 
individualistic training stressing solo performance ability. which in turn 
encourages the staff, who serve to an extent as role models, to be highly 
individualistic in their teaching styles. (Note that this varies in appropriateness 
from a professional perspective, being more suited to pianists than orchestral 
players. ) Success for the student reflects well on both student and teacher, which 
ultimately makes for a charged, competitive atmosphere of study. 
The central portion of his book examines the notion of talent. He 
demonstrates the difficulty in quantifying it, citing inconsistent judgements and 
the role peers and mentors play in constructing a student's self-image. If 
teachers or examiners say a student has talent, that will tend to set up 
expectations and in extreme cases it can amount to a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Kingsbury also argues compellingly that the converse is true: it is very difficult 
for a student to perform well to an audience which holds the performer in low 
esteem . 
28 What this suggests is that not only the player should be committed, but 
- intriguingly - also the audience. For Kingsbury talent is a construct, a 
6cultural representation', a mental quality only accessible through performance. 
In proposing its existence behind the sum of an individual's performances, we 
propose a potential for development; 2' but ultimately, he says, 
An assessment of musicality or talent is not something that 
is ever proved or disproved. Rather, it is validated with 
reference to the same social process in which it first arose. 
An assessment of musical talent is an aesthetic judgement. 
An aesthetic judgement of musical performance is a 
statement that is evaluative of a person or persons. Here we 
see the full force of Leach's dictum... regarding the 
relationship between ethics and aesthetics. " 
271 bid, p. 19. 
28 lbid, chapter five. 'A Song in a Strange Land'. 
lbid, p. 6-33. 
lbid, p. 75. Tile relationship between ethics and aesthetics proposed here is open to challenge- 
it leads to a reductive circularity in describing behaviour. I 
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Talent, then, is 'a concept frequently used to explain something that couldn't be 
explained otherwise'. " However. talent is perhaps too useful a term. e\-en given 
these limitations, to jettison, in use not just in music but across the whole 
educational spectrum. We need it precisely to be able to evaluate a realm 
between individual performances and individuals per se. 
Of further interest is his report on the masterclass. 32 What, indeed, is at 
issue here? Kingsbury tries to describe the conflicting loyalties of students, on 
the one hand to a score which contains considerable indeterminacy and on the 
other to their own feelings and intuitions about how to perform and the guidance 
they receive from the teacher. The teacher summarises this conflict as follows: 
'[students] must not play something simply because it is written in the score, but 
rather because they feel it that way. 33 If you don't feel it, you don't express it. 
Technique, in other words, means nothing without feeling, which renders it 
expressive. But the teacher Kingsbury observes in the masterclass situation 
actually insists on obedience to what he feels is the right way. 3' Thus the student 
is - apparently - caught in a double bind: she has to obey someone else's 
impulses and present them as personally authentic. " For Kingsbury this is 
evidence that musical performance skill can be seen to be both product and 
producer of social power. And the teacher controls the class. As far as the 
relationship between musical 'structure', performance and meaning is 
concerned, he has this to say: 
... the study of music 
in the contexts of performance and 
rendition suggests the conclusion that "music" doesn't 
"have" a meaning, but rather that music is given a meaning 
in performance. By the same token, the study of music in 
performance brings with it the realisation that "music" 
doesn't "have" structure, so much as it is given structure in 
performance. Musical structure is not a phenomenon that 
leads its own existence outside of social action; rather, it is 
a notion that is variously invoked, appealed to, or cited in 
lbid, p. 81. 
lbid, ch. 4, 'Lessons with the Master', p. 85-1 10. 
lbid, p. 87. 
This is in the context of a discussion of Beethoven's C major cello sonata. lbid, p. 98. 
-, 5 Later I will argue that the double bind is both real and necessary. I 
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the context of social action. " 
Difficult though it is to refute this point of view, it does seem to me to overstate 
the case. An insightful interpretation is being made to work just a little too hard 
and I will offer one criticism of it here. An instrumental teacher - in one-to-one 
lessons and even more in the masterclass environment, where the audience in a 
sense amplifies every gesture - teaches exemplifications of how to arrive at an 
individual interpretation. (Ultimately, exemplifications are all one can teach, as 
no copy will be completely successful: the distinction to bear in mind is in the 
student's attitude to imitation. ") I was told by one professor that he deliberately 
taught an 'orthodox' interpretation of the mainstream literature; and his students 
were in fact frequently quite taken aback when they heard him perform in 
concert in a highly idiosyncratic manner. (He added that students would be free 
to play how they liked after graduation. ") So you might better describe the 
process of teaching an interpretation as a form of guided trial and error, where 
the teacher's role is to demonstrate virtues such as the self-critical faculty, 
patience, or persistence. 
I hinted at a rather different criticism in the paragraph above: Kingsbury 
does not really investigate the private world of the 'teacher- student dyad'. 
Indeed, this may not be possible at all. What he has observed is a 'performance' 
of teaching. This raises the interesting question of what the true purpose of a 
inasterclass is, and whether the format satisfies these purposes. I would argue 
that as a 'performance' genre, it often fails because it attempts too much. A 
masterclass can be judged from too many perspectives simultaneously. The 
sheer range of 'interests' at issue in the masterclass scenario necessarily 
involves faking - for example the student already has strong performance 
convictions about the piece; or the 'master' entertains the audience with his own 
expertise as a player or musical analyst - and there is inevitably a sense of 
compromise and incoherence. Kingsbury himself points out the theatrical 
30 lbid, p. 109-110. 
37 Charles Rosen's comments on the necessariýv individual nature of technique have some 
bearing on this. Charles Rosen, 'On Playing the Piano', The A"cit, York Review of Books, Oct. II 1,1999, p. 49-54, especially p. 49. 
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exaggerations, the fierce energy, the rhetorical devices used by the teacher to 
maintain control over the large group assembled in the studio. However, the 
relative privacy of one-to-one tuition means that a student is far more disposed 
to take risks and try new ideas because there is less face-saving necessary if he 
fails. It is effectively, one short step away from practising. The hermeneutic 
circle of music-making and feeling is one in which the feelings occur in the act 
of trying out the music and reflecting on the effect it has on the player, the affect 
it produces: the player becomes her own audience. It is real experimentation - 
practising, no less - and no student could reasonably be expected to experiment 
openly in this way in the public glare of a masterclass, not least because it is so 
time-consuming. Elsewhere Kingsbury says that 'the notions of performance, 
rendition and practice form a continuum of overlapping categories, and 
distinctions among them are made by musicians with regard to social context or 
frame. "' In other words, the categorisation of these overlapping categories has 
to do with the degree of performativity; and this in turn depends on the presence 
of ajudging audience. 
I welcome Kingsbury's central points, which I would summarise as 
follows: 
1. Key concepts in use in the field are employed inconsistently, manipulated by 
those in power to their own advantage; and that this inconsistency often goes 
unrecognised and unchallenged. 
2. There is a conflict of interest between the supporting institutions and the 
individuals within them. 
3. Musical meaning is to an extent a reflection of social relationships. 
I think there are positive consequences of this state of affairs which he 
overlooks. It is widely accepted that human beings do not organise their 
conceptual worlds in terms of definitions which list necessary and sufficient 
conditions, just as it is recognised that such efforts at definition are often both 
necessary and helpful. The very imprecision of such terms as 'talent', 
6musicality' and 'music' allows space for renegotiating their meaninos, in the 
'8 Professor Herbert Seidel, at the Hochschule für Musik und Darstellende Kunst in 
Frankfürt/Main, Germany. 
31) Kingsbury, I lusic, Talent, and Performance, p. 187, endnote 1. 
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light of changing needs. This is an ongoing process. At the same time, education 
relies on reification and standardisation in order to function. Kingsbury is wrong 
to collapse ethics into aesthetics because the distinction between intentions (and 
the concepts that inform them) and observed behaviour is a useful one. The 
claim that human behaviour is adequately described through descriptions of 
what can be seen from outside alone - and that is the ultimate implication of the 
collapsing of ethics into aesthetics - is a remnant of behaviourist psychology. 
As such it has largely been discredited by more recent cognitivist approaches. 'O 
Its status as a mental concept may render it unclear exactly what, say, 
ýmusicality' is, in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but there is 
broad agreement about many of its components, for example among music 
psychologists. (They, too, deal of necessity in generalisations. ) Such terms 
function as a useful, if potentially misleading, shorthand in a practice. Without 
this slackness, practices would be frozen into mere repetitiousness. (The point 
that administrators require precisely this obviously encourages a degree of 
conflict. ) I return to these points below (in A Note on Concepts). For this 
reason, among others, I am loath to accept Kingsbury's rather grim picture of 
conservatory life within which students are awarded victim status. 
This brings me on to the third point. Surely there is a positive motivation 
for the student studying music, one which points beyond social relationships? 
How, if not through some notion of 'the pleasure of the text' 41 and its study in 
and for itself, can we otherwise account for the fact that so many people want to 
study musical performance even though there are indeed far too few 
professional opportunities for those who are trained? 
40 For a more general discussion of definitions of the term 'aesthetics', see Carroll, Philosophy 
ofAri, p. 156-168. 
" it is such an appeal to motivation that Jim Samson makes at the end of his article 'Analysjs in 
Context' in Rethinking Afusic, eds. Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). p. 3-33-54 (see p. 54). The phrase 'pleasure of the text' originates with 
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Ethical Theories and Performance 
I have proposed that we retain the traditional division between ethics and 
aesthetics in our investigation of performance practice, keeping a weather eye 
open for conflicts between them. It is, after all, a division which arose in 
response to the creation of an autonomous sphere of art in the eighteenth 
century. " If we accept the division, as I propose to, we may ask which ethical 
theory, of the many available, will yield the best results. ` Consider the 
following, by no means exhaustive, list: 
1. Rule-driven theories, which attempt to derive ethics from the application of 
logical imperatives. As Kant's work attempts this in a particularly 
thoroughgoing way, this strand of ethics is often associated with his name. A 
characteristic question such theories pose would be: how far is individual 
freedom compatible with social justice? This strand of (deontic) ethical theory is 
often interested in the notion of a contract between social parties (as an 
example, consider John Rawls's work). " Jeffrey Kallberg's discussion of genres 
as stabilising contracts within the composer/performer/audience cluster is an 
implicit application of this approach. Peter Kivy has accorded it more extensive 
treatment, arguing that a composer's intentions should - and in practice do - 
play a role in interpretative practice. 45 
Barthes. 
4' For overviews of this field, see Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity ftom Kant to 
Nietzsche (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990) and Terry Eagleton, The Ideology 
qf the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). 
For more detailed orientation on ethical theories the following are useful: A Companion to 
Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), which contains introductory essays on all 
the theoretical approaches mentioned here. The essay on virtue theory is by Greg Pence (p. 249- 
259). A rather different perspective on ethics is provided by Mark L. Johnson's essay 'Ethics', 
in A Companion to Cognitive Science, eds. William Bechtel and George Graham (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998), p. 691-701. His examination of the compatibility of modern ethical theories 
with the state of knowledge in cognitive science is highly critical of the overtly 'rational' :D2: ) 
approaches described in points I and 2 in the text and broadly endorses the work of Macintyre 
and virtue theory. 
John Rawls, A Theon, ofJustice (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972). 
Jeffi-ey Kallberg, 'The Rhetoric of Genre: Chopin's Nocturne in G minor', in Chopin at the 
Boundaries: Sex, Histoiy and Musical Genre (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universitý Press, 
1996), p. 3-29. Kivy's essay entitled 'Live performers and dead composers: On the ethics of 
musical interpretation' is collected in his book The Fine Art of Repetition: Essqvs in the 
Philosophy of Alusic (Cambridge: Cambrid e University Press, 199' )). p. 95-116. 19 
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2. Utilitarianism and its favoured modem offspring Consequentialism try to 
evaluate behaviour by comparing outcomes. This entails knowing wl-ilch 
outcome is best before we act: in other words, it requires a highlý, determinate - 
ideally singular - definition of the good(s) it aims to achieve. However. within 
the practices of the arts there is no consensus about purposes. 
I Virtue theory tries to pin down the qualities an individual requires to achieVe 
goods. I would argue that this focus on the individual makes it a promising 
candidate for analysing performance. 
These theories are certainly not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, the 
possibility of using any one mode to complement or critique any other is itself a 
valuable resource. So we should expect 'contracts' and rules to be implicit 
within traits or concepts, or for contracts to base themselves in turn on more or 
less unexamined motives. With these qualifications firmly in mind I would like 
to proceed to a detailed examination of Alasdair Macintyre's notion of the 
practice and the role of the virtues therein. 
Macintyre's Concept of the Practice: (1) a Definition 
In his book After Virtue, " Alisdair Macintyre proposes the definition of 
the practice (which I quoted above) which makes an explicit connection with the 
exercise of the virtues: 
By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and 
complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved are 
systematically extended. " 
" Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981, second edition 1985). All 
references are to the second edition. 
,, Macintyre, A er I "irtue, p. 187. See footnote 12 above for my original citation. fit 
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A practice thus involves 'standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well 
as achievement of goods'. " Virtues are those qualities \\-hich we possess and 
exercise in achieving the goods internal to practices. Intention and behaviour 
help to define each other and a setting is necessary to make an intention clear. 
But, as Macintyre argues, a setting entails a history. This is the chronological 
dimension of a practice: its tradition. One virtue participants will require is a 
critical respect for that tradition. The performer, as an individual, has intentions 
in terms of her own history and the history of her practice. So 'narrative history 
of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the 
characterisation of human actions'. " To this Macintyre adds the conditions of 
intelligibility and accountability: 
To identify an occurrence as an action is... to identify it... 
as flowing intelligibly from an agent's intentions, motives, 
passions and purposes. It is therefore to understand an 
action as something for which someone is accountable, 
about which it is always appropriate to ask the agent for an 
intelligible account. " 
So this description of a practice - and let us take the pianistic endeavour 
to be a sub-practice within the larger domain of musical culture - takes account 
of a social dimension (a dimension of space), a historical dimension (the 
tradition, the dimension of time), a narrative line and unity (with the individual 
as the carrier of that unity in and outside the practice and its tradition) and the 
psychological credibility of his actions (their intelligibility and his 
accountability). This is not to suppose that a practice is the carrier of objective 
values which are universally valid for all time. However, it does require us to 
accept - or failing that, to renegotiate 
from traditionally accepted principles - 
the current standards when we are initiated into the practice. Macintyre's 
example suggests - unusually for him" -a musical application: 'If, on starting 
" lbid, p. 190. 
49 lbid, p. 208. 
ý" lbid, p. 209. 
51 Macintyre has not, to my knowledge, published in the field of aesthetics. Musical examples 
do however occur xvith some frequency in his discussions of the practice both here and 
elsewhere. 
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to listen to music I do not accept my own incapacity to judge correctly. I xvill 
ý52 never learn to hear, let alone appreciate, Bartok's last quartets . 
The practice, in this conception, points in many directions; or. to put it 
another way, it draws together individual motives, rules. roles, - even texts - 
and synthesises them. 
The Practice: (2) History and Telos 
Ethical enquiry is, in Macintyre's view, only possible through a 
contemplation of its history and the products of that history. 5' Historical enquiry 
has formed the substance of his extensive work in the field of ethics over the 
last twenty years. By examining the products of such enquiry - texts, artefacts 
and so on - in terms of their provenance and genre we group them together in 
clusters and chains which form traditions. Traditions in turn generate 
Weltanschauungen and philosophical systems . 
5' Thus he proposes a nested 
system of individual, practice, tradition and Weltanschauung. The related issues 
of commensurability and translatability arise between traditions and texts 
respectively. In order for the former to occur, we must locate a level of 
abstraction at which there is agreement about the content of concepts and then 
examine how the rival tradition builds from this position. In practice this entails 
rewriting the histories of rival traditions from a critical perspective. In a parallel 
move, he endorses translations provided that the translator has effectively 
learned the target language as a second 'first' language. In consequence, 
Macintyre views the history of philosophy as primary within the discipline - 
and not, for example, logic or ontology - and has therefore expended much 
effort on evaluating competing traditions, attempting to establish their 
commensurability by using their internal resources to critique those of their 
rivals. This has taken the form of extended historical narratives on, among other 
" Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 190. Note the oddly inappropriate plural form. 
. 53 A lasdair Macintyre, A Short Histotý, of Ethics (London: Routledge, 1967), chapter 1, p. 1-4. 
ý4 These distinctions are articulated in Alasdair Macintyre, 'The Relationship of Philosophý to 
its Past', in Philosophy in History, eds. R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Universitv Press, 1984), p. 3 ) 1-48. 
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topics, Thomist ethics, the Scottish Enlightenment, and Nietzsche. Framing 
these debates is the larger project of trying to expose the shortcomings of post- 
Enlightenment 'liberal modernity' and the 'rationally inspired' ethical theories 
(Neo-Kantianism, Utilitarianism: see Ethical Theories and Performance 
above) most closely associated with it. He denies, in short,, the possibility of an 
autonomous rational ethics, exhorting us to examine how key terms in ethical 
debates are historically constituted. Hence his interest in virtue theory and its 
history. " This is a parallel position to, and a vindication of, the recent critiques 
of the ideology of musical work autonomy (critiques which this study 
endorses). " I should mention that this is a quite brutal summary of a substantial 
body of work and does it scant justice. It has been much discussed and not 
always well received. " 
One of the earliest authoritative formulations of virtue theory is to be 
found in Aristotle, who initiates his enquiry in the Nicomachean Elhics with 
these famous words: 'Every art and every investigation, and likewise every 
action and decision aim at some good; hence the good has been well described 
as that at which everything aims. "' This is, of course, a circular definition, one 
which begs the question of a transcendent good. Macintyre sees the search for 
the good as at least in part sel f- constitutive: the search itself - he calls it a 
(quest"' - helps to define the end it seeks, which is initially indicated by the 
" Of relevance here are: 'The Relationship of Philosophy to its Past', which deals with the issue 
of commensurability and the 'sovereignty of history' within the discipline of philosophy; Whose 
Justice9 Which Rationality9 (London: Duckworth, 1988), which examines through detailed 
historical narrative competing concepts of justice by Hume and Aristotle; it includes detailed 
discussions of his views on translation, to which a whole chapter is devoted; Three Rival 
["ersions of Alloral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, Tradition (London: Duckworth, 1990): 
and of course After Virtue itself, which is itself a history of virtue theory from Homer to the 
present day, conjoined with a fierce critique of what Macintyre calls 'emotivism', by which he 
means an extreme form of liberalism driven by subjective desire. 
Lydia Goehr's work is a well-known example. 
Macintyre's work is discussed by a variety of authors in After Macintyre.. Critical 
Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair Macintyre, eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). Joseph Margolis offers a detailed critique of the relation of 
theory to practice as expressed in the work of Macintyre and others in his Life without 
Principles. - Reconciling Theory and Practice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). A detailed refutation 
of the concept of the practice as employed in the social sciences generally is to be found in 
Stephen Turner, The Social Theory of Practices. - Tradition, Tacit Knowlecýge and 
Prcsuppositlons (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994). Turner's book is reviewed by James Bohman in 
Hisioi-v and Theory. - Studics in the Philosophy of History, 36, (1997), 93-107. 
" Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), p. 1. 
59 Macintyre. After Firtue, p. 219. 
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practice and the tradition it occupies. This is an intelligible position: Carroll's 
view is effectively that the art world is not goal-directed, but operates in a 
continual cycle of innovation and critical reflection, thus rendering it self- 
constitutive in Macintyre's sense. As far as the musical performer is concerned, 
innovation is kept in check by what might be called 'local' or 'micro-goods'. 
which are well established: these have,, as Kingsbury's investigation intimates, 
tended to harden to obligations of categorical obedience towards institutional ly 
empowered individuals. 
The Practice: (3) the Dialectic of Practice and Institution 
Macintyre's motives in writing After Virtue were to explore and analyse 
what he saw as the moral decay of contemporary society. Hence the title 'After 
Virtue'. One important conflict he tackles is the tension between institutions and 
the individuals that work within them. The criteria which make modem 
institutions successful - in particular their need for economic security - can 
obviously conflict with the values a practice wishes to uphold. Here is how 
Macintyre describes this relationship: 
Practices must not be confused with institutions. Chess, 
physics and medicine are practices: chess clubs, 
laboratories, universities and hospitals are institutions. 
Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned 
with what I have called external goods. They are involved 
with acquiring money and other material goods; they are 
structured in terms of power and social status and they 
distribute money, power and status as rewards. Nor could 
they do otherwise if they are to sustain not only 
themselves, but also the practices of which they are the 
bearers. For no practices can survive for any length of time 
unsustained by institutions. Indeed, so intimate is the 
relationship of practices to institutions - and consequently 
of the goods internal to the practices in question - that 
institutions and practices characteristically form a single 
causal order in which the ideals and the creativity of the 
practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the 
institution, in which the cooperative care for the common 
goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the 
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competitiveness of the institution. In this context the 
essential function of the virtues is clear. Without them, 
without justice, courage and truthfulness. practices could 
60 not resist the corrupting power of institutions. 
Here Macintyre's description chimes in happily with Kingsbury's empirical 
observations. It may appear that Macintyre Is rather more conciliatory than 
Kingsbury, but Macintyre's is an idealised account. In fact his diagnosis of the 
problems surrounding institutional power more often resembles an autopsy. 
There is also an unmistakably Marxist flavour to this analysis, which is hardly 
unexpected given his longstanding engagement with this strand of thought. In 
fact it is to Weber's analysis of bureaucracy and bureaucratic power that 
Macintyre turns to describe what is most characteristic of modern social 
organisation, and he tries to show how an atomistic, autonomous conception of 
ethics interlocks with it. He isolates three distinctive types of individual, whom 
he designates 'characters', as symbolically significant. These are the Rich 
Aesthete, the Therapist and the Manager" and it is the latter figure, whose 
organising function acknowledges no aim beyond its own effectiveness within 
organisations and, atornistically, for himself, who is most important. Weber's 
analysis itself offers no help because in Macintyre's view it makes no sustained 
distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. The 
value that motivates a Manager in bureaucratic organisations is the mere 
maintenance of power and it is the managerial ethos that characteristically 
determines the goods external to contemporary practices. As the Manager has 
no motive for action other than to gain power or retain hold over it the goods 
internal to the practice increasingly come to serve external goods - such as 
promoting financial gain over all else - rather than the reverse condition, which 
Macintyre sees as defining the practice. Hence he asserts that practices, in his 
understanding of the term, cannot flourish in societies in which the virtues are 
not valued - and lie clearly believes this is overwhelmingly the case today - 
Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 194. 
The Rich Aesthete is a character whose wealth allows him to disengage from anv hil-her 
loyalties but who commands loyalty from those dependent upon him (ýIacintyre cites He nry 
James as an inspired analyst of this character-type). The Therapist is someone who sees her role 
as corrective: anyone who fails to conform socially requires by definition therapy. \Nhich 
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. although institutions and technical skills serving unified purposes might well 
continue to flourish'. 62 
Clearly there is much sense in this analysis and it deserves broad 
sympathy. Indeed, the doornsaying of, for example, Norman Lebrecht - and 
here the title of one of his recent books suffices: When the Music stops... 
Managers, Maestros and the Corporate Murder of Classical Music 63 _ 
immediately gains in weight and authority read against the background of 
Macintyre. Adorno's aesthetics too, also drawing on Weber, make extensive use 
of the figure of a progressive encroachment of rationality in modern life, though 
here the application in music inclines towards the musical work itself, rather 
than human agency, as a 'zone of irrationality'. His suggestion is that the 
domain of the aesthetic in toto is less susceptible to rational i sation, as Max 
Paddison points OUt. 64 But there are problems with the concept of virtue itself. 
For example, the distinction - and conflict - between goods internal and 
external to the practice requires the individual, who may well function within 
the institution and practice simultaneously, to embody their contradictory 
values. Virtues, as we shall see, must normally be defined as mandatory 
qualities, if they are to retain their autonomy: if they are optional, they can 
degenerate into 'instruments of rationality' themselves. Any concept of the 
virtues will need to take account of this. The unity of narrative life which 
Macintyre stresses is a record of the swerves and compromises - thefailures of 
virtue - that reconciling the internal and external goods of a practice entail. 65 
To summarise: Macintyre's model of the practice places it within a 
larger social context which contains other practices; it locates the individual 
henceforth becomes the technique of generating conformity. Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 24 ff. 
62 Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 193. 
63 Norman Lebrecht, When the Music stops... Managers, Maestros and the Corporate Murder of 
Classical Music (London: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
61 Max Paddison, Adorno's Aesthetics of Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), p. 135-148; see especially p. 136-7 on 'instrumental' and 'value' rationality; and p. 139 on 
music as a 'zone of irrationality'. See also Max Paddison, Adorno, 11odernism and Mass 
Cullure (London: Kahn and Averill, 1996) for further discussion (chapter one, 'Critical theory 
and Music', p. 11-44). Richard Taruskin makes a direct connection between reification and what 
lie calls the 'essential modernist fallacy': 'Turning ideas into objects, and putting objects in the 
place of people, is the essential modernist fallacy - the fallacy of reification, as it is called. ' 
Richard Taruskin, Text and Act Essays on Music and Performance (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 199-5), p. 24. 
76 
both within the practice and within society at large- it stresses the importance of 
narrative unity for the individual and suggests how this unity can be threatened. 
The practice has two faces: an institution, whose function is enabling and 
supportive, but which is subject to general financial, legal and resource 
constraints; and the practice itself, which exists to further its tradition and the 
goods that tradition aspires to. The goods external to the practice reflect global 
constraints while the goods internal to it provide the individual with goals to 
work towards. To achieve these goods, the individual exercises the virtues. 
There is not always a clean division between these two domains. 
The Practice: (4) Virtues, Skills, and Natural Capacities 
Musical performance would seem to require an unusual range of 
qualities which on account of their contrary nature are not often found together 
and are not easily developed in tandem. For example, in preparing a piece for 
performance, a pianist spends a great deal of time making sense of the details of 
the score,, or in trying to solve complex problems of muscular coordination. In 
other words, preparing an interpretation requires systematic attention to detail. 
Within the time constraints a performance schedule imposes, it also requires 
considerable organisational ability, especially in estimating how much time 
learning new repertoire will take and integrating this into a daily practice 
regimen. Concentration, self-discipline, sensitivity to detail, the ability to solve 
intellectual problems and to balance priorities over the short and long term: 
these qualities sit uncomfortably together with those called upon in the 
performing situation itself, such as communicative flair, spontaneity, coping 
with the unforeseen, the ability to immerse oneself in the expressive moment, 
and a resilience of nerve which borders on insensitivity. The performer has at 
different times to plan resolutely for the future or to live from moment to 
moment. 
How might , N-e classify this diverse range of qualities? Let me consider 
Nlacintyre's views before turning to other commentators. In invoking '\, litue' 
`5 Macintyre, After Virtue, p-2 1-3 ). 
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and virtue theory, I want to access a resource which goes beyond mere skill or 
technique. (The negative everyday associations of the word - it can sound 
pompous and old-fashioned - should be disregarded in this discussion. ) 
Macintyre's definition - 'partial and tentative' - relates the virtues in the first 
instance not so much to other qualities in the individual but to the practice itself: 
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and 
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods 
which are internal to practices and the lack of which 
effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods. " 
But this is only half the story, for virtues are qualities which, Janus-like, link the 
practice to the individual, marking him out as belonging. They can be learned or 
acquired, like a skill or technique; but technique is definable as the most 
efficient means to achieve an end, while a virtue is implicated in the end itself- 
up to a point, virtue is indeed its own reward. Macintyre argues that the 
transformations that internal goods undergo over time are the result of human 
powers extended through the acquisition of skills subordinated to the exercise 
of virtue. He says: 
What is distinctive in a practice is in part the way in which 
conceptions of the relevant goods and ends which the 
technical skills serve - and every practice does require the 
exercise of technical skills - are transformed and enriched 
by these extensions of human powers and by that regard 
for its own internal goods which are partially definitive of 
each particular practice or type of practice. " 
In consequence, 'practices never have a goal or goals fixed for all time' but are 
altered through a dialectical interaction with virtue. " It is therefore a virtue in 
itself to possess 'an adequate sense of the traditions to which one belongs or 
Ný7hich confront one'. " All this tends to confirm Kingsbury's conclusion that 
" Mac intyre, After I'irtue, p. 19 1. 
67 lbid, p. 193. 
Ibid, p. 193. 
lbid, p. 2233. 
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musical values are both the product and producer of musical practice. _0 This 
makes of music a mere vehicle for the exercise of power relations and I think we 
should reject a circularity conceived quite so narrowly. Macintyre's conception 
points to a more complex web of connections involving both other practices and 
the narrative thread of the individual life, the ways in which integritv across a 
whole life is sought (though not, of course,, necessarily achieved). 
The distinction here between virtue and skill is paralleled in musical 
parlance by that of expression and technique respectively. Kingsbury's top- 
down hierarchy is: talent, of which musicality is a kind; and technique and 
expression, which are aspects of musicality. " For performing musicians, 
technique signifies the range of physical skills - the 'toolbox' -a player 
possesses. " Musicality (or musicianship") involves the ability to follow musical 
instructions (make sense of a score, interpret a conductor's gestures) 
expressively. In invoking 'expression' I do not wish to offer up a theory of one 
of the most discussed terms of aesthetics, except to say that in Kingsbury's 
sense - also the sense in which musical performers commonly use the word - it 
has an ambiguous transitivity. The player expresses both herself and the music 
(or some property of it). This is an ambiguity it shares with the terms 
'authenticity' and 'performance'. In general terms, the self individuates itself by 
doing something familiar in a novel way: expression is allusive, intertextual, 
performative. " 
There is more to musical performance than the marriage of technique 
and virtue as Linda Zagzebski's detailed ruminations on the nature of virtue and 
'0 1 quoted Kingsbury above as saying that 'musical performance (including in this the social 
relations obtaining in the performance situation: relations of power), musical meaning, and 
musical structure are linked in a nexus in which each aspect is both product and producer of the 
others'. Kingsbury, Music, Talent, and Performance, p. I 10. 
Kingsbury, Music, Talent, and Performance, p. 137. 
72 Technique is in turn dependent on instrument technology and developments in this field. I 
have not explored this avenue in this study, but have assumed that as a factor within pianistic 
practice it is relatively stable. An overview is provided by Reginald R. Gerig, Famous Pianists 
aml Their Technique (Washington/New York: Robert B. Luce, 1974). 
7 -3, Kingsbury does not discuss the differences between these two terms, apparently treating them I t) 
as synonyms. In chapter five I will suggest a distinction between them. 1 74 For a comment to this effect, see the concluding words of the entry on 'expression' by 
Stephen Mulhall, in A Companion to Aesthetics, ed. David Cooper (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 
p. 144-149. 
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its role in human behaviour implies. " She distinguishes between natural 
capacities, skills and virtues and their relationship to habits and feelings. I will 
now submit her claims to critical scrutiny: 
1. Natural Capacities. These are uncontrollable or unchanging facts about a 
person. In so far as such facts exist, they are beyond the individual*s 
responsibility and advantages that accrue from them are unearned. What she has 
in mind are above all physical characteristics, such as height. So if somebody 
can only stretch an octave at the piano, they cannot acquire the ability to stretch 
a tenth through diligent practice . 
76 But such a concept is impossible to define 
accurately, because the body is in a constant state of change, change which is in 
turn critically dependent on environmental conditions. The most we can say is 
that certain changes are (currently) impossible and that others are more or less 
improbable. Instead, we might think in terms of certain potentials which a 
person more or less realises, depending on the environment she is in. This 
development contains time constraints, or 'windows of opportunity. How tall 
you are depends on both genetic factors and how these (through diet and 
exercise, for example) interact with the environment: there is no making good 
on lost opportunities when body growth ceases. So it is with a performer's 
technique. As Zagzebski diffidently states '... the distinction between natural 
and acquired is somewhat vague since even natural qualities can often improve 
with training and practice'. " It is in part this distinction that is at stake in 
Kingsbury's identification of talent with a musician's sense of self-worth: how 
much of what a musician can do musically is the result of their own efforts, how 
much 'given"? There is no clear answer. What is clear is the need for a term that 
describes potential, which is a 'best case scenario' or an idealised future: this is 
another instance of the need for a degree of conceptual slackness to account for 
Linda Trinkaus Zacyzebski, Virtues of the Mind. - an Inquiry into the Nature of l'irtue and the 
Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
16 Charles Rosen relates that Josef Hoffman could only manage an octave and Steinway actually Z-: ) 
went to the trouble of constructing him a piano with slightly narrower keys to make certain 
works easier to play. (Charles Rosen, 'On Playing the Piano', p. 49. ) A point Rosen also makes 
is that the size of a pianist's hand is of minor significance and that technique is highly 
individual. In fact we might say, following his argument to a logical conclusion, that one skill a 
(proficient) pianist needs is to be able to find personalised technical solutions to planistic 
problerns and develop his own personal technique through experiment. 
Za-zebski, Virtues of'the 11hid, p. 103. It) 
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the unpredictability of human behaviour. Kingsbury is right in problematising 
the concept of 'talent', which is used in precisely this ,, N, ay: it is neither part of 
the individual nor entirely separate. But it is a term with an important role to 
play within the conceptual scheme. I would propose a different avenue of 
exploration: when do we decide that an individual has talent? And how is it 
monitored? This is a question about individual development and how children 
gain membership of a practice. " 
2. Skills. Her view confirms what we already know: that they are the specific 
means to achieving particular ends and that they are to be judged for their 
external effectiveness; they are learnable and forgettable-, some are prerequisite 
to successful social functioning (such as the ability to read) while others, such 
as some musicianship skills are highly differentiated and hence not 
'transferable'; skills have no opposites, unlike virtues (whose opposites are of 
course 'vices'); while it is conceivable that someone could on occasion be 
virtuous by accident, accidental skill is virtually impossible. Monkeys do not 
type sentences, let alone Shakespearean tragedies. Some skills are not worth 
possessing, but all virtues are. " 'Virtue in excess' is nonetheless conceivable. " 
Skills are also inseparable from virtues because carrying out virtuous actions 
requires skill. Zagzebski gives some interesting examples of this connectedness 
which suggest that the underlying distinction between the two parallels Ryle's 
famous epistemic categorisation: 'knowing that' entails virtue, whereas 
'knowing how' entails skill. " If virtues provide a stable framework for 
behaviour, skills are the executive function. Zagzebski's larger project, 'an 
inquiry into the ethical foundations of knowledge' is indeed an attempt to centre 
epistemology on the virtues. 
Virtues. Zagzebski's definition of a virtue is as follows: 
78 1 return to this theme in chapter four below. There I propose a three stage model to describe I'D 
the initiation process. 
79 it is a moot point, incidentally, whether all practices are worthwhile. This is discussed by 
Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey in 'Macintyre, Feminism, and the Concept of Practice' in 
Horton and Mendus, After Alacint , vre, p. 
265-282, esp. p. 273-5. 
"0 Zagzebski, Firtues of the I fin(l, p. 196. 
" Zagzebski, Firtues of the Ifimi, p. 1133 and 117. Gilbert Ryle, Concept Qf ýIlind 
(Hari-nondsworth: Penguin, 1990. first edition 1949). 
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... a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person. involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain 
desired end and reliable success in bringing about that 
end. " 
What marks out a virtue is that it is acquired over a long period of time and is 
consistently employed in different situations and practices. It is habitual, but not 
thoughtlessly so. This sense of scale is important because it links virtues to the 
life narrative and its intelligibility. This is one of the key arguments in refuting 
the criticism that the definition is circular and hence merely a paraphrase of 
means-ends rationality. Echoing Macintyre, she says: 
It is part of the ability to have a concept of the self that 
changes in character can be understood by the agent 
herself. She must be able to tell herself a story in which she 
has no trouble identifying with the person she remembers 
being at each stage of the change. " 
Virtues can be 'self-regarding' or 'other-regarding' and there can be antagonism 
between the two aspects; " their consequences can be gauged internally and 
externally; " they can appear in a moral and an intellectual guise, where the 
intellectual virtues operate as a control or 'filter' for the memory, and the moral 
virtues as a control on actions. " There is also a special higher-order, organising 
virtue, that of phronesis, or practical wisdom. " Feelings play an important role 
in what Zagzebski refers to as the 'motivational component' of virtue: 'a 
11 motive"', she says, 'in the sense relevant to an inquiry into virtue is an emotion 
or feeling that initiates and directs action towards an end'. " This is consistent 
with recent research on the role of feelings and emotions in the brain and 
nervous system. For example, it has been shown in research on brain-damaged 
patients that an absence of feeling effectively freezes up the decision-making 
82 Zagzebski, Firmes of the Alind, p. 137. 
83 lbid, p. 1233. 
4 lbid, p. 99. 
lbid, p. 98-99. 
lbid, p. 89. 
4701, phronesis, see Za,, zebski, Virtues of the Alind, p. 211-23 ) 1. 
Zagzebski, l'irtues ofthe .1 find, p. 
II 31. 
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process. " In the light of this, a theory of musical performance will require a 
virtue of 'commitment'. 
Zagzebski concludes that *virtues and skills have numerous connections. 
but virtues are psychically prior to skills'. 'o However, I think she goes too far in 
claiming that they are distinct from each other: rather, the *value system" and 
the 'executive' are mutually implicated. 
Zagzebski's discussion of virtue aims for 'a high degree of theoretical 
significance combined with practical usefulness. " Although she adopts an 
analytical stance she is not rigid in applying it. Nor does she claim to have 
exhausted the topic. " Paths are left untrodden and projects postponed. So XN-e 
should not expect peremptory conclusions. Even so, some of the claims she 
makes seem to me rash - given that the distinction between virtue, skill and 
natural capacity is not always as clear as she would wish - others, such as the 
discussion of moral and intellectual virtue, vague. " 
A Note on Concepts 
It may be worthy to regard persons as 'ontologically more fundamental 
than acts' and to wish to define acts in terms of persons, as virtue theory does; it 
is certainly theoretically implied in the ethics of 'individualism' which underlies 
the performing musician's training. " If we allow this ontological move - and in 
making the performer the locus of attention, we do just this - we must agree 
with Zagzebski that what makes a theory a virtue theory is that 'it focuses 
analysis more on the concepts involved in the evaluation of persons than on act 
evaluation'. 95 What do we know of the concept of a concept? And how useful is 
the kind of 'classical' analytical concept, with its search for necessary and 
In this regard, see the work of Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error. - Emotion, Reason and 
the Human Brain (New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994), which argues this point in detail. Also of 
interest is Joseph Ledoux, The Emotional Brain. - the Mysterious Underpinnings qfEmotional 
LýA, (London: Phoenix, 1999). 
90 Zagzebski, Firtues of the Mind, p. 115. 
9' Zaozebski, Firtues of the Mind, p. 89. 
See, for example, her comments on integritN'. Ibid, p. 166. 
93 Ibid, p. 139. 
04 Za-zebski, Virtues ofthe, 11ind. p. 79. 
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Ö-) 
sufficient conditions, that Zagzebski and other analytical philosophers work 
with? 
Owen Flanagan has argued that any moral theory should achieve at least 
a minimal compatibility with the understanding of liuman nature available f'rom 
cognitive science. He calls this the 'principle of minimal psychological realism': 
Make sure when constructing a moral theory or projecting 
a moral ideal that the character, decision processing, and 
behaviour described are possible, or are perceived to be 
possible, for creatures like us. " 
It turns out that there is no single accepted description of the concept as a 
mental entity. The 'classical' theory, as defined above ('necessary and sufficient 
conditions'), fares badly. " Rather, it is typical of concepts to lack hard-edged 
boundaries. 
) to be 'fuzzy'; to demonstrate prototypical effects, and to contain 
metaphorical elements. " We might therefore expect the concept of performance 
to exhibit these qualities. 
Is Zagzebski's analysis psychologically realistic? Although it fails to 
provide watertight categories, its very fuzziness is an advantage. Musical 
performance practice values innovation: but any analysis which looks closely at 
peýformance must have a means of accounting for difference, the uniqueness of 
the occasion. A theory which posits fixed character traits in a person will always 
struggle at the level of finest detail, because no two actions are completely alike. 
As I have already argued in relation to the concept of the practice, a degree of 
conceptual fuzziness in describing human behaviour is essential in allowing us 
to assess innovation and reassess past achievements. 
95 Zagzebski, l'irtues of the Mind, p. 79. 
96 Flanagan is quoted by Mark L. Johnson in his essay 'Ethics', in Bechtel and Graham, .4 
Companion to Cognitive Science, p. 69-3. 
97 One recent definition: 'Most concepts (especially lexical concepts) are structured 
representations that encode a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their application, if 
possible, in sensory or perceptual terms. ' From Concepts: Core Readings, eds. Eric Margolis 
and Stephen Laurence, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technolop I 1: ýý I 1999), P. 10. 
Margolis and Laurence, Concepts: Core Readings chapter 1; and Mark L. Johnson, 'Ethics'. I 
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Beyond Virtue: Imagination, Originality, and Creativity 
The conclusion to draw from the above is that ýve should expect 
anomalies, impurity and untidiness in the conceptual world. This is nicely 
illustrated by the problem of accounting for the virtues - if such they be - of 
originality, imagination and creativity. Zagzebski is willing to include them as 
such" while at the same time denying them some of the defining qualities that 
supposedly constitute virtues generally, such as rule-obedience, or habituation. 
In musical performance terms I would offer this model. If a performer, at 
work on preparing an interpretation, imagines how a part of the music will 
sound, this is a performative act. It is performative in so far as it involves both 
imagining something that already exists (the notated work), for an 'audience' of 
the critical self, and in so doing it necessarily alters it (exact repetition being 
impossible). Originality is implicated in any performative act: it is a matter of 
degree. On a larger time scale, originality depends on historical context, and can 
only be a relative value. Creativity is the name we give to the synthesis of what 
is perceived as substantially and intentionally different from prior conceptions. 
This model requires that the performer has planned her interpretation. (And of 
course it is possible to play music quasi -spontaneously, without forming an 
interpretation first: this is what happens in sight-reading. "') 
These are, if you like, necessary, but not sufficient conditions for 
creativity. A musical performance must also be received with critical approval: 
what is approved is a matter for the exponents and critics of a practice to 
discuss. As I noted in Chapter One, it is only to be expected in a practice with 
such a large element of innovation as musical performance that theory will lag 
behind practice. This is the logical outcome. 
Zagzebski, l'irtucs qfthe llind, p123. p. 155. 
100 1 return to this in chapter four. See in particular Jerrold Levinson's discussion of the limits of 
performative interpretation in Terformative vs. Critical Interpretation of Music', in Krausz, The 
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Summary: Constituents of Macintyre's Model of a Practice 
Macintyre's model contains the following elements: 
1. Social - cooperative human activity. 
2. Social/historical - the setting. 
3. Historical - tradition. 
4. Psychological/ethical - unity and intergrity of individual behaviour within the 
practice and within an individual life; and 
5. Intelligibility of behaviour and potential accountability. 
6. Ethical - standards of excellence, obedience to rules and achievement of 
goods through 
7. The exercise of the virtues. 
In addition, he makes a distinction between practices and institutions, which 
exist to support them. 
baci-preiation of Music. 
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Part Two: Pianistic Practice 
Situating Pianistic Practice 
Macintyre's model is a layered, nested structure. The outer rings - 
Tradition, which generates 'Weltanschauungen' and philosophical systems - 
encompass the largest scoops of time and space and deal in the most abstract 
generalities: they contain practices, which in turn contain individuals within 
them with the performances themselves at each unique nexus of time and space 
as the primal instances of particularity. "' The world of music can be viewed in 
this way. At the most general level we raise the issue of the concept of 'music' 
itself: what common features do the musics of different cultures exhibit? Are 
they reducible to an identifiable, definable essence? Here the question of 
commensurability arises, and this is a matter for ethnomusicologists and music 
psychologists to investigate. It will be the theme of part of my final chapter. The 
present perspective is narrower: classical music performance, and pianism in 
particular, to be understood at the level of a well-establi shed practice, some two 
hundred years old. 
I would like to complicate further Macintyre's (spatial) metaphor in two 
ways. Both concern the problem of framing a practice. Firstly, we should 
remind ourselves of the possibility of multiple membership: we identify 
ourselves, and are identified, as belonging to many different practices 
simultaneously. Virtues cross practices and in this way exert a pervasive 
influence. Secondly - and partly in consequence of this - the boundaries of 
practices are not absolute: membership may be a matter of degree, with 
institutional and attitudinal factors playing a part. In fact, the problems of 
describing practice membership are rather similar to those of describing concept 
membership: the boundaries are not infinitely permeable, nor are they rigidly 
defined. 
"' Macintyre, 'The Relationship of Philosophy to its Past'. 
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Taking pianism as my central practice, I will in the course of this study 
encounter some of the other major practices with which it overlaps. such as 
composition, analysis, recording and piano teaching. 
The Double History of Pianism 
In chapter one (History or Histories? ) I argued. following Lydia Goehr, 
that the practice of art music performance is effectively a double history, in 
which two attitudes to performance are in constant counterpoint. "" This double 
practice emerged in the nineteenth century with Liszt as a key figure in its 
mythology, one who embodied this ambivalence. I take this to be a picture 
which many pianists (and performers generally) of this century would recognise 
and broadly endorse, though of course individual perspectives will vary. 
The first strand of this larger theme I would like to take up is the 
emergence of specialisation. Historically we can note that from the very 
beginnings of pianistic practice, there has been considerable overlap between 
composition and performance. Mozart, Beethoven, and then Clementi, Hummel 
and many other early nineteenth-century figures did both. In fact, in the first few 
decades of the nineteenth century, composers who were not also performers 
(such as Schubert) were exceptions to the rule. By the middle of the century, 
there is an increasing tendency for musicians to become identified with one 
dominant pursuit, even though they may have simultaneously been active as 
performers, transcribers, composers, critics and even historical musicologists. 
(Think of the alternative careers of Brahms as editor, Clara Schumann and 
Joachim as composers, Wagner as critic and conductor as examples. ) 
If in the nineteenth century composers were often performers (or vice 
versa), in the twentieth century the drive towards specialisation into discrete 
practices has certainly been more urgent. As in the field of composition, it is the 
"' Lydia Goehr, 'The Perfect Performance of Music and the Perfect Musical Performance", new 
fin-mations. - a Journal (? f CulturelTheorvlPolitics, 27, (Winter 1995-6), volume title 
'Perfori-nance Matters', P. 1 -2. 
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years preceding the First World War that seem to mark a ývatershed. "' Busoni is 
a figure who captures the contradictions of this critical phase. around the turn of 
the century; within him the roles of performer, transcriber, composer. 
aesthetician and critic are finely balanced. He occupies a fascinating point of 
intersection. His almost exact contemporary Rachmaninoff approaches him in 
breadth as do Paderewski and Cortot (though in each case with different 
emphases). The following generations produced a number of great composers 
who were also notable performers - Bartok, Prokofiev and later Benjamin 
Britten, for example - but the trend towards specialisation was by mid century 
advanced. "' 
In the early years of the century these new specialisations were also 
increasingly regulated and hence standardised. These were years of 
demographic change with the emergence of 'mass culture', the decline in the 
role of informal contacts (the piano 'schools' of Leschetizky and others) relative 
to that of organised pedagogy administered by institutions (the conservatory); 
and, in the long term, the revolutionising complementary inventions of 
broadcasting and the mechanical (later electronic-digital) reproduction of music. 
Standardisation segues into internationalisation, especially in the years after the 
Second World War, and the division of labour in the art music field into 
composer and performer is replicated in other industrialised countries. The 
audience classical music performers serve begins to be thought of in global, 
rather than national, or European, terms. Recordings help to establish 
international reputations - here the advent of the LP and tape-recording and 
editing tectmiques are significant - and improvements in long distance 
transportation (such as the introduction of commercial air flight) makes 
'0' Dahlhaus places the end of the Romantic era in the first decade of the twentieth century. Carl 
Dahlhaus, Nineteenth- Cent ury Music, trans. J. B. Robinson (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1989), ch. 7. (p. 390-394). Marc Pincherle, The World of the Virtuoso trans. Brockway 
(London: Gollancz, 1964) makes much of an isolated incident at a concert in Paris earl,, in the 
century to support this claim. (p. 29-30. ) Robert Philip makes 1911 'a convenient landmark in 
the history of marketing of piano recordings' in The Cambridge Companion to the Piano, ed. z! ) 
David Rowland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 82. In 11ý lo-4 There are of course many contemporary examples of performer-composers. It is however 
rather unusual to come across a professional performer of eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
repertory who is active as a composer of contemporary music. 
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extended touring easier. There is thus an increase in de facto autonomy for both 
packaged sounds and performances. 
The end of the Second World War marks a threshold of another kind. as 
a new practice of performing emerges. There are compelling reasons for 
drawing the line here and I will argue later (in chapter four) that these have to 
do with innovations in post war avant-garde compositional practice which 
effectively lead to the transformation of the concept of 'interpretation' (or, in a 
sense, to its demise). At the same time the established 'double' practice lived on 
in the second half of the century, its repertory largely frozen, with Bach and 
Webern marking the outer limits, leavened with occasional token gestures 
towards 'new' Music. 105 
Pianistic history is, then, a double history, with a pronounced move 
towards specialisation and a critical hiatus around 1945. Attempts to categorise 
styles of interpretation and performance further according to genealogy - the 
pupils of Liszt constituting a 'Liszt school' in contrast with the 'Leschetitzky 
school' or according to geographical distribution - 'national' schools of 
pianism have not been convincing. In fact a simple 'generational' model 
seems to capture similarities in performance styles best: contemporaries tend to 
play in a broadly similar way. "' 
For these reasons, it is perhaps easiest to conceive the history of pianism 
in terms of a succession of key figures: initially the practice starts out with 
individuals tending to embody the contradictory elements of the 'double' 
practice (for example Liszt or Busoni); later, the practice tends to generate 
"' This is a crudely oversimplified picture which contains a central truth. Charles Rosen offers 
an explanation from a different perspective. He comments: 'Every pianist plays some of the 
music that was being written when he was twenty or thirty. But after that, it gets harder and 
harder to learn new music and to appreciate it, so you stick with the composers you start with. ' 
Rosen is quoted by David Dubai in his interview collection The World of the Concert Pianist: 
Conversations with 35 Internationally Celebrated Pianists (London: Gollancz, 1985), p. 278. 
For further comments on this topic, see Charles Rosen, The Frontiers of Meaning. - Three 
lqforinal Lectures on Music (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), p. 3). 
'0' James Methuen Cambell, Chopin Playing: From the Composer to the Present Day (London: 
Gollancz, 1981) and (by the same author) 'Chopin in Performance', in The Cambridge 
Companion to Chopin, ed. Jim Samson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). p. 19 1- 
205) both organise their discussions around the notion of 'national' schools. In The Four 
Ballades (Carnbridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Jim Samson follows the 
loenerational' model. Perhaps there is a limited case for a combined genealogical geographical 
argument. 
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planistic types, who align themselves with either strand. Consider the example 
of Artur Schnabel, who occupies the high point of modernism within this 
history. He remembers (with pride, one feels) his teacher, Leschetizky. 
describing him as a 'musician', rather than a 'pianist' (whereas his rival, Mark 
Hambourg was, in Schnabel's opinion, the reverse) and comments that. 
... being a pupil of Leschetitzky and Mandiczewski. I 
became associated with two different musical departments. 
Through Leschetizky I was connected with the virtuoso 
tradition and introduced to Anton Rubenstein. Through 
Mandiczewski I made contact with the Brahms circle. "' 
His concern is thus in part to distance himself from the particularities of the 
instrument itself, this is entirely of a piece with his attitude towards the 
performance occasion as a whole , in which the greatest music is 'absolute 
music' and the performer and the listener are disembodied and thus effectively 
disappear. "' The connections line up neatly: the instrument, skill/'knowing- 
how'/virtuosity, the concrete performance occasion; as opposed to knowledge 
and understanding ('knowing that' as virtue), disembodiment and 
transcendence. "' 
At the same time, Schnabel acknowledges the role of compositional 
style: his idealist stance towards the performance occasion is reflected in his 
taste in music. He famously commented that he was 'only attracted to music 
that is better than it can be performed' (the category consists of the German 
classics but excludes for example Chopin's studies) and adds that 'unless a 
piece of music presents a problem to me, a never-ending problem, it doesn't 
interest me too much'. "' This indirect association of performance with problem- 
solving dovetails nicely with the notion of transparent translation, too, because 
Artur Schnabel, My Life and Music, p. 24-6. Glenn Gould argues a similar case. See Kevin 
Bazzana, Glenn Gould. - the Performer in the Work (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), p. 122. 
"' Schnabel, My Life and Music, p. 239. 
'09 Lydia Goehr, in The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works. - an Essay in the Philosophy of 
Alusic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), speaks of the 'transcendent move from the worldlý and 
particular to the spiritual and universal; [and] theformalist move which brought meaning from 
music's outside into its inside. ' (p. 121) It is interesting to note how the original etymological It) - 
connection between 'virtue' and 'virtuosity' has been obscured to the point where I find myself 
aligning virtuosity with a lack of virtue. 
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it suggests that text contains problems rather than requires completion. "' One of 
Schnabel's best-known pupils, Leon Fleischer. lumps together Schnabel xvith 
Toscanini as the most influential figures in twentieth-century performance 
because 
[T]hey counteracted that horrible nineteenth-century trend 
in which the performer became more important than the 
music... [They] brought back fidelity to the text. Not just a 
dry fidelity, but an alive, impassioned recreation, in which 
the reality of the text becomes your base of operation. ' 12 
In this interpretation, Schnabel's shift of emphasis was, pace Goehr, a critical 
response to a deplorable state of affairs. Incidentally, note how Fleischer's 
comments allow for a distinction between fidelity to the score (Texttreue) 
subordinated to the notion of fidelity to the work (Werktreue). 
Other pianists follow a similar line of argument. For example, Claudio 
Arrau traces the conflict within the practice back to Liszt, finding (like 
Dahlhaus) a distinction in his compositional praxis. He comments that 
... 
in the Mephisto Waltz, every note has so much 
expressive value, one wouldn't do anything for bravura's 
sake... the Norma Fantasy, or the Ipuritani Paraphrase... 
were made to show off the capacity of the pianist. At one 
time this was justified in a sense because concerts were 
supposed to be a display of skill. Then it was justified. But 
not now. ' 13 
Elsewhere Brendel offers a different slant on this distinctioril making not Liszt 
but Chopin of decisive importance: 
Looking back at the tradition of performing since Liszt, I 
see two basic types of performers: those who mastered a 
large central European repertory, and those who became 
Chopin specialists, with a few composers around him;... to 
'" Schnabel, My Life and Music, p. 122. 
... Lawrence Venuti discusses this issue in relation to language translation in The Translator's 
Invisibililv: a History of Translation (London: Routledge, 1995), ch. l. On 'problem-solving', b 
see Sarah Martin's review of Dunsby: Performing Music and John Rink, ed.: The Practice of 
Performancc. - Studies in Musical Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversitN Press, 
1995) in A hisic Analysis, 17 (1998), 108-12 1. 
112 Dubai, The Worldofthe Concert Pianist, p. 171. 
1" Joseph Horowitz, Conversations wiihArrau (London: Collins, 1982), p. 124. 
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do Chopin justice, one would have to specialise, at least I 
know I would have to specialise. '" 
Brendel does not spell out what it is that makes Chopin's music exceptional, 
though he might have in mind, on the one hand, a certain indebtedness, highly 
mediated though it is, to the 'display' culture of early nineteenth-century 
pianism; or perhaps those elements of pianistic style which Carl Schachter 
summarised as Thopin's unparalleled mastery of free, idiomatically pianistic 
counterpoint'. '" Brendel's avowed personal taste is, significantly, for music 
which foregrounds motivic processes, and his musical analyses demonstrate this 
preoccupation. '" 
Some pianists express an allegiance openly: Schiff echoes Schnabel, for 
example. '" Others talk about their activity in a way which betrays a sympathy, 
such as Ivo Pogorelich. "' Pogorelich is a 'virtuoso' who clearly has the 
performer's image and impact firmly in the foreground of his consciousness. 
Commenting on the reputedly 'demonic' qualities of virtuosi such as Paganini 
and Liszt in performance he has this to say: 
David Dubai, The World of the Concert Pianist, p. 95. 
As quoted in Jim Samson, Chopin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 112, from 
Schacter's review of Samson: The Music of Chopin, in Music Anal is, 8 (1989), 187-196. YS 
Alfred Brendel, Music Sounded Out: Essays, Lectures, Interviews, Afterthoughts (London: 
Robson, 1990) contains representative examples of his 'motivic' analyses. Nicholas Cook 
discusses Chopin in this regard. His words are worth quoting at length: '... from Beethoven's 
time onwards, a variety of fast music developed which makes less sense when played slowly: in 
Chopin's Scherzos, for instance, or for that matter in most of his faster piano pieces, there are 
sequences of chords which have no structural significance whatever, and which are meant to be 
perceived as splashes of colour within slower-moving progressions of structural harmonies. 
When they are played too slowly, these colouristic chord sequences are no longer perceived as 
such: instead they are heard as if they were genuine harmonic progressions, and the result is that 
the music becomes both texturally clogged and harmonically incoherent. Playing the music too 
slowly, in other words, turns it into nonsense; and the same applies to a great deal of more 
recent music, above all, perhaps, to Messiaen's piano works. Whether or not this is of 
significance to the composer, it is certainly of significance to the performer... ' Nicholas Cook, z! ) : Z> 
il hisic, Imagination, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), p. 200-20 1. 
The tendency to categorise repertory in this way lives on. It has been applied to 
contemporary music by Mervyn Cooke. He proposes a dialectic between 'structure' and 
'sonority': '[M]any composers moved away from overtly colouristic effects to cultivate a more 
abstract keyboard idiom as a vehicle for complex musical structures. Others continued to 
experiment with the piano's sonorous potential by introducing further innovative methods of 
sound production... ' He adds that the distinction is not absolute. From Rowland, The 
Cambridge Companion to the Piano, p. 202. 
Dubai, The World of the Concert Pianist, p. 294. 
Dubai, The World of the Concert Pianist, p. 264. Pogorelich talks of 'making a successful 
performance' (my italics) with two pieces by Prokofiev (significantly transcriptions). 
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If the artist on stage has this quality he must let it escape. 
But this can be very draining, even dangerous, because the 
performer must release all of his personality and being the 
way Horowitz could. He was white hot - his passion and 
volcanic power, his ability to excite, the fire of his 
temperament dominated the piano-playing world. "' 
It is important for a great virtuoso not to play badly, he adds, as this might 
damage his reputation and 'kill his legend'. Pogorelich's point is not a trivial 
observation. A (virtuoso) performer whose interest is in 'the perfect musical 
performance' stakes his claim to fame on creating a lasting reputation. If 
successful,, a 'legend' or a 'myth' arises. The perfect musical performance is 
unreconstructable and so it relies instead on exemplifying anecdotes. A story 
told of an early Horowitz performance is typical: when he began playing the 
(accompanying) chords at the beginning of Tchaikovsky's first concerto, the 
conductor apparently could not believe his ears and stepped off the podium to 
stare in astonishment at the pianist playing. To show a highly respected member 
of the profession in awe of a fellow performer is one of the best ways to fuel a 
legend. "O But such a form of evanescent fame is fragile., based as it is on 
subjective memory. Such a player will tend to be preoccupied with the 
incalculable and the irrational: the acoustics of the venue, the tone and action of 
the instrument,, nuance, atmosphere and the excitement of the moment. If the 
perfect musical performance succeeds, then the performer will take credit for it. 
Interestingly, if the perfect performance of music succeeds, the description of 
the process is characteristically rather different: the music takes over and 
communicates itself. 121 
'" Dubai, The World of the Concert Pianist, p. 269. 
120 Harold C. Schonberg, Horowil--. - His Life and Music (London: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 
p. 79-80. Schonberg presents the story in Horowitz's own words (the conductor was Eugene 
Pabst). 
121 Jonathan Dunsby's comments at the beginning of the final chapter of his Pelf6rining 1111sic. - 
Aared Concerns (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) tend to confirm this observation. 'Perhaps there is 
an Irony in the fact that whereas the intellectual with a carefully nurtured philosophical 
disposition may well find Boulez's notion of past masters "speaking of us through LIS" 
altogether too gooey for our own good, this is just what the performer does experience %N. lien 
things are going well; and this is something of what passes to the audience - "It's just as if 
Mozart himself had been playing tonight", we sometimes say. ' (p. 80) 1 17. 
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No performer is wholly dedicated to either the work or the performance 
of it: these are extreme positions with no more than theoretical significance. 
They mark the limits of a space within which performers can move with some 
fluidity. Changes in allegiance can be momentary; or they can occur over 
decades. "' The double history is in this respect doubtless no more than a 
persuasive simplification. 
Individual Careers and Narrative Unity 
What bearing does all this have on the notion of the unity of an 
individual life? In Macintyre's formulation, being able to construct a plausible 
narrative is a major factor. This would seem to make good psychological sense. 
It is widely acknowledged that narrative plays a central part in our creating a 
sense of identity for ourselves. "' A common story musicians - be they 
composers or performers - tell of themselves is vocational. In Schnabel's 
striking formulation, for example, 'a true musician was not only a man in love 
with music but one who was "loved by music - whose mind and being was 
possessed by music"'. "' The vocation is precisely the kind of structuring telos 
Macintyre has in mind. 
Here the issue of specialisation deserves further consideration, for it has 
both a historical and an individual dimension. Many composers spent time early 
in their musical careers performing before switching their allegiance. Chopin, 
for example, was unusually distinguished in both fields: he initially made a 
living as a pianist who composed, becoming in later years a composer who 
occasionally performed. This turns out to be a characteristic shift within 
individual lives. Performance skills are 'embodied': the process of embodiment 
has to begin early and requires continuous cultivation. Youth and early maturity 
122 Arrau, the one-tirne child prodigy and virtuoso is a case in point. 
12 ' ' For example, the cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner has suggested that already as 
children we possess a 'protolinguistic' readiness for narrative organisation and discourse. 
itý Press, 1990), p. 80. Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universi ! 
Cesar Saerchinger, Artur Schnabel: a Biogrqpýv (London: Cassell, 1957), p. 309. This It) 
striking formulation anticipites the fashionable idea of music as a 'meme'. See Susan I Blackmore, The Meme Machine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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cope with the physical demands of (virtuoso) performance better. and the urge 
to prove oneself against competition - and competitions are the best measure of 
skill - will be undimmed. "' Pogorelich speculates that for a performer of the 
status of Liszt or Horowitz, whose publics attributed almost super-human 
powers to them, succumbing to age must be a terrible frustration. 126 It is above 
all Liszt's career,, with its abrupt renunciation of virtuoso public performance, 
which exemplifies in radical form a frequently encountered tendency throughout 
the history of piano performance. The numerous examples of pianists who have 
either given up performing in public completely, or interrupted their careers for 
long periods, supply haunting variations on this theme. Liszt both sets and 
follows (e. g. Beethoven before him) a precedent; Horowitz himself took 
extended sabbaticals from performing, in order to recover and recharge himself 
(and financial inducements certainly seem to have played their part in tempting 
him back); 12' a frustration with the 'non-take-two-ness' of performance and a 
fear of a perceived (or paranoia-induced) 'blood-lust' in audiences who want to 
witness scandalous failure,, appparently lay behind Gould's departure from the 
concert scene; 128 Pollini's early success in the Chopin Competition at the age of 
eighteen in 1959 was followed by a period of complete withdrawal from concert 
life for near on a decade,, in order to study the instrument; more recently, we 
have seen a tendency for pianists (Barenbolm, Ashkenazy, Vasary) to move into 
the field of conducting (as Cortot did at the beginning of the century); still 
"' Dunsby talks about the many different types of loss (including technique) in Performing 
Music, p. 35. 
"' Dubal, The World of the Concert Pianist, p. 269. Compare the case of Paderewski, whose 
pianistic powers in later life were said to have declined steeply. His recordings have been 
interpreted as reflecting this. See Robert Philip's comments in Rowland, The Cambridge t) 
Companion to the Piano, p. 76. 
127 Schonberg, Horoivit.:. 
zn 12' Geoffrey Payzant, Glenn Gould. - Music and Mind (Toronto: Key Porter, 1984), ch. 2. 
Gould's motives have been subject to close scrutiny. Andrew Stephen, for example, plausibly 
(but prosaically) suggests that Gould set himself such high standards at an early age - having 
been pushed to the limit by an over-ambitious mother - that he was increasingly unable to meet 
thern. His well-known dependency on drugs (especially barbiturates) exacerbated the problems, 
making him prone to memory lapses. Andrew Stephen, 'Genius who died with his loves on', 
review of Peter Oswald: Glenn Gould- the Ecstacy and Tragedy of Genius (New York: Norton, 
1997) in The Observer, Review section, Sept. 14,1997. Peter Oswald himself avoids such 
cynically 'materialist' explanations; his view is that Gould suffered from Asperger's S,, ndrome, 
a condition related to autism, and that this best accounts for much of Gould's strange (anti-) 
social behaviour. 
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others, like Schnabel himself, have chosen to teach: these are prominent 
examples scattered through the history of the practice. 
In closing, I will allow myself a speculation which touches on a 
recurring theme in this study: the relationship of product to process. It may be 
that those performers who dedicate themselves to 'the perfect performance of 
music' - who endorse a 'craft' relation of performance to composition' - are 
better equipped to creating unity (or at least continuity) in their lives. Those 
who pursue the 'perfect musical performance' are more prone to disappointment 
as their quest is for something which by its very nature evanesces. The musical 
work is a concrete exemplification of a transcendent value: it is a reification, an 
objectification which celebrates stability. Stability, it has been persuasively 
argued, is an ultimate goal of human cultures. In the words of Hannah Arendt, 
... the reality and reliability of the human world rest 
primarily on the fact that we are surrounded by things more 
permanent than the activity by which they were produced, 
and potentially even more permanent than the lives of their 
authors. "' 
The musical performance is quite the opposite: it aims to achieve an 
improbable transcendence from process. Performers who pitch their lot with the 
ephemeral alone constantly face this debilitating paradox. 
12' This is Adorno's description. See Paddison, Adorno's Aesthetics oj'21 litsic, p. 187. 
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 94, 
quoted in Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticit-v (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), p. 7- 
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Part Three: The Virtues of Pianism 
Virtues of Pianistic, Performance 
Performing music is more than a matter of simply following 
instructions. At least, that is my assumption. The difficulty facing the theorist of 
performer behaviour is in going beyond a description of performance as the 
realisation of a set of commands contained in a score. "' It is a fact that scores 
underdetermine performances, just as it is a fact that no performance, however 
well planned, can be entirely predictable: nothing ever happens exactly the same 
way twice. If a performance were entirely predetermined, the performer's role 
would be reduced to that of an 'operator' (rather in the sense that we operate CD 
players). There is a balance between pre-determined elements - the 
composition, the player's preconceived interpretation - and open, occasion- 
dependent elements in which a constant feedback between the performer and his 
envirom-nent contributes to the final outcome. My proposal has been to enlist 
virtue theory as a way of filling this gap. It is through the possession and 
exercise of specific virtues that a performer negotiates the space that the score's 
multi-valency and the accidents of the occasion create. Simultaneously, I hope 
that virtue theory at least hints at a solution to the problem of circularity, by 
showing how a performer's behaviour in performance can - in theory at least - 
be linked to her behaviour elsewhere. 
Let me continue with a reminder of the two definitions I quoted above. 
First Macintyre's 'partial and tentative' definition: 
... an acquired 
human quality the possession and exercise 
of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which 
are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively 
prevents us from achieving any such goods. "' 
"' Taruskin draws attention to a parallel between the two tiers of legal practice - legislative and 
interpretative - and the roles of composer and performer in the perfon-ning arts. Taruskin, Text 
andAct, p. 35-37. 
13 22 Macintyre, After Firtue, p. 19 1. 
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To this we should add that the achievement of goods invokes standards of 
excellence and requires obedience to rules. "' Now Zagzebski: 
... a 
deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, 
involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain 
desired end and reliable success in bringing about that 
end. 134 
The two definitions apply at different levels of generality: Macintyre's points to 
the latitudinal frame of the practice, Zagzebski's to the longditudinal frame of 
the individual. At this point an ideal continuation of the argument would be to 
propose a list of virtues entailed in pianistic practice. It is clear that such 
personal qualities as determination, patience and intellectual integrity are 
essential to the undertaking; however, generalisations of this kind are simply too 
abstract. "' Virtues begin to resemble contracts more and more at the level of 
specific instances. What follows is an attempt to bridge the gap between abstract 
virtues of this kind and simplistic prescription. I propose we think of pianistic 
performance as guided by the following principles. (It will be clear, I hope, that 
they require only minor adjustments to make them applicable to art music 
performance generally): 
1. To perform a work in such a way that a considered personal interpretation is 
audibly manifest. 
2. To derive a personal interpretation as far as possible from the evidence the 
work. ) and 
its tradition of performance, provides. 
3. To perform with personal commitment and a heightened sense of awareness 
of what is taking place; to respect the uniqueness of the occasion and each 
moment within it. 
4. To exercise whatever control one can over the content and context of the 
performance occasion such that the other virtues are readily perceivable. 
Macintyre, After Firtue, p. 190. 
Zagzebsk i, Virtues of the Mind, p. 13 7. 
13 -' Fanny Waterman has provided a resonant list. A great performer must possess 'Inclination 
and imagination, backed up by application, concentration and determination'. Wend\' 
Thompson with Fanny Waterman, Piano Competition. - The Ston- of Leeds (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1990), p-xiv. 
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There are, no doubt, significant gaps here between virtue, principle and rule 
which remain to be filled adequately. Nonetheless, this fon-nulation does (Yo 
some way towards building bridges. The historical framework is clear: these 
have been the guiding principles of the practice from its gradual emergence in 
the middle of the nineteenth century until the present day. As far as the 
dialectical tension between the two strands of the practice is concerned, both 
draw on these principles, but on different aspects, in different ways. In 
particular, the first two, which stress the pre-existing 'text' of a performance 
(interpretation) are in potential conflict with the third and fourth, which are 
orientated to the concrete moment. 
What justification is there for linking these prescriptive statements to 
ývirtues' at all? What do they exemplify which might relate them to something 
greater than pianistic practice? What is the ethical framework within which the 
art music performance practice is understood? The underlying notion here is 
that each individual possesses an inestimable value, free from the constraints of 
prescribed function, of means-ends rationality: the only condition is a devotion 
to the practice itself. I follow Macintyre in suggesting that the link to other 
practices, where it occurs at all,, is through virtue. In short, it is an ethics of 
individual autonomy, predicated on an ethics of work autonomy. "' As a result, a 
definition of the higher order, organising virtue of phronesis (practical wisdom) 
becomes an uneasy balancing act. "' Here, by way of example, is Taruskin's by 
now well-known formulation of the outcome of virtue, authenticity: 
Authenticity... is knowing what you mean and whence 
comes that knowledge. And more than that, even, 
authenticity is knowing what you are, and acting in 
accordance with that knowledge. It is having what 
Rousseau called a 'sentiment of being' that is independent 
of the values, opinions and demands of others. "' 
"' Incidentally, the argument that the history of pianism is best told as the history of individual 
contributions to it makes sense in the light of this: one of the factors which makes a performer 
great is precisely her dissimilarity to others, her sheer individuality. Too great a deference 
towards the work itself (for example in the form of the score, or 'structure') leads to reification 
and the eventual neutralising of the performance occasion. (I argue that the overall trajectory of 
the history of the practice has been towards such a reification. ) 
Zaazebski, Virtues (? f the 1 find, p. 211-23 1. 
13 ' Taruskin, Tcxt and. 40, p. 67. 
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Just as Macintyre's and Zagzebski's ruminations on virtue point to internal and 
external values, so does Taruskin's formulation, which acknowledges the 
'situatedness' of the individual in a practice ('knowing what you mean and 
whence comes that knowledge') and the transcendent value of individual 
uniqueness ('independent of the values and demands of others'). "' 
The concepts of authenticity and performance share something 
important: they are both concepts which can be applied to any and every aspect 
of human life. Every human experience can be viewed as 'authentic', just as any 
action can be seen as a performance. As a summary quotation which pinpoints 
the dilemma facing analysts of the concept of 'authenticity' I cannot better these 
words of Arnos Finkelstein: 
From an ethical point of view every life is authentic, a 
value in and of itself, not interchangeable with any other 
human life,, a mode sui generis. "' 
In order to narrow down the applicability of these concepts, we need to specify 
conditions of inclusion. But classificatory conditions mean invoking a general 
concept, removed from the 'real' (authentic), happening in a unique present (as 
a performance). Hence the double history of pianism, and of art music 
performance practice as a whole, is neither a dubious nor a tragic impurity. It is 
a logical necessity. 
In the following sections, I examine two aspects of performance practice 
with virtue in mind. The first concerns itself with what we might call the 
evidential base for individual worth - memory - and the second with a 
performance situation - the competition - in which virtue is made to disappear. 
"' The literature on authenticity is vast. Taruskin offers Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and 
I Authenticiti- (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972) as a starting point. (See Text and 
Act, p. 72-33 
"" Quoted in M. A. Bernstein, Foregone Conclusions. - Against Apocalyptic History (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994), p. 122. 
101 
Case Studies in Performance Virtue: (1) Performance from Memory 
Where did the idea of performing from memory originate. and why" 
What purpose does it serve and what meanings might it have? Lý'dia Goehr 
makes a distinction between two modes of performance practised by Liszt: the 
performance of works and the practice of extemporisation and improvisation 
clearly involve memory in quite different ways. The question of memorising 
only really arises when fully composed works enter the fray. She credits Liszt 
with this innovation, one among many: 
Liszt was... the first to play a whole programme of pre- 
composed works from memory, which indicated many 
things, not the least being that he had obviously practised 
the works before the concert took place. "' 
Goehr is not explicit at this point about the 'many things' this practice 
might indicate. "' What is clear is that Liszt's innovation was one of extent, 
rather than principle, as other performers and pedagogues were already 
recommending playing from memory to students of the instrument. Czerny, for 
example, offers a negative justification, suggesting that 
... it appears rather childish to 
be obliged, for every trifle, 
to turn over one's collection of music; or, when in a 
strange place, to be always obliged to draw back with the 
excuse 'that you cannot play anything by heart'. "' 
"' Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, p. 240. She cites Alan Walker, Franz Lis--t. - 
The Virtuoso Years (New York: Ithaca, 1987), p. 285, who in turn cites Ludwig Rellstab, Franz 
Lisz1-- Beurtheilungen - Berichte - Lebenskizze (Berlin, 1842), p. 41 ff. Other innovations 
credited at least in part to Liszt include the name 'recital'; performing works without significant 
interruptions, including the performer's and composer's names on concert programmes 
separately; shortening and tightening up programmes and standardisino, programme notes; C) t) Z) 
positioning the piano at right angles to the audience. (Walker, Franz-, Liszt- The Virtuoso Years, 
Chapter 8. ) 
I am not aware of any literature on the topic of the history and significance of memorising 
music, outside of empirical studies on memory conducted in the field of music psychology, for 
which see John Sloboda, The Musical Mind: the Cognitive Psychology of Music (Oxford 
Clarendon: 1985), p. 94-98. 
143 Karl Czerny, Letters to a Young Lady, on the 4rt of Pla-ving the Pianoforte, trans. J. A. 
Hamilton, originally published in New York, 1837-41 (New York: Da Capo, 1972), p. 41. 
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For the young ladies he is addressing here spontaneity and independence are to 
be valued as civilising, social graces. 
Clara Schumann was also an early advocate of playing from memory. A 
recent study by Claudia de Vries claims that it was she who introduced the 
public to playing from memory, citing her performance vathout music of 
Beethoven's Op. 57 sonata in Berlin in 1837, and suggesting that this took some 
courage as it might at that time have been interpreted as a sign of disrespect 
towards the composer. "' In a review of a recital she gave in London in 1856, the 
fact that she performed from memory was deemed worthy of comment. 145 
Over the next hundred years, performing from memory became the 
norm 146 and yet it cost its practitioners considerable effort, heaping further stress 
onto an already hazardous undertaking. Clara Schumann's stage nerves were, on 
one account, not just exacerbated by, but largely attributable to her memory 
(which she felt she could not rely on); 147 yet she insisted on performing without 
music throughout her career (and encouraged her pupils to do the same), even 
though this eventually restricted her choice of repertoire (learning new works 
becoming more and more arduous with increasing age). 148 The difficulties for 
the performer were compounded by a further condition which we also take for 
granted today. The fact that Czerny thought it necessary to draw attention to it 
makes it clear that it was (and is) not obvious to everyone: 
When playing before others you should particularly 
endeavour to execute your well-studied piece... especially 
without coming to a stand-still; for this... is the most 
144 Claudia de Vries, Die Pianistin Clara Wieck-Schumann (Mainz: Schott, 1996), p. 252. The 
source de Vries cites here is Marian McKenna, Myra Hess: a Portrait (London: 1976), p. 
176. It 
is worth noting that Clara's father, who was her teacher, placed great weight on aural training t) 
(de Vries, Die Pianistin Clara Wieck-Schumann, p. 126). 
145 'Except the prelude and fugue by Bach, Mad. Schumann gave the whole programme without 
book. Her memory is as wonderful as her playing is interesting. ' Quoted in 
de Vries, Die 
Pianistin Clara Wieck-Schumann, p. 252, footnote 130. 
"" See, for example, Percy Scholes's comments on 'The New Fashion of Playing, 
from 
Memory' in The Alfirror of Alusic. - 1844-1944. A Century of Musical Life in 
Britain as reflected 
in the Pages of the Alusical Times (London: Novello, 1947,2 volumes), p. 
321-2 of volume 1, 
referred to in de Vries, Die Pianistin Clara lVieck-Schumann, p. 
252. 
147 de Vries, Die Pianistin Clara lFieck-Schumann, p. 252. 
"' Bach was an exception to the rule here. Scholes makes a similar point. 
Scholes, The Afirror 
qf'Ahlsic, P-321- 
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unpleasant fault which we can commit before an 
audience. "' 
The unity of a piece is inextricably bound up with its continuity in time. 150 
1 have by no means exhausted the reasons one might give for performing 
from memory. There are prosaic considerations, such as the ugliness and 
inconvenience of music stands, the noise of page turns, the possible need for a 
distracting assistant and so on. The appearance of the performer clearly has a 
bearing on the performance. 15 ' Nonetheless, it is not immediately clear why 
performers should have taken upon themselves this extra burden. In trying to 
make sense of this issue, I need to anticipate my discussion of the history of 
performance theory. Over the course of the nineteenth century an initially latent 
conflict of interests gradually manifests itself This leads to problems in 
theorising performance which are never properly resolved. Symptomatic of the 
difficulty are the number of unfulfilled projects left behind in the early years of 
this century, including fýagrnents by Adorno, Schenker, Schbnberg and Kolisch, 
as Hermann Danuser points Out. 152 1 will attempt to surnmarise the sketch he 
provides. As a starting point he takes up a distinction made by Hegel between 
two types of performance, which we might label 'rendition' and 're-creation'. 
The former is linked to an ancient concept of the work as functional genre (such 
as the Mass, or Motet) while the second, more recent, conception allows the 
subjectivity of the performer space to unfold. Later theorising by Crelle (1832), 
Gustav Schilling (1843) and Hanslick map the performer's subjectivity onto a 
conception of the musical work as itself the embodiment of a composer's 
unique subjectivity. Following a well-rehearsed argument from Kant, the artistic 
value of the work lay in its positing its own inherent logic, subsuming received 
"' Czerny, Letters to a Young Lady, p. 40. The full quotation runs: 'When playing before others, 4: -) 
You should particularly endeavour to execute your well-studied piece with tranquillity and self- 
possession, without hurrying, without allowing your ideas to wander and more especially 
without coming to a stand-still; for this last is the most unpleasant fault which we can commit 
before an audience. ' (Italics in original. ) 
"' This is discussed from an analytical viewpoint by Lee B. Brown in 'Musical Works, 
Improvisation, and the Principle of Continuity' in Journal ofAesthetics andArt Criticism, 54 
(1996), p. 353-369. 
is' For further comments, see Hans-Werrier Heister, Das Konzert: Theorie einer Kulturform 
volume 2, (Wilhelmshaven: Heinrichshofen, 198-33), p. 494-5. 
152 Ihisik in Geschichic und Gegenwart, (MGG) volume 9 (Sachteil), (Kassel: Bdrenreiter, 
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generic conventions and rules. Musical works wove together the diverse threads 
of unity, uniqueness, compositional subjectivity and autonomy. each element 
implicating and supporting the others. The task of the performer becomes. in 
Schilling's words, 'the bringing to life of a work of art which is already 
complete as regards its form and being'. "' Crudely put, this becomes the neXV 
6success indicator' in performance, supplanting age-old traditions of fulfilling a 
ritual function and/or pleasing an audience. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century the pianist's task comes to 
be expressed in terms of a commitment to exploring the subjective content of 
the work: 
It is the task of the interpreting artist to penetrate into all 
[the] moods [in the work], to understand each in turn and 
to feel, throughout all details, the unity of meaning in the 
psychic imagery - warm enthusiasm for the whole. Only 
where the inner comprehension has been gained 
receptively, can the reproductive interpretation be 
satisfactory. "' 
As Kullak (and Schilling) suggest, a nascent concept of 'interpretation' is 
gradually emerging. Authentic 'bringing to life' ['Verlebendigung'] requires 
prior 'internalising' ['Verinnerlichung']. Memorising the work goes some way 
to guaranteeing this. 155 
Danuser sees a move in the latter half of the nineteenth century towards 
more detailed musical analysis as the basis for performance (in the writings of 
A. B. Marx and Wagner) and Kullak's comments should be read as a 
commitment to respect the details of the individual work. This is a shift in 
emphasis, however: the result at this point in the history of the practice is a 
1998), entry on 'Vortrag', by Hermann Danuser, p. 1821-1836 (p. 1833). 
"' Danuser, MGG, 'Vortrag', P. 1825. My translation. The original German text is: 'die 
Verlebendigung eines bereits nach Form und Wesenheit fertigen Kunstwerks'. 
15' Adolph Kullak, The. 4esthetics of Pianoforte-playing, trans. Theodore Baker (New York: Da 
Capo, 1972, original edition of this translation New York, 1893), p. 323). The idea here is that 
4critical' interpretation is a prerequisite of 'performative' interpretation. 
` Of related interest here is the emergence and employment of the metaphor of 'organicism' in tý -: 1 
tile nineteenth century and the phases it went through. See Jim Samson, 'Analysis in Context' in rn 
Rethinking Ilusic. eds. Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford Universit" Press, 
1999), p. 33-54, p-39- 
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finely-tuned balance of work and performer, poetry and analysis. as Hanslick's 
description suggests: 
It is by no means insignificant whether a piece is sung [or 
played] from memory or whether it is read from the score. 
The wondrous process of musical reproduction - this re- 
creative creativity, this discovery of the already discovered 
- is exposed so vulnerably on the cusp of these oppositions 
that even externals should not be overlooked when it 
comes to making one's performance convincing. It is more 
than of marginal significance when a virtuoso so 
completely immerses himself in the music [Dichtung = 
poetry] that he - at the same time controlling it and 
willingly in its grasp - can deliver it up as if it were a piece 
of himself. 
[Es ist gar nicht so gleichgültig, ob jemand dasselbe Stück 
frei aus sich heraussingt oder ob er es mit den Augen (aus 
dem Notenblatt) hervorsuchen muß. Der wunderbare 
Vorgang der musikalischen Reproduktion, dieses 
nachschaffenden Schaffens, dieses Finden von bereits 
Erfundenem, steht so frei auf der Grenze dieser beiden 
Gegensätze, daß selbst einer Außerlichkeit nicht 
verschmäht werden darf, welche den schönen Schein des 
eigenen begeisterten Vorbringens zu erhöhen vermag. Es 
ist aber mehr als bloße Äußerlichkeit, wenn ein Virtuose 
sich so vollständig in die vorzutragende Dichtung einlebt, 
daß er beherrschend und zugleich willig von ihr beherrscht, 
sie wie ein Stück seiner selbst loslösen und begeistert 
freigeben kann. ]` 
At this point we might ask what meaning the concept of memory had in 
mid/late nineteenth-century Europe. Ian Hacking has argued that new sciences 
of memory were emerging at this time, whose purpose was 'to secularise the 
Soul ý. 157 Prior to this the soul had been unavailable to scientific study. Memory 
was the means, he says, of replacing the ineffable soul with material knowledge. 
The outcome of these new sciences is a notion of 'personality' as the colour 
filling the outline of the (autonomous, liberated) individual. What a person has 
experienced and internalised in the form of memories is what makes that person 
Quoted in Heister, Das, Konzert, p. 495. My translation. 
Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personalit-V and the Sciences of Afemorl, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 5 and chapters 14-18. 
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uniquely and authentically different. The uniqueness of occasions constitutes 
the uniqueness of persons. Hence a performance from memory becomes - 
potentially, at least - an expression of the performer's individuality. 
The idea I return to again and again in this study is that the conceptual 
ecology of performance has transformed itself in the twentieth century as 
virtuoso performance practice became discredited and the concept of Werktreue, 
or fidelity to the work, gained the upper hand. What the performer comes to be 
left with is the right - or the duty - to generate a personal interpretation of the 
work, but, as Adorno is at pains to point out, the freedom of the performer is 
small and often overestimated. "' The smaller the space the performer is granted, 
the closer her task to mere 'execution' (and this is indeed what Hindemith and 
Stravinsky, to name but two, urged). We might think of the concept of 
interpretation in two ways: as product (or finished object) and process (as a set 
of strategies for dealing with eventualities). In Hanslick's terms the former 
represents the control of the performer over his material, and the latter the 
control of the material over him ('... beherrschend und zugleich willig von ihr 
beherrscht': that is to say, controlling and allowing the music to control the 
performance process). As a technician following instructions, as 'executant', the 
performer is firmly in control of the music; at the same time, it (i. e. the music) 
loses its control over him in the performance moment itself, because it is reifed 
into a rigid, objectified 'interpretation'. This development makes sense in a 
concert environment which is purged of irregularities: standardised, is the term 
I used above. In the latter years of the twentieth century, performers who are 
overly free are anachronistic: as Cherkassky was in his last years, for example. 
This leads us into the issue of the 'paradox of spontaneity'. 159 
Spontaneity is important because the expressive content of a work can only be 
authentic if it appears unrehearsed: genuine emotion cannot appear to be the 
product of calculation, however true this may be in fact. She must be overcome 
by the music. Hence the performer is faced with a constant need to pretend: 
Paddison, Adorno's Aesthetics (? f Music, p. 195-6. 
This is a topic I return to in chapter four. 
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... the performer [Ausfiffirende has the sense of executant] 
in accordance with his nature... continually strives to mal-'a ke the music [Material] sound as if he is creating it in the 
moment of rendition [Wiedergabe]. 
[... der Ausführende seiner Natur gemäß... noch immer 
danach trachtet, das Material so erklingen zu lassen, als ob 
er es im Augenblick der Wiedergabe selbst erschüfe. ]"' 
These words - Krenek's, written in 1944 - problematise performance abo\ýe all 
for the performer. We know this cannot be completely true, but it has become a 
convention to 'believe' (or rather, overlook) it. As I have made clear, it becomes 
problematic when the notion of interpretation is identified as a preconceived 
fixity, rather than imaginative response, moment by moment, to the unique 
demands of the occasion. 
However,, simply recalling the music from memory becomes suspect, the 
moment memorising and recalling become mere techniques, as opposed to 
forms of committed engagement with the subjective content of the work in 
varying performance contexts. It is not surprising that performers will want to 
regain what they see as lost creative ground. For example, Heister quotes 
Karaj an: 
Playing from memory... is not a feat of memory... but the 
reproduction of something which is completely inside of 
you. It emerges from inside yourself, without your having 
to think about it consciously. 
[Auswendigspiel... ist keine Gedächtnisleistung... sondern 
die Wiedergabe einer Sache, die vollkommen in einem drin 
ist. Sie entsteigt dem Innern, ohne daß man darüber 
nachdenken müßte. ]"' 
What Karajan wants to say - and it is both a refutation of 'performance- 
as-execution' and a reiteration of Hanslick's point about performance as a form 
of 'giving' - is that he is doing more in performing music than merely following 
instructions. He is delivering up a part of his being. 
"0 Krenek, quoted in Heister, Das Konzert, p. 494. My translation. 
"' Quoted in Heister, Das kwizert, p. 494. My translation. 
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My argument here is not merely about the embattled nature of the 
performance territory as rival notions of work-interpretation jostle for position. 
It is about the role of memory in performance as something more than a mere 
skill or practical convenience. What seems to have happened is that memorised 
performance gradually loses status as a virtue - as an index of the performer's 
personality - and becomes, by the mid twentieth century an empty convention 
of performance practice. "' (One might say that performing from music comes to 
be a vice. ) It appears a necessary convention, because the practice of 
performance has come to mean the performance of a considered, more or less 
fixed interpretation. So performance from memory no longer carries a meaning 
for the audience: it has become absorbed into the range of skills which are 
prerequisite to the public presentation of art music. 
There is an element of oversimplification here: not all the music 
performed was amenable to memorisation. Clara Schumann was not alone in 
preferring to play Bach with the music in front of her. Bach's patterns of 
counterpoint do not usually imply patterns of physical movement and fugal 
writing requires considerable mental exertion if it is to be committed to memory 
successfully. When Claudio Arrau moved to consolidate his reputation in 
Germany in the inter-war years, he sought a task that would maximally impress 
the musical world. He chose to perform the complete keyboard works (i. e. 
Klavierwerke) of J. S. Bach from memory in a cycle of twelve recitals in Berlin 
(in 1935-6). He says of this undertaking: 
... there was a wish to 
do something outstanding, that 
would prove what a serious musician I was. Because at that 
time people were saying that I was a very good technician, 
but rather the virtuoso type. That was the second aspect - 
to help my career. But the first idea was to have the 
satisfaction of having in my brain this tremendous amount 
of great music. People said 'Is it a stuntT A little bit 
maybe, it was. But mostly not. 163 
Scholes says 'what had begun as an attractive novelty was now becoming the normal thina; 
pianists had to memorise'. He is writing of the last two decades of the nineteenth centur" here, 
when tile first advertising for memory-trainers appeared in the Musical Times (the,, were later to 
becorne a common feature). Scholes, TheAfirror ofAlusic, vol. 1, p. 3321. 
161 Joseph Horowitz, Conversations with Arrau (London: Collins, 1982), p. 72. 
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Here memorising is tied both to internalising the music and yet also to 
selling the performances to the public. Arrau consciouslY used his memory in 
precisely the way virtuosi traditionally flirt with physical risk in performance 
and this extraordinary excess - and success"' - drew attention to the act of 
memory in itself. His achievement became a legend: an act of arrogant defiance 
of human fallibility. 
Within the context of high modernism, the advent of a method of 
studying the piano which relies entirely on memory will come as no surprise. 
The Gieseking-Leimer method, developed early this century, involves learning 
the music without touching the instrument. (Ironically this favours musicians 
with an eidetic memory. ) Of course, this bid for disembodied purity 
misunderstands the composite nature of memory in the musical performance. It 
has long since been realised that the pianist's recall-memory is a recipe: piano 
pedagogues typically arrive at four different ingredients: visual, acoustic, 
motoric and analytical. "' 
In conclusion I return to my opening question: does playing from 
memory constitute a performance virtue? My answer is that it did for a time, but 
has been demoted to the realm of skill (for the performer) or convention (for the 
audience). It ceases to be an option for the performer: it no longer counts as an 
expressive innovation. Too many factors argue for it. The reason for this has to 
do in part with the changing notion of interpretation away from a mixture of 
knowledge-plus-improvisation towards knowledge-alone (objectification), 
where as many of the decisions about sound production as possible are taken 
before the performance event itself. 
"" In fact Arrau had to reschedule a couple of concerts after a small memory slip, which he put 
down to exhaustion at having practised so hard. Horowitz, Convet-sations withArrall, p. 72. 
165 See, for example, Georgy Sandor, On Piano Playing (New York: Schirmer, 198 1), p. 194. 
Sandor offers an overview of the topic, training strategies, tips for overcoming special I1 1-: 1 
weaknesses and much reassurance that improvement is possible. 
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Case Studies in Performance Virtue: (2) Competitions (Absent 
Virtue) 
Consider what happens to performance in unusual. or marginal 
situations. For example, how is performance changed by the addition of a 
competitive context? Although it is often maintained that there is a surfeit of 
competitions in musical life - and that competitiveness in music is harmful - it 
would be wrong to conclude that this is a recent phenomenon. Competitions 
have long been a feature of public musical life. Their purpose is to establish a 
value: who is better, and who is best? These are questions which consistently 
fascinate. It is arguable, however, that there is something intrinsic to the nature 
of competitiveness in art music that effectively forestalls our reaching 
unambiguous results. I would like to demonstrate this with a brief example. 
The Leeds Piano Competition, which was first held in 1963, was for a 
time (and perhaps still is) a major event in the musical calendar. Former prize 
winners and finalists are among the most respected contemporary players. 
Fanny Waterman, its founder, is nonetheless very guarded in her claims as to its 
effectiveness in locating the best in the field: 
Do the finest pianists always win first prize? [ ... 
] My reply 
is that the jury... has come to the conclusions in its musical 
wisdom that this competitor shall be proclaimed a 
winner. "' 
As an answer this is the epitome of tact. She goes on to emphasise the many 
things a jury cannot know, such as whether the winner will have the necessary 
physical and emotional resources to deal with the stresses of concert life. A 
great performer, she claims 'must have inclination and imagination, backed up 
by application, concentration and determination. "' In other words, a sustained 
high-flying career within the pianistic practice requires general 'framing' 
virtues, of the kind that connect across other practices (though imagination is, as 
Thompson, Piano Competition, p. xiii. 
Thompson, Piano Competition, p. xiv. I have already referred to this list in footnote 135 
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I have said, a special case). The competition 'frame' is. of course. much smaller. 
consisting typically of about four stages, with several works to be played at each 
stage, culminating in a concerto performance. (Leeds has followed this model 
for decades with only minor variations. "') The jury panel is made up of senior 
musical establishment figures, with a largish percentage of pianists. either still 
active or teaching, and a co-ordinating chairperson. What are their criteria of 
judgement? 
From the outset Fanny [Waterman] and Marion 
[Harewood] determined that the emphasis in their 
competition would be on musicianship, not the kind of 
flashy technique that had already given some competitions 
a bad name. Beauty of tone was Fanny's top priority, 
followed by musical integrity, rhythmic vitality and artistic 
imagination. "' 
These are indeed the noblest of standards. Elsewhere, though, a rather more 
prosaic motive for setting up the competition is invoked, specifically the poor 
standards of technical proficiency among pianists in Britain, measured against 
continental counterparts. 170 
This tension between measurable skills, or 'technique', and 
unquantifiables such as 'musicianship' and 'artistic imagination' poses a 
constant threat to a competition's credibility. It is ultimately irresolvable. It 
exploded in the second competition (in 1966) when both the chairman, William 
Glock, and his deputy, Hans Keller were forced to recognise a majority decision 
in favour of a candidate they felt was undeserving (Rafael Orozco). Glock 
stresses in his account how the organisers tried to learn from the experience the 
next time the competition was held, when Radu Lupu, the eventual winner, was 
only admitted to the final stage as a result of special pleading, effectively 
changing the competition rules. "' Hans Keller's analysis of the 'competition 
problem' seems to me to penetrate to the heart of the matter, even if his 
above. 
lbid, appendix, p. 242-261. 
lbid, p. 18. 
170 lbid, p. 13. 
171 William Glock, Alotes inA(Awnce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199 1), p. 162-3 3. 
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proposed solution issues in an absurdity. He claimed that the 1966 decision in 
favour of Orozco (over Victoria Postnikova, his and Glock's preferred 
candidate) was due to technique being overvalued by the panel. His proposal 
was: 
... to remove the overweight of instrumental expert opinion 
from the jury. A piano competition should not be judged 
chiefly by pianists, however distinguished, because their 
verdict will subtly be influenced by technical 
considerations at the expense of ultimate musical values. "' 
In a competition, 'best' comes to mean foregrounding what Keller calls 
the 'sporting aspect'. His proposed solution - which is fully congruent with the 
definition of evaluation proposed by Barbara Hermstein Smith above"' - was to 
share the prizes equally among the leading talents because 'above a certain level 
you're not "better" or "worse", but different, and it's the difference that makes 
you interesting. ' 174 
Because the sporting aspect - the possession of a reliable technique - is 
the only certainty, it comes to be valued by participants above all else. The 
necessary narrow focus on a few performances, all of which are crucial for 
success, discourages risk-taking, which is the concomitant of innovative, 
imaginative performance. The lack of criteria among jurors to evaluate 
originality in performance means that, in the long run, technique will become a 
fall-back point of consensus, a lowest common denominator. So when Charles 
Rosen says that 'the trouble with competitions is that far too often only dull but 
worthy pianists get through', he is describing the logical outcome of art music 
competitions. 17' A reliable, uncontroversial performance style translates into 
technical precision honed to the point of absolute predictability. Interpretation 
172 Thompson, Piano Competition, p. 44-5. 
173 In O-itical Terms r Literary Study, eds. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin fo 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 18 1. 1 174 Thompson, Piano Competition, p. 45. Keller has written elsewhere of the relationship 
between sport and music-making- He argues that Nve should think of the consistenc,, that comes 
from practice in both sport and art as 'master\"; and that (consistent) mastery 
is achieved at the 
expense of (inconsistent, unpredictable) genius. He refers to 'the curse of mastery'. 
See 'Sport 
and Art: the Concept of Mastery', in: Hans Keller, Hans Keller: 
Essays on )11usic, ed. 
Christopher Wintle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). p. 26-9. 
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rigidifies. The uniqueness of the occasion has no part to play. Hence any minor 
irregularities in the setting or instrument will assume great significance for the 
performer. A further consequence will be that the competitors will select music 
which is 'context-proof i. e. does not rely on unusual or subtle timbral effects 
which a poorly adjusted piano or an odd acoustic might destroy. "' In short, the 
ecology of performance inside competitions is quite different from that outside. 
It is easy to spot miscarriages of justice in retrospect. If it seems that 
competitions do in fact often select worthy winners, this is no doubt a tribute to 
those performers who continue entering until they eventually succeed. Many 
victors fall. by the wayside. We might conclude by saying that the smaller the 
frame within which a performance is judged, the less virtues count and the more 
important rules and rehearsals become. 
"' Thompson, Piano Competition. p. 117. 
i ion or 176 There is a great deal of insider-lore about pieces that are good (or bad) in competiti 
examination settings. I 
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Chapter 3: Performance 
Part One: A Supra-Disciplinary Orientation 
Practices ultimately consist of series of performances. How are they 
categorised? This apparently simple question is in fact a consuming 
philosophical problem about which little can be said with absolute certainty. It 
is commonly posed in terms of objects, concepts and categories: concepts are 
the mental identities of objects in the external world, and categories - which 
stand in a mutually defining relationship with concepts - are the means by 
which objects are classified. As in the case of the chicken and the egg, neither 
concept nor category is prior. In this scheme, object is a crude shorthand: we 
might further distinguish between objects, events and processes. The 
distinctions here are by no means hard and fast, as all objects are processes, 
viewed at the appropriate time scale, and all events have a processual aspect. ' 
In the classical definition of a concept, necessary and sufficient 
conditions are specified. This, as we have seen (Chapter two, A Note on 
Concepts above), is not an accurate reflection of human psychology. 
Boundaries are fuzzy and permeable, though not infinitely so; they are 
historical, and undergo revision; and they are therefore contestable. This is as 
true of the term 'performance' as of all the terms I make use of in its definition. ' 
'I have no wish here to do more than point to issues that have been the subject of extended 
debate throughout the history of (western) philosophy, under the rubrics of ontology and 
epistemology. The distinction I propose is common enough, if ultimately poorly understood. Its 
rootedness in natural language is reflected in analyses of grammar, such as that employed by 
Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik in A Communicative Grammar of English (London: Longman, 
1975). The phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, whose writings on music I consider in more 
detail later, suggests it in The Work of Music and the Problem of its Identio,, trans. Adam 111) ID 
Czerniawski, ed. Jean G. Harrell (London: Macmillan, 1986) p. 10, footnote 1. 
2 For brief comments of similar import see Jim Samson: 'Analysis in Context', in Rethinking 
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Performance: An Essentially Contested Concept 
The term performance has come to have a bewildering range of 
applications both in the contemporary academic world and in everyday life. A 
consequence of this is that it is increasingly difficult to establish common 
ground between divergent usage. Actually, this could be said of any number of 
general terms - such as analysis or culture - but it is striking how in recent 
years many different academic disciplines have alighted on just this term, 
claiming it as an analytical tool, even as a 'term of art', and decking it out with 
sometimes highly technical specific meanings. Why is this? There are two 
issues here. Firstly, why not reserve unfamiliar but already extant words, or 
invent new ones, if it is a matter of primarily technical use? Clearly current 
colloquial use must be doing important semantic work, which commentators 
wish to draw on. ' Secondly, what is so attractive about 'performance' just now? 
And if different disciplines are stipulating divergent technical meanings, is there 
any chance of (re)establishing a common semantic core? 
Marvin Carlson, in his recent book, Performance. - a Critical 
Introduction, offers reassurance: 
If we consider performance as an essentially contested 
concept, this will help us to understand the futility of 
seeking some overarching semantic field to cover such 
seemingly disparate usages as the performance of an actor, 
of a schoolchild, of an automobile. ' 
The phrase 'essentially contested concept' was invented by W. B. Gallie, and it 
deserves a moment's reflection. ' Gallie's analysis of a handful of paradigmatic 
ECCs - and these include religion, art, science and democracy - throws up a 
Music, eds. Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3 )5. 
' Nicholas Cook has addressed this point in a related context, in which he says that '[t]here is 
nothing worse than a theoretical vocabulary that tries to take possession of indispensably 
ordinary English words', adding that the terms he adopts (such as 'conformance') are outside 
everyday use and so do not interfere with it. There is, of course, a potential conflict here which 
in the case of concepts in common use (such as 'performance') is unavoidable. See Analysing 
Alusical Multimedia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pAx. 
' Marvin Carlson, Petformance. - a Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 5. 
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number of issues. Without quite saying so himself, Gallie tends towards the 
view that concepts of a more specific nature might also qualify: in other words, 
he is saying something about the instability of language per se. The 
consequence is that 'to use an ECC means to use it against other uses and to 
recognise that one's own use of it has to be maintained against these other 
uses. ý6 This can be understood in part as a paraphrase of the structuralist idea of 
meaning arising from the definition of what is in terms of what is not. Note, too, 
the Foucaultian ring to this sense of 'maintenance'. 
A strategy Gallie, as a philosopher of history, finds sympathetic is to try 
to establish how different meanings have arisen, rather than to mediate between 
them. This to a large extent is what Carlson's 'critical' genealogy of 
performance does and, as far as it goes - and it goes a long way - it is very 
successful. It will be an important source in the discussion which follows. 
However it is by no means comprehensive, for all its range. The index lists 
extensive references to gender, feminism, autobiographical performance, the 
avant-garde, politics, dance, the circus... but, surprisingly, no separate reference 
for music. ' In fact this is by no means unusual in discussions of the discipline of 
'performance', understood as shorthand for 'performance art': for historical 
reasons, theatrical understandings predominate. It is as if music - especially 
classical music - as a performing art occupies a niche of specialised pure 
abstraction which the most prominent theorists have felt unable to sully. ' 
Musical performance does appear to stand apart from other kinds of 
performance and we might take this is a premonition of its distinctiveness. 
Definition: a Preliminary Orientation 
A performance, I contend, is a concatenation of agent(s), event(s) and 
circumstance(s). I assumed as much at the outset of the previous chapter. Just 
' W. B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (London: Chatto and Windus, 
1964), ch. 8, p. 157-19 1; see also Carlson, Performance, p. 1. 
' Gallie, Philosophy andthe Historical Understanding, p. 161. 
7 Carlson, Peýformancc, p. 245. The entry for music in the index says 'see under cabaret'. 
' The Compact Oxford English Dictionary (Second edition, 1989/94) lists 7 sub-definitions of 
117 
about anything, anywhere can count as 'performance'. provided that there is 
some evidence of intentionality (or causality). I suggest the natural' as an 
oppositional term to the 'performed' as a means of excluding those objects. 
events and processes that human beings can neither control. nor enlist as 
instruments of performance (erupting volcanoes, for example). I would like to 
refine and extend this crude hermeneutics, by suggesting that we think of the 
concatenation of agency, eventhood and circumstance in the following way. A 
performance is always identifiably: 
1. Of something (a text, script, role, work ... 
2. By someone (a performer, actor, agent ... 
3. With the aid of something (a prop, instrument, piece of technology, part of 
the body... ) 
4. For a purpose (reason, with an intention,, commitment... 
5. In a setting (location, place, context, scene, stage... 
6. On an occasion (at a time... ) 
7. For an observer (audience, listener, self... 
This prepositional organisation will serve as an initial informal checklist 
of elements when I come to examine other definitions. ' The concatenation 
(nexus, intersection... ) constitutes a matrix and a performance is the matrix as 
a whole: any attempt to remove any element from it turns it into something else. 
Thinking of this definition as a 'performance' of 'performance' leads of course 
to paradox and absurdity: in the normal case, any attempt to preserve or record a 
performance must of necessity fail. There is no true identity across time. as 
Roger Scruton says, nothing is ever 'the same again'. 'O Nonetheless, different 
definitions of performance balance the elements in different ways and employ 
different terms to talk of similar functions (as the bracketed alternative terms 
'perform', and music receives overt mention only in the last of these. 
'I acknowledge here the influence of Kenneth Burke, whose approach to 'motive' proceeds 
from a similar 'situational' analysis, in terms of 'what was done (Act), NN'hen or ýý'here it Xýas 
done (Scene), who did it (Agent), how he did it (Agency), and why (Purpose)'. See, -I Grammar 
of, 11otives (Cleveland: Meridian, 1962), p. xvil. Burke is quoted in Carlson, Performance, p. 37- 
8. 
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imply). The recurring elements are typically a concern with a notion of text and 
how it is stored; the framing of the text in space and time. the nature and status 
of the observer, and the issues that agency imply, such as identity and intention. 
The sum of competing definitions is dilute generality. Performance at the most 
abstract level - and notice how the metaphors of frame, focus and level coincide 
here - has been described by the ethnolinguist Richard Bauman as 'a 
consciousness of doubleness'. " This doubleness can ultimately be thought of as 
a meeting of text and context, a reification of product within process, a dialectic 
of the particular and the general. The very notion of consciousness itself 
contains within it a paradoxical 'doubleness': a self aware of its selthood. 
Some Competing Definitions of Performance: (1) The Social 
Sciences 
In Carlson's account, the range of disciplines which have made a pitch 
for performance as a key term include anthropology, ethnology, sociology, 
psychology, linguistics and performance art. The final section of his book deals 
with relationships between performance, identity, politics and postmodernity. 
Though much of the groundwork dates from earlier, the 1960s and 70s saw a 
particularly intense and fruitful period of theoretical interplay between social 
science and theatre studies, at a time when performance art was also 
emancipating itself as a discipline. 12 My point in the subsequent commentary 
will be twofold: firstly, to give a taste of just how varied are the uses the term 
'performance' has been put to; and secondly - and this is a more challenging 
undertaking - to suggest how each discipline develops its own self-serving 
'hermeneutic' of performance which tends to hover around a specific element 
(drawn from my checklist above). Note that the other, subsidiary elements never 
completely disappear from view: they are merely reiterated in different forms. 
Each particular 'foregrounding' should be read as a consequence of the 
'0 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics oflfusic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), p. 106. 
'' Quoted in Carlson, Performance, p. 5. 
12 The role of the theatre critic Richard Schechner in this rapprochement is serninal. See 
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discipline's self-understanding. The self- understanding of disciplines shifts over 
time, as do the meanings of their key concepts (and it is not always clear ', ". -hat 
leads the way). For all that, I would hope to identify a relationship between the 
discipline's overall aims and its particular appropriation of the performance 
concept. These sketches are partial, simplified and highly contestable... 
unavoidably so. 
1. Anthropology/Ethnography. In the science of human culture at the most 
general level there has been a marked tendency to think in terms of how human 
behaviour becomes 'performance' through 'marking' or 'framing' - making it 
stand out against an unperformed background - and what such a performance 
achieves i. e. the consequences of its having taken place. Milton Singer 
introduced the term 'cultural performance' to the discipline in 1959 to describe 
discrete events set apart from reality (such as theatre events, weddings, or 
religious festivals). " Gregory Bateson's elaboration of the concept of 'play' and 
how individuals signal the boundary between the 'playful' and 'serious' was a 
further important theoretical step, later elaborated in different ways by 
Huizinga, Caillois and Clifford Geertz. " Victor Turner, perhaps the most 
important theorist in this field, later shifted the concept of performance away 
from 'that which is contained within a frame' onto the threshold, an area of 'in- 
betweenness', which becomes a site of either (a) separation, (b) transition or (c) 
reintegration within a social order (for which the terms 'preliminal', 'liminal' 
and 'postliminal' - respectively - have been adopted). " He too was influential 
in importing theatrical imagery into anthropology, along with a notion of the 
performance as scripted, through his extended collaboration with Richard 
Schechner (who described performance in a much quoted phrase as 'restored 
Carlson, Performance, p. 13- 14. 
Carlson, Performance, p. 16. 
Grecory Bateson, 'A Theory of Play and Fantasy', originally written in 1954, later 
republished in Steps to an Ecology of Mind (San Francisco: Chandler, 1972). See also Carlson, 
Peiformance. p. 18. Huizinga and Callois's work is described later in the same chapter (Carlson, 
Petfiýrmancc, p. 25-28). Geertz's distinction between 'deep play' arid 'shallow play', Milch 
bears some resemblance to Turner's distinction between the liminal and the liminoid, is 
discussed on p. 24. 
15 Carlson, Petformance. p. 21. 
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behaviour"'). Turner later developed a distinction between *11minal' and 
'liminoid' performance, where the former term signifies activity which is less 
scripted and thus potentially questions cultural conventions. Later theorists, 
such as Colin Turnbull and Dwight Conquergood, have examined the role of the 
observer as implicated in the performance (and in particular the position of the 
researching anthropologist in the field), concluding that objectivity and 
neutrality were chimerical values. " 
Birth, death, courtship, marriage, friendship, work: social rituals 
associated with these states and events are inescapably central to lived life. They 
are the content of the discipline. As such it would seem logical that the 
anthropologist's conception of performance should be centred on ritual, the 
ftame (and a multitude of related concepts dealing with threshold and 
transition), the ambiguities of play and an implication that observers also 
perform. At the heart of this conceptual net is the relationship of performance to 
change, that the 'before' and 'after' of a performance are different worlds. 
2. Sociology. The work of Erving Goffman has had an overwhelming impact in 
the social sciences. Particularly relevant to our concerns is the influential early 
study The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, published in 1959, in which the 
notion of the self as consisting of a repertoire of roles employed in a sequence 
of structured performances is elaborated (and indeed 'Performances' is the title 
of the first chapter). Performance is defined as 'all the activity of an individual 
which occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before a 
particular set of observers and which has some influence on the observers'. 18 
The typical setting is a social establishment, which is '... any place surrounded 
by fixed barriers to perception in which a particular type of activity regularly 
takes place. '9 Goffman thus proposes a quasi-Aristotelian unity of time, place 
Carlson, Performance, p. 4. Schechner's work has been extensive and influential. 
Carlson, Performance, p. 33 1. Conquergood's five stances towards the ethnograph\ of 
performance (discussed in 'Performing as a Moral Act: Ethical Dimensions of the Ethnography 
of Perfori-nance', in Literature in Performance, 5 (1985), 1-133) are relevant here, especiallN, to 
ethnomusicolo",, y. 
" Goffiiian, Erving, The Presentation of Se4f in Everyday Life (USA: Anchor Books, 1959. 
second edition Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 32, quoted in Carlson, Performance, p. 37-8. 
Goffman. The Presentation of Seýf in Evciý'dql- Life, p. 2 10. 
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and action as a framing constraint on performance - one of his later books deals 
specifically with the concept of framing" - as well as stressing its function, 
which is to influence an audience. As far as the content of performance goes, 
anything can count: analyses take a 'strip of experience', which is simplý, a *raxN- 
batch of occurrences (of whatever status in reality) that one waiits to dra', N- 
attention to ... 
1.2 ' An important secondary issue is thus audience interpretation 
and the communicative success of a text or role. 22 
There is an inherent tension in such theorising. On the one hand it is 
willing to consider any behavioural material as grist to the mill of performance 
23 in support of a view of social reality as 'constructed'. Yet it threatens to void a 
distinction between the improvised and the rehearsed, between self and role, in 
setting no limits to content. One could go further and claim that the Kantian 
conception of an autonomous moral self as a coordinator and overseer of roles 
disappears (and with it such notions as a distinction between ethics - taken as a 
code guiding behaviour - and aesthetics - in the sense used by Kingsbury in his 
analysis of the conservatory, as 'observed behaviour 24). It further problematises 
an already fragile notion of 'authenticity'. This undoubtedly parodies Goffman's 
position, and to be fair to him, he has in some later work pointed to the limits of 
this form of determiniSM; 2' but as Carlson points out,, Goffffian generally 
downplays the improvisatory, ad hoc aspect of performance: performance as 
exploratory play . 
2' At issue here is (once again) the status of text and code: how 
finely detailed is it? How much space is there for originality? Goffman has been 
much criticised for his deterministic views by, among others, Bruce Wilshire 
'0 Goffiman, Frame Analysis. - an essay on the organisation of experience (Han-nondsworth: 
Penguin, 1975). 
2' Goffman, Frame Analysis, quoted in Carlson, Performance, p. 50. 
22 Umberto Eco has contributed importantly here: see, for example, 'The Serniotics of Theatrical 
Performance' in The Drama Review, volume 21,1977, p. 107-117. 
23 Here the key text is Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reali4ý. - 
.4 Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967). 
24 Henry Kingsbury, Music, Talent, and Performance. - a Conservatory Cultural Si'stem 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988). See my discussion of this work in chapter 2. ) 
25 For example, in Forms of Talk (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981). In this regard, see the 
comments by Graharne F. Thompson in 'Approaches to Performance', in Screen, 26 (1985), 78- 
90, (p. 80-81). In The Presentation of Seýf in Everyday Life, Goffman distinguishes between I 
performer, character, individual and self Within this constellation, the self is epiphenomenal. 
At the same time, Goffman is keen to point to the rhetorical nature of his theatrical metaphor. 
See 'Staging and the Self, The Presentation of Self in EvcrydT, Life, p. 244-6. 
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(whose work is discussed by Carlson2-), and Alasdair Macintyre has provided a 
penetrating critique of Goffman's position and the Sartrean existentialist 
antithesis, in which the role, where it exists at all, is seen as merely imposed and 
ceremonial. " On the notion of identity as both given and created, Jonathan 
Glover's analysis occupies a sensible middle ground. " 
Sociologists have sought mechanisms to demonstrate hoNv human 
behaviour is formed, or determined by society. In order to become an object of 
study, society must be identifiably patterned: it must exhibit structure. The 
implication is that the more structure there is, the more significance the 
discipline will acquire. Thus individual behaviour has been examined in terms 
of patterns. We can usefully summarise the key opposition (variouslý, 
formulated) as between role and self, which together constitute identity. (Behind 
this lies the ethical notion of authenticity. ) The role implies in turn texi(s) and 
code(s) (language, serniotic systems). And for a performance to attain 
objecthood, it needs a defined boundary, which is itsftame. 
3. Linguistics. In this field the term performance occurs as the partner of the 
(privileged) term 'competence' in Chomsky's well-known distinction (now 
considered obsolete by him). It arguably builds on Saussure's prior opposition 
of 'langue' and 'Parole'. Linguistics has, over the last fifty years, fanned out 
into the subdisciplines of phonetics/phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics 
and pragmatics. Increasingly, this initial, widely accepted emphasis on an 
underlying fixed ('deep') structure - of which performance is a corrupted 
variant - has shifted, as linguists became interested in the role context plays in 
determining meaning. Wittgenstein's influence lay behind Austin's theory of 
speech acts (dating originally from the mid-50s), later elaborated in different 
ways by Searle, Grice and others . 
3' An important recent contributor to this field 
" Carlson, Performance, p. 50. 
27 Carlson, Pei. -formance, p. 44. 
2' Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981; second edition 1985), p. 32-5 
and p. I 15- 117. 
29 Jonathan Glover, I. - The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal ldentity (London: Penguin, 
1988). 
" J. L. Austin, How To Do Things with 11"ords (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962), John Searle, ýpccch 
AcIs. - Aii Essav in the Philosophýv qj'Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968). 
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has been Dan Sperber. " In all this work we can see a partial rapprochement with 
the political concerns of anthropology and the constructivist theme of sociology: 
what is the status of 'reality' vis d vis language? One of the central tenets of 
speech act theory is that there is a discrete world of language. As Charles Taylor 
says: 
Meaning... is for a subject, of something, in a field. This 
distinguishes it from linguistic meaning which has a four- 
and not a three-dimensional structure. Linguistic meaning 
is for subjects and in a field, but it is the meaning of 
signifiers and it is about a world of referents. " 
Within this world, to say something is to do something. Further to this are a 
speaker's intentions and the effects of a speech act (illocutionary force and 
perlocutionary effect, respectively). Much theoretical effort has gone into trying 
to discover just how much of language use is 'performative' in this sense (as 
opposed to descriptive, or 'constative"'). Nowadays, the subdiscipline of speech 
act theory is normally referred to as 'pragmatics', a term first used by the 
serniotician Charles Morris, who broadened its application by defining it as 'the 
science of the relation of signs to interpreters'. 34 
One important issue arising from speech act theory concerns the 
ambiguity of the 'act'. At what point does speech resolve into an act? What is 
the relationship of process to product, and at what point(s) can we consider the 
speech as performed? This is important, because to focus on the effects of a 
speech act is to focus on the changes it brings about and hence to politicise it. 
Yet it may not always be clear what the 'unit of performance' is. I believe that a 
distinction between fluid speech and reffied writing - between process and 
product - is crucial. It is apt to be overlooked. 
The key concept within linguistics has always been the nature of 
communication. Chomsky can be said to have invented the subject matter of 
Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance. - Communication and Cognition (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986, second edition 1995). 
32 Charles Taý, Ior, 'Hermeneutics and Politics', in Critical Sociology, ed. Paul Connerton 
(Harmondsworth: Penauin, 1976), p. 153-19' ), (p. 162). 
The term is Austin's, frorn How To Do Things with Ifords. 
Quoted in Carlson, Performance, p. 61. 
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modern linguistics by focusing on the invariance of the underl ng code (or 
what he called 'deep structure'). Pragmatics explores how context qualifies 
linguistic meaning. Linguists have also clarified the nature of the Ian(-Yuage 
world as in a sense 'interposed' between us and 'reality'. In this sense. language 
brings its own frame with it; rhetorical forms are frames within the language 
medium itself. 
4. Cognitive Science. There is a telling use of the term 'performance' found 
throughout scientific discourse, so familiar that we are liable to overlook it 
completely. " Scientists 'perform' experiments. What exactly does this mean'? 
The experimental method is about observing the behaviour of animate or 
inanimate objects (processes, events... ), whereby the behaviour (or activity) is 
framed (or isolated) in such a way that only one variable at a time is observed 
(by an 'audience' of scientists). The 'performance' is repeated to establish a 
mean value for a class of experiments which are as near to identical as possible. 
Hence performance has come to signify a predictable value (outcome, result, 
achievement). Some points to note: this sense of the word is retrospective, as it 
signifies an outcome; it is not confined to (or even usually associated with) 
intentionality, and what that can entail (skill, commitment etc. ), but rather with 
cause and effect; and, most importantly, performed experiments are valued for 
their repeatability, not their uniqueness. The content of performance in this 
sense is reduced to a repeatable 'text'. 
Cognitive science reintroduces intentionality into the performance 
paradigm. The use to which cognitive scientists habitually put the term 
performance follows Chomsky's distinction between performance and 
competence. Competence refers to something stored (such as an ability) and 
performance to its use in real time. Within the field of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) research, attempts to model human competence/performance soon 
identified what has become known as 'the frame problem'. In essence this 
concerns the need to limit the amount of information available and stored by an W 
35 This is an area Carlson does not discuss. 
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actor - mechanical or human - in the real world. 36 There has been much debate 
and controversy about how, if at all. this matter can be resolved. In an attempt to 
address pressing criticisms, the Al researcher Marvin Minsky developed the 
concept of the frame as a structure which represents stereotypical situations in 
terms of features that are common to a range of such situations, Xvith slots for 
features which can vary their values. The frame is thus an heuristic device. The 
system is recursive, as frames can be contained within frames. In effect, the 
frame separates text from context, but recursion allows the frame itself to be the 
text within another frame, thus potentially blurring this distinction. 37 The 'text' 
is viewed as a role within a framed speech-led interaction: decisions are taken in 
order to reach a goal (i. e. to achieve some kind of desired change). A continuous 
stream of feedback is used to update the contents of the frame. Decisions can be 
stored in the form of rules with a hypothetical component: if X, then do Y. 
Human processual performance can thus be described in terms of rules and 
(framed) representations linked by a feedback loop. Crude though this sketch 
may be, its relevance to musical (as opposed to literary) performance is, I think, 
immediately apparent: it describes the manner in which a performer constantly 
monitors and updates a 'performative' interpretation during the act of 
performance, what Andras Schiff felicitously referred to as doing running 
38 repairs. 
Competing Definitions: (2) The Arts 
1. The most important area here is performance art. Roselee Goldberg's history 
of this field - the first of its kind when originally published 
in 1979 - is 
basically a study of twentieth-century avant-garde theatre. 
'9 This is both in 
.4 
Companion to Cognitive Science, eds. William Bechtel and George Graham (Oxford: ltý 
Blackwell, 1998), p. 54-62, (p. 57). 
37 Bechtel and Graham, .4 Companion to 
Cognitive Science, p. 61. Minsky further links his term 
to the psychologist F. C. Bartlett's use of the word *scherna' and Kuhn's term 'paradigin'. 
38 In an interview in the Journal of the European Piano Teachers Association 
(EPTA), No. 6, 
vol. 12 (Oct. 199 1), p-9-12, lie says: 'The art of a musician 
is to play a work in its entirety, not in 
separate bits, doing continuously some repairs. 
' (p. 12) 
Roscl-ee Goldberg, Peiforniance Art: ftom Futurism to the Present (London: Thames and 
Hudson, second edition 1988). 
126 
keeping with, and a contribution to, a theatrical orientation in performance 
studies. Within this history, two pronounced waves of activitv stand out: the 
Dadaists of the post World War One years, whose work was partly anticipated 
by Eric Satie in the musical field; and the emergence of performance art in the 
form of staged multimedia happenings in the late 1950s. Here John Cage was a 
seminal figure. As Carlson notes (following Moholy-Nagy), an experimental 
tradition arose in which the traditional concept of the performer as interpreter of 
an already existing (usually literary) text was put to one side in favour of the 
performer as creator of an act or action. " Accompanying this was a move 
towards mixed-media events and a shift from the presentation of a scripted 
product to a process more or less characterised by spontaneity and chance. The 
Dadaist emphasis on social dissent and protest gave way in the second wave of 
the avant-garde to more thoughtful, opaque experimentation, which explored 
diverse approaches in a rather more systematic way. 41 
In the later decades of the century, performance art has emancipated 
itself as a practice and developed distinctive thematic strands. For example, the 
issue of identity and the body (particularly the female body) has provided a 
central theme and the continuing exploration of multimedia a characteristic 
mode. In particular, performance art has become closely associated with a 
politics of resistance to or outright rejection of commodification (and an 
underlying unease with free market capitalism). This work - often absurd or 
bizarre, frequently funny and all too susceptible to parod Y42 _ is underpinned by 
a distinctive ontology of performance, which I will be considering in more 
detail presently. 
By way of summary we could say that performance art problematises the 
text, not in terms of its content but as such. It asks: is it possible to deny text? 
Or: how can we evade the notion of text? It is, in short, meta-textual, using text 
to comment on its own possibilities and limits. Thus it focuses on 
Carlson, Performance, p. 92. 
So for example Richard Kostelanetz distinguishes between four different uenres of 1: 1 - 
happening: pure happenings, staged happenings, kinetic envi and sta-ed 11=1 17 1 ironments, ID 
performances. See Carlson, Performance, p. 98. 
42 A useful text here is Suzi Gablik's critique of modernism, Has 11mlernism Failed9 (London: 
Tharnes and Hudson, 1984), especially chapter '), entitled 'Anxious Objects: Modes of Cultural 
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experimentation, often together with a theatrically inspired insistence on visual 
display, sometimes overtly skilful. Above all, performance art in underscoring 
uniqueness exemplifies difference. 
2. Literary theory: Within this field the concept of performance has a role in, 
among others, the work of Derrida ('supplementarity'), Eco (on interpretation). 
and Stanley Fish (on the role of interpretative communities). I have already 
briefly discussed the work of Edward Said (and Richard Poirier) in relation to 
the literary performance of identity (chapter one, Definitions and Identities). 
Here we may ask: how exactly is literary language marked out from the 
everyday? And in what sense(s) can a writer be said to perform a text? Is writing 
performative in the sense that speech is, or can be? 
In this initial phase of the discussion I have argued that the materials for 
a theory of performance are continuous with perception itself. Given the wide 
range of applications of the term colloquially, and its fashionable status as a 
concept, the academic requirement of precision entails narrow technical 
definition. The tendency for local definitions to run adrift from each other is 
inevitable. Here I should stress once more that it is not necessarily important 
that the accounts I have given are objective, balanced and complete (were such a 
thing possible): my aim has been to demonstrate (a) a principle of 
diversification and fragmentation (and not to argue for a new central, all- 
encompassing definition) and (b) that the range of concepts involved in 
performance theories is fairly consistent and that they differ in their emphases. 
In fact, I will go further here, and reiterate the point that conceptual fuzziness, or 
ambiguity is a positive value: it allows innovation to proceed. The plethora of 
definitions that have arisen nonetheless invite clarification and in the next 
section I propose a distinction between two ontologies of performance which I 
see as fundamental to our understanding of music. 
Resistance I- 
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Performance as Process; Performance as Product 
As I hinted in chapter one (Definitions and Identities). the notion of 
performance has been enlisted by literary theorists. Edward Said uses it to argue 
against a brand of identity politics. Briefly, his point is that the literary act (or 
speech act? ) of labelling and defining tends to result in individual and ethnic 
identities congealing and reifying: the pose held becomes a stance, both for the 
observer and the observed. The stance entraps. However, none of this 
invalidates the need for naming. In this sense, Said's position is open to 
criticism. Put simply, we can say that words themselves are reifications of 
meaning: for a word to carry meaning, it must be able to signify a range of 
particular cases (proper names excepted). For all its ambiguities, our conceptual 
world requires a degree of consensus about meanings in order to function, 
which is to reiterate the point that concepts are not infinitely permeable. This 
consensus must attain a modicum of stability within a world of human 
dimensions, across time (measured in generations) and space, that is to say 
within a language community which acknowledges the authority of relevant 
institutions, such as publishers, broadcasters, or lawyers. (At this level I would 
invoke the concept of the practice. ) At a higher level, the text itself - and its 
minimal unit of utterance (usually sentence) - must be storable: it must have 
some kind of physical existence, usually until now as manuscript or print, but 
increasingly in a virtual electronic format. Any literary concept of performance 
must acknowledge, and find a place for, conceptual and textual levels of 
reification. The literary conception of performance is to this extent always a 
stable product. 
Let me contrast this with a performance theorist's ontology of 
performance. Peggy Phelan's words will speak eloquently for themselves: 
Performance's only life is in the present. Performance 
cannot be saved, recorded, documented. or otherwise 
participate in the circulation of representations qf 
representations: once it does so. it becomes something 
other than performance. To the degree that performance 
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attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays 
and lessens the promise of its own ontology. 
Performance's being [i. e. its ontological status]... becomes 
itself through disappearance. " 
It is clear that Phelan's radical ontology of ephemerality is, like Said's parallel 
commitment to identity-in-flux, politically motivated. Where Said rails against 
negative stereotyping, Phelan has the capitalist economy of reproduction in her 
sights: 
Performance in a strict ontological sense is 
nonreproductive. It is this quality which makes 
performance the runt of the litter of contemporary art. 
Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive 
representation necessary to the circulation of capital. " 
While the performance art she documents and discusses sometimes makes use 
of language, it claims to bypass the levels of reification literature must embrace. 
Phelan's ontology, then, should be read against the background of 
performance art, its aims and strategies: among others, to tie itself to the visual 
and the speechless. 'Speechlessness' is something it importantly shares with live 
instrumental music and her point that performance 'becomes itself though 
disappearance' - that performance is process - is well taken in both contexts. 
She is ready to embrace the consequences to the full. So she usefully points to 
the performative nature of reception: in a gallery every individual sees 
something different and nobody ever sees quite the same thing twice. As she 
puts it: 
... the interaction 
between the art object and the spectator 
is, essentially, performative - and therefore resistant to the 
claims of validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of 
reproduction. 45 
Peggy Phelan, Unmarked. - the Politics of Performance (London: Routledge. 1993), p. 146. 
The title of the chapter this and the following references are taken from is The ontology of 
performance: representation without reproduction' p. 146-166. 
" Phelan, Unmarked, p. 148. 
45 lbid, p. 147. 
1 110 
Reception is, in short, a performative process. Furthermore, 
Without a copy, live performance plunges into invisibility 
- in a maniacally charged present - and disappears into 
memory, into the realm of invisibility and the 
unconscious... " 
What does this line of reasoning ultimately imply? Well, it ends up 
denying the possibility of any form of artistic evaluation - 'You had to be 
there', the critic says with a shrug - unless, that is, the documentation of the 
event - prior, as notation, or subsequent, as criticism - is to play a significant 
role in the experience of performance art. Phelan's claim is that while speech is 
performative, writing is 'constative' (descriptive) and, as such, shorn of evasive 
powers and open to commodification: it becomes a potential participant in the 
economy of reproduction. " The problem here is that any act of communication 
requires a stable code. If members of an audience at a performance art event, or 
of a community of readers, want to compare interpretations, their only 
intelligible access to their respective experiences - stored in their memories - is 
through language, a stored system of rules (syntax) and representations 
(semantics). " 
I would like to hint at a further caveat to Phelan's ontology voiced by 
the performance theorist Philip Auslander. Phelan claimed in her quotation 
above that performance 'disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility 
and the unconscious... '. The sentence continues '-where it eludes regulation and 
control. ' Following a detailed consideration of the interactions of media 
(especially mass media, such as television) and live events, Auslander concludes 
quite the opposite: that 'in order to escape regulation and the economy of 
" Ibid, p. 148. 
4' Her discussion of this problem and the 'challenge' it poses threatens to issue in absurdity. 
She 
talks of 'writing towards disappearance, rather than the act of writing towards preservation' 
invokinc, the work of Barthes. (Phelan, Unmarked, p. 148. ) But if one is truly writing 
towards 
disappearance, why write at all? The point of writing is that it conserves. 
48 In this context I might mention John Frow's comments on the nature of memory 
in his essa-, 





iw in Cultural Theory and Postmodernitj) 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), p. 218-246, (p. 234). 
He araues that what is memorised is not a 
fixed text; recalling memories is an act of 
1-: 1 11ý1 
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reconstruction, vulnerable to distortion and 
fragile. Recall is subject to moment-to-mornent 
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reproduction, performance must not only disappear, it must be excluded from 
memory'. " 
What Said's and Phelan's contrasting ontologies make plain is that all 
performance has both an element of reproduction - of a stored product - and 
uniqueness - of a process in real time. (We should remind ourselves that the 
distinction between object, event and process is 'soft'. ) Either element can be 
severely attenuated, but it cannot quite disappear. The distinction I wish to make 
at this point is designed to aid our thinking about music. We need to separate 
out theories which talk of a performance as a finished product from processual 
theories. Literature, for example, is written and read at different times and 
places by audiences of individuals also separate in time and space. The text 
which links these separate occasions is a form of storage, a product; on the other 
hand 
, its writing and reading can be viewed as processual performances of the 
text, where the author or the reader acts simultaneously as both performer and 
audience. Critical writing about art is performative in this sense. Phelan's 
critical accounts of performance art are themselves literary (reified) 
performances, but their value is inseparable from their reproducibility. The fact 
is - and Phelan is aware of this - that although they do indeed preserve 
subjective experience, they always do so imperfectly, because each (refteading 
is a new performance. 'o 
So reified performances maintain their identity across time and space. 
They are documents, or forms of storage. Processual performance must always 
take place in a unified field of time and place, in which there is immediate 
sensory feedback for the performer. A reified performance is, within the 
conceptual scheme I propose, a potential 'text' of a future processual 
performance. In my subsequent employment of 'performance' as a term of art, I 
will have in mind the processual rather than the reified, unless expressly stated 
to the contrary. 
interference. In this sense, then, memory is performative. 
41) Philip Auslander, Liveness. - Performance in aWediatizecl Culture (London: Routledge, 1999), 
p. 156. 
5' Phelan, Unmarked: 'The attempt to write about the undocumentable event of performance is 
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This further exploration of the concept of performance has confirmed the 
fact that the term is not, in any simple sense. a unified concept: it has generated 
many different definitions. The themes that recur include ritual. . 
/rame, role, wid 
text/context. In discussions of performance we should expect to eiicounter 
notions of difference, uniqueness, change, authenticity,, commitment and identity 
in various guises. And ideas about play, experimentation, skill, and (&ýplq-l- will 
resurface from time to time. 
to invoke the rules of the written document and 
thereb% alter the c\ ent itsel t (P. 148) 
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Part Two: Performance and Music 
Narrowing the Focus: Theories and Descriptions of Musical 
Performance 
In this section I would like to contrast two further approaches to 
performance, connected in turn with the philosophy of art/analytical aesthetics 
and popular music/cultural studies. The same disclaimer applies as above: this is 
not a systematic overview, but a set of commentaries and case studies which 
frame the question of what performance is more closely. More specifically, the 
contrast here concerns the relative scope of each endeavour. So my first 
approach - the aesthetic - is systematic. It examines fine detail, using the tools 
of logic. The focus is narrowed to the familiar 'high art' concert performance 
situation, which is treated as a social given. 
1. Analytical aesthetics: Within this field, performance has often been defined 
as an ad unct of the 'work' and its 'interpretation', or within a larger debate 
concerning the ontology of artworks, their relative status, and how they are 
perceived and enjoyed. " The type-token distinction, originally taken from 
Peirce, and popularised by Richard Wollheim, has also found employment 
here. " An important discussion of the issue of the ontology of musical works is 
contained in Lydia Goehr's The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, in which 
she argues against a 'timeless' Platonic conception proposed by Kivy, Levinson 
and others, viewing the work concept as a product rooted in (recent) music 
history. Since her work was published, there has been a discernible rise in 
SI This section includes discussions of aesthetic theories which are not strictly classifiable as 
canalytical'. Important contributions to this field - many of which have appeared in journals 
rather than book form have been made by (among others) Jerrold Levinson, Peter Kivv. Arthur 
Danto, Stephen Davies, George Dickie, R. A. Sharpe and Kingsley Price. An excellent 
reference source is the bibliography of Lydia Goehr's The lmaginaýv Museum of Musical 
I Vot-ks. - an Essm, in the Philosophy of Music (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1991). 
52 Richard Wollheim points out the link to C. S. Peirce in Art and Its Objects (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1975), p. 178. 
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interest in the concept of performance, with two book-length studies appearing 
recently, by Peter Kivy and Stan Godlovitch. " 
It is characteristic of the genre that its product is ever finer conceptual 
differentiation. This is the case in Kivy's study, which proceeds by examining, 
comparing and rejecting arguments in turn. (This can, in less able hands, make 
for dense reading: Kivy is among the most stylistically felicitous in this field). 
He approaches the topic of performance obliquely, through his analysis of 
'authenticities' and the concept of performance as such is never the object of 
direct philosophical scrutiny. What he has to say on the nature of performance 
in passing nicely exemplifies what we might see now as a dilemma: how can we 
talk about the process of performance without turning it into a product? Here is 
how he sets about his analysis, which I will quote in full: 
1. There has to be some viable distinction between the 
performance (object) and what it is a performance of- that 
is to say, there must be a performance and some at least 
vaguely autonomous, identifiable entity that 'survives' 
performance and endures through time - what has, since 
the modern era,, been called the 'work'. 
2. The performance (object) is a work of art itself, an 
arrangement or version of the musical work that has been 
performed, and, as such, a subject of the kind of evaluation 
and aesthetic satisfaction that artworks support and 
provide. 
3. The performer is an artist, somewhat akin to a composer 
or, better,, 'arranger' of musical works. " 
Some of the points Kivy makes here are familiar enough. Busoni, for 
example, had already in 1910 claimed that a performance is a transcription. 
" 
" Peter Kivy, Authenticities: Philosophical Reflections on Musical Performance (Ithaca: 
Cornell, 1995). 1 have already referred to Godlovitch's work - specifically to his definition of 
performance - in chapter one. Stan Godlovitch, 
Musical Performance. - a Philosophical Study 
(London: Routledge, 1998). 
5' Kivy, Authenticities, p. 261. 
55 Ferruccio Busoni, 'Value of the Transcription', The Essence of Music, trans. Rosamond Ley 
(New York: Dover, 1965), p. 85-89. Within a discussion in defence of transcription he has this 
to say: 'The performance of a work is also a transcription, and this too - 
however free the 
performance may be - can never do away with the original. 
For the musical work of art exists 
whole and intact before it has sounded and after the sound 
is finished. 
It is, at the same tirne, in and outside of Time. ' (p. 88) Like 
KivN1, Busoni is clearl\ putting 
forward a 'Platonic' theory of the musical work as ideal form. 
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The 'consciousness of doubleness',, in the form of work/performance is central 
to the argument. However flattering it may be to the performer to be an artist 
somewhat akin' to a composer - and one of the aims of Kivy's study is to give 
the performer her proper due -I find it difficult to accept that a musical 
performance is an arrangement (with or without scare quotes). Arrangement 
conjures up the semantic components of structured organisation and planned 
predictability: and I realise that Kivy's argument is precisely that performance is 
not a mechanical, predictable matter; nonetheless the practising musician is 
likely to think immediately of arrangements in relation to 'hard' versions of a 
piece, made up for a purpose, such as transcriptions or reductions. The 
performance is, in Kivy's definition, neither/both an object, (n)or its absence. 
And he is as uncomfortable with this ambiguity as his punctuation will suggest. 
The claim that there are two works of art rather than one, where a fine 
performance is involved, is, I think unsustainable without further elaboration: 
where,, we are entitled to ask, is this second artwork? In Kivy's formulation the 
answer is nowhere. And are recordings also to count as artworks, making a 
possible third category? Is there not a useful distinction to be made between the 
notated work, the performer's interpretation and the particular performance? 
Godlovitch tackles performance head-on. Instead of differentiating 
between kinds, however, he narrows the focus in what I think is ultimately a 
self-defeating way, producing a thirteen point definition of 'necessary 
conditions' (on whose 'joint sufficiency' he is uncommitted) of the live art 
music concert/recital. " In the end, this gives an impression of thoroughness, 
rather than substance. It must be said that the Anglo-American school of 
analytical aesthetics rarely offers an identifiable philosophy of history, or indeed 
any formal analysis of social, cultural or historical contexts, a shortcoming 
exposed above all by Goehr's analysis in The Imaginary Museum of Musical 
Works. " But Godlovitch's perspective does seem unduly one-sided: his study of 
"I quoted Godlovitch's definition in chapter one above (A Philosophical Parenthesis: 
Godlovitch's Performance Model). 
" Lydia Goehr, The In7aginar 
,v 
Museum of Musical Works. See above chapter 1, footnote 72, 
where I quote Max Paddison's critique of Kivy's Authenticities in BritishJournal of. Aesthetics, 
36 (1996), 330-332. Paddison also makes this comment: 'What becomes apparent [on readin-, -, 
his book] is the absence of any real philosophy of history within Kivy's toolkit which can 
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musical performance is so heavily weighed towards the systematic that almost 
no sense of historically motivated cause emerges. In other words. he has next to 
nothing to say about why the performance of (art) music occurs the way it does 
within our culture. This narrowness also leaves the impression that the large 
swathes of our culture (and the academic world) which also avail themselves of 
the term are talking of something quite unrelated. (Establishing a closer sense of 
kinship between the different senses in which the term 'performance' is used is 
one of the aims here. ) Circularity is inevitable at some level in defining terms, 
but here there is no attempt at a broader cultural hermeneutics: the horizon is 
suffocatingly close. Any attempt to relate musical performance to, say, the 
theatre, falls at the first hurdle: performance, his definition claims, is 'a datable 
sound sequence (that is, a sonic event)' involving 'the immediate output of 
some musical instrument'. " Visual elements play no part in his definition, 
which mentions 'listeners', rather than 'audience' (or, for that matter, 
spectators') - 
Certainly his definition does capture something important that has 
eluded others. For example, he unravels a peculiar but significant difference 
between performing and operating a piece of technology. After all, a piano is as 
much a piece of technology as a CD player. The distinction here rests on the 
speed, continuity and extent of differentiation of feedback between the 
performer and his ability (and commitment) to adapt the performance to the 
immediate conditions; to acknowledge, and make positive use of, a 
performance's necessary uniqueness. (I mentioned Andras Schiff s description 
of this as doing running repairs. ") Simon Frith proposes a distinction between 
ýproductive' and 'reproductive' instruments to account for the difference 
adequately account for the predicament of performance practice in the twentieth century. ' 
(p. 332) 
5' Godlovitch, Musical Performance, p. 49. 




Godlovitch describes. " He has much else to say about skill. as well as the social 
organisations which allow its acquisition. " 
In conclusion, I would say that while Godlovitch is more interested in 
establishing logical consistency in the description of a narrowly conceived class 
of events, he is lamed by his own lack of ambition, because the resulting 
analysis has so little cultural resonance. It merely maintains, in the manner of a 
lawyer arguing a precedent, that what emerges logically is true. 
Music aesthetics in Europe has a distinguished history - and a rather 
longer one - as well as a quite different sense of that history's import within 
ýsystematic' discussion. For that reason,, I will for the present restrict my 
comments on the work of Adorno and Dahlhaus to a single observation: for 
both, the history of music is primarily the history of musical works and their 
performances are contingent upon this. This is very much the conventional 
ýmainstream' view (discussed in more detail below). The work of the European 
(Polish) philosopher Roman Ingarden is somewhat difficult to place. As a critic 
of German Idealist thought, he was drawn to an alternative approach to 
ontology, generally termed 'phenomenological'. His work is 'analytical' in a 
rather different sense from the Anglo-American philosophers discussed above: 
it enumerates and examines sense impressions, rather than analysing concepts. 
In contrast to Godlovitch's over-particularity, Ingardens's findings are intended 
62 to be generalisable across the domain of the arts (and beyond). His conclusions 
concern the existence and nature of stratification and schernatisation (whereby 
literature differs in significant ways from music). Briefly, he views a musical 
work as both an 'intentional object' created out of the beliefs and desires of the 
composer, a 'schematic object' containing aesthetically significant gaps of 
63 indeterminacy and a 'social object', a part of a society's environment. 
" Simon Frith discusses the relationship between technology and instrument in Performing 
Rites. - On the Value of Popular Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), chapter 11. 
Frith points to the historically important role of the player piano as a mid point between these 
categories. (p. 233). For further details, see footnote 70 below. 
6' Godlovitch, Musical Performance, ch. 2. 
62 See Roman Ingarden, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, vols. 1-3) (Tfibingen: Niemeyer 
1964,1965,1974). 
6' Roman Ingarden, The Work of Music and the Problem of its ldentitv, trans. Adam It) - Czerniawski, ed. Jean G. Harrell (London: Macmillan, 1986). This edition contains a brief essay 
on Ingarden's work and its position within twentieth century European philosoph,, b,, Max 
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The first chapter of The Work of Music and the Problem of its Identiry 
deals with performance, which Ingarden defines as follows: 
Each performance of a certain musical work is a certain 
individual occurrence (process) developing in time and 
placed in it univocally [ ... ] As a process, every specific 
performance of a musical work can take place only once. " 
To this he adds that performance is 'univocally fixed in space' and that it can 
only be heard once from a particular position: in other words, each listener's 
experience is genuinely, uniquely subjective and in this sense irrecoverable. In 
other words, like Peggy Phelan, Ingarden takes the ephemerality of performance 
seriously. He hints too at the role 'aesthetic attitude' plays (how we feel, how 
well we concentrate) in what he calls the 'concretion' of a work's performance. 
The concretion is the unique subjective identity which emerges as the work-as- 
schematic-object is 'filled in' or 'realised'. We might, incidentally, think of the 
attitude of the listener as a further framing device (for frames need not be 
physical barriers). What is available to the musician-reader or listener outside of 
the performance event itself is mere schematic representation (as notation, for 
example). 
An omission at this stage - and here I would refer back to my comments 
on Kivy above - is Ingarden's failure to locate and name that form the work 
takes while it is in mental storage: what I would call the 'interpretation'. 
Interpretation in this sense is another form of more or less stable storage for the 
work, comparable in this sense to written notation. As notation underdetermines 
performance, there is space for it to be partly determined by traditions of 
interpretation. Ingarden seems bent on making a contrary point: 
The work remains insensible to the processes occurring in 
the contents and in the manner of experiencing auditory 
aspects of particular performances: it does not change as a 
Rieser (p. 159-17-33). 
Ingarden, The lVork of Alusic, p. 10. Further to this, he points to the uniqueness of every 
performance' (in the sense of 'playing') of a recording: each time we hear a recordin,!. we 
hear 
ýI- 
it In a different strip of sound, so there is no exact, true repetition. 
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result of the performances, acquiring this or that 65 
characteristic... 
Thus he makes a radical separation between the 'schematic object' and the 
socially grounded interpretations it receives: and this is arguably justifiable in 
an investigation into ontology. His later discussion of the work's identity in 
'historical time' revolves around the notion of an ideal or perfect performance, 
which he concludes is illusory. Rather, he claims, there is no 'originaY, of 
which performances are copies or derivatives, but only various 'concretions', 
whose character will change from epoch to epoch, in a process of continuous 
discovery. " As far as interpretation is concerned, he does not speculate at length 
on the structural similarities between interpretations over time, or the 
mechanisms that lead to them (though he does mention the changes in taste in 
performances of Chopin over the last century). " Research by music 
psychologists on the structural characteristics of interpretation and by scholars 
of recorded music on the patterns of change they have undergone has clarified 
the picture here. (Ingarden was writing at a time when such research had not yet 
been undertaken). 
2. Popular Music/Cultural Studies. There could hardly be a greater contrast 
between the microcosms of analytic pedantry described above and the vaulting 
ambition of cultural studies. Simon Frith's recent book Performing Rites. - On 
the Value of Popular MuSiC68 is typical of work in its field in that it casts the net 
very widely: indeed, it aims to take in the whole culture. The basic approach is 
sociological, with an initial division of 'high' and 'low' cutting across all 
domains, and a further subdivision of music into three 'overlapping and 
contradictory grids' labelled 'art', 'folk' and 'pop'. Later Frith extends this 
organisation to cover the technological aspect of musical (re)production in a 
65 lbid, p. 18-19. 
66 Ibid, chapter 8, especially p. 154-8. 
67 lbid , p. 144-5. 68 1 have ignored the work of Frith (and others working in the field of cultural studies and 
popular music) in my discussion of the practice above partly for reasons of space and partly 
because of Frith's strong sociological slant. However, there is some overlap in the ground III 
covered. For example, his excellent summary and assessment of Kingsbury's work on the 
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provocative way. Although there is some risk in doing so - Frith's study 
attempts a rather grand synthesis - let us cut to the chase and consider his Niews 
on performance in isolation. " 
At the start of the chapter of his book entitled 'Performance", Frith 
makes it clear that he is prepared to take a broad view of the topic, including, for 
example, listening-as-performance: 
My argument in this book is not just that in listening to 
popular music we are listening to a performance, but, 
further, that 'listening' itself is a performance: to 
understand how musical pleasure, meaning, and evaluation 
work, we have to understand how, ' as listeners, we perform the music for ourselves. 'O 
A question to bear in mind here is: if listening is a performance, what exactly is 
it a performance oj? (What Frith seems to have in mind is the performance of a 
role - the 'fan' - which implies 'typical' ways of listening. ) Later he points to 
the increasing importance of performance in everyday life, mentioning such 
causal factors as urbanisation and the loss of intimacy (dealing with people we 
don't know), and a raft of effects connected with industrial capitalism. " 
A question arises, then, how Frith is to distinguish between what counts 
as a performance and what is outside of it. This, remember, was much at issue in 
conservatory is relevant here. Performing Rites, p. 37-8. 
" Many would question the division of culture into high and low (or mass/elite): John Frow has 
argued that it is no longer applicable in his Cultural Studies and Cultural Value (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995). But Frith's argument isn't quite as banal as I make it sound. He says that 
,... we should begin from the principle that there is no difference between high and low culture, 
and then see how, nevertheless, such a difference has become a social fact... ' (Performing 
Rites, p. 19. ) The art/folk/pop distinction structures the book and is first presented on p. 26. The 
link to different technologies is in the chapter entitled 'Technology and Authority' (see esp. 
p. 227). Here he argues that there are three 'cultures' of music organised according to the degree 
of sophistication with which they use technology in producing sound. 'Folk' music is a 
technologically naYve stage, in which music is stored in the mind/body and is restored in 
performance. 'Art' music represents a second stage, in which music comes to be stored in 
(handwritten, printed) notation, against which performances can subsequently be judged. And 
in a final stage, 'Pop' music can be stored mechanically or electronically and reproduced away 
from the point of creation, thus potentially breaking up the unified time-space field of 
processual performance. There is no denying the historical time sequence here, but Frith does 
not have in mind a progression of value (i. e. more sophisticated technology does not equal 
better music in his scheme). 
70 Frith, Performing Rites, p. 203-4. 
" lbid, p. 206. 
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the comments I cited on sociological theories of performance above. Frith's 
general orientation is indeed resolutely sociological: what he is interested in is 
performance as an experience [ ... ] of sociability'. 72 More formallý, expressed. 
... 
"performance" defines a social - or communicative - process. It requires an 
audience and is dependent, in this sense, on interpretation', it is about 
meanings. "' Incidentally, note his claim here that performance is a process. The 
extraordinary interpenetration of Product into process in popular music 
performance (often referred to as 'mediatisation'), where the two can barely be 
told apart, makes it doubly important that we hold him to this. " 
The second point to make concerns his attitude towards the content of 
performance. He claims to be 'less interested in theories of text than of 
context', " by which I take him to mean that his orientation is reception- 
weighted: the primary question is how listeners make sense of popular music 
(and the value it has for them), as opposed to how the performer interprets a 
prior representation (such as musical notation). '[B]efore trying to make sense 
of performance as a way of working with a text, ' he says, 'we should first be 
sure we understand how performance is different, how it is "non-textual". "' 
This in turn raises other questions: what (or where) exactly is the 'text' in a 
performance? Is there unanimity (and how much) between performer and 
audience as to what the point (content, text ... ) of a performance is? Do we share 
assumptions about what I as a performer intend to perform and what you as an 
audience (member) wish to experience? 
One way of delimiting content is through framing and Frith's comments 
will strike a familiar chord: 
... popular performance concerns 
'framing'. Performance 
may only make sense through the everyday, but 'public 
performance' also describes something marked off from 
the everyday. " 
72 lbid, p. 204. This is made clear from the very start of the book. See especially chapters 1-22 
" lbid, p. 205. 
74 The term 'mediatisation' was invented by Jean Baudrillard. See For a Critique of the Political 
Econonil, qf the Sign, trans. Charles Levin (St. Louis: Telos Press, 198 1). 
75 Frith, Performing Rites, p. 204. 
7' Frith, Performing Rites, p. 204. 
77 lbid, p. 207. 
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How this marking off takes place is problematic and some of his best 
commentary examines the ambiguities and ironic possibilities XN-hich arise. and 
how 'play' and spontaneous improvisation fit into this. (These were prominent 
themes in my commentary on anthropological notions of performance. ) He 
further points to the role that genre rules play in this public framing. " 
One of the reasons why the question of 'text' is so complicated is that in 
popular music the overwhelming majority of the music is itself texted (i. e. it has 
lyrics). So Frith spends much time examining 'role' and the nature of the 
various possible identifications - between singer and song, listener and song, 
listener and singer - that emerge, commenting that 'all live performance 
involves both spontaneous action and the playing of a role'. " What I take Frith 
to be doing here is taking the matrix of the performance situation in toto and 
extracting a different 'text' as central to his analysis: text here is not notation- 
reali sed- in- sound, but rather the whole range of codes which in sociological or 
dramatic terms constitute roles, including scripted lyrics, dance, gesture, props 
and attire. (The sociologist has an interest in seeking out gaps of the hitherto 
indeterminate and proposing meanings for them within a performance. ) The 
(communicative process' is the simultaneous decoding of this multi-layered, 
multi-media performance event. Listening is performative in the sense that each 
individual will extract different meanings from (or construct different meanings 
out of) this complex whole. The 'sounding' text is embedded in a complex mix 
of activities. So it is, all in all, not all that surprising that Frith has next to 
nothing to say about those technical aspects of music-making which are 
normally of paramount concern to the classical music performer. 
Up to this point I have tried to limit myself to an exposition of Frith's 
theory. It must be clear by now that a simplistic application in the domain of art 
music would be problematic. Consider the functions of text, role, 
communication and interpretation in Frith's conceptual scheme. Mainstream 
musicologists tend to identify the music to a great extent with notation: notation 
is their primary 'text'. There have been successful textual analyses of popular 
78 lbid, p. 207. 
79 lbid, p. 207. 
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music, to be sure. But what is available is usually little more than a thin schema. 
or prototype; and the notion of authorship and the concomitant claim that the 
text encodes a valuable individual authorial subjectivity is misplaced. " Hence 
Frith's orientation towards 'context', or rather. as I claimed above. the multiple 
coded texts which constitute role. If the notated musical work is central to art 
music performance, the possibilities of role analysis are considerably reduced. 
as there are no lyrics in instrumental music,, no discrete role which the performer 
is overtly acting out. They are not extinguished entirely, however: the performer 
utilises gestural and dress codes which have identifiable, if somewhat opaque 
(or faint) social meanings. And the nineteenth-century notion of Kunstf-eligion 
points to an obvious situational model (containing roles such as the musician- 
as-priest, the audience-as-congregation, the concert-as-holy-communion). " 
Frith's use of the concepts of interpretation and communication raise 
large questions which certainly go beyond the scope of this commentary. I will 
merely try to hint at some of the difficulties. We become aware of a need for 
clearer differentiation between performance and interpretation when, in an over- 
zealous attempt to extend the range of his performance label, he comments that 
Just as a singer is both performing the song and performing 
the performance of the song, so we, as an audience, are 
listening both to the song and to its performance. " 
Here, a failure to pursue the ontological implications of performance-as-process 
produces a verbal contortion. For surely what Frith means is that the singer is 
both performing the song and its interpretation? Or that the performance is of 
an interpretation of a prior recording? However much Frith may want to leave 
aside the notion of text-as-musical-work,, he cannot do without it completely. 
" For a description of the popular music text as 'schema', see Peter Van Der Merwe, Origins of 
fl7c Popular Style. - The Antecedents of Twentieth Centurj, Popular Music (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1989), chapter 10. Nicholas Cook draws attention to the limitations of an 'authorial' approach 
to the analysis of rock music in 'Music minus One: Rock, Theory and Performance', in new 
fibrinations. - a Journal of CulturelTheorylPolitics, 27 (Winter 1995-6), volume title 
'Performance Matters', p. 23-41. 
" For further discussion, see Carl Dahlhaus, The Idea ofAbsolute Ifusic, trans. Roger Lustig 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). Christopher Small and Henr,, KillusbUr" 11av'e 
It) ltý -- 
each analysed the concert situation in this way. 
Frith, Performing Rites, p. 21 1. 
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The interpretation in this sense would be the mental reification of the 
performer's intentions, the 'game plan^ performers follov, - and which in 
performance never comes out quite the same way twice. If we accept Frith's 
comment here, we conflate the two sense of performance I distinguished 
between above, namely the reified and the processual. " 
This brings me to communication. Sermotic codes may aspire to the 
status of natural language, but they do not achieve it. Communication is not an 
unambiguous concept, and not all forms of communication are equally flexible 
or successful as the serniotician Peirce's well-known distinction between Icon, 
Index and Symbol makes clear. Frith makes an important point about the role of 
convention in popular music performance, when he says that '... the 
performance artist depends on an audience which can interpret her work through 
its own experience ofperformance.. . 
'. (And later, 'a performance is always... a 
performance in a history of performances... '. ") There is much which is 
entertaining and insightful in Frith's musings on role-playing and the 
construction of identities and how the audience colludes in this. For 
performances to work, audiences need expectations, and a central task for a 
performance theory of music must be to describe this 'generic contract'. In other 
words, there must be a consciousness of doubleness. 85 But we are really none 
the wiser after reading his account of how or what the music communicates. 
Indeed, is communication really the concept we need here? 
Are these lapses -- if lapses they are - crucial? Perhaps they are 
best seen 
as the consequence of Frith's choice of literary genre here. Cultural studies 
writing rejects the high academic mode of close, formal reasoning. It alms 
for 
accessibility and Frith's style is a poeticised journalese modelled on 
'direct' 
" Frith is evidently aware of the problem here. He quotes Richard 
Bauman as saying that 
performance is an 'emergent structure' that comes 
into being only as it is performed. 
(Peýforming Rites, p. 208. ) He adds in a footnote (p. 327) that 'it may 
be true... that books too 
only corne into being when read, but they can and are studied as 
if they were always already 
structured, so to speak. ' Here the problem word 
becomes 'structure' and its status as what is 
performed. 
Frith, Perjbi-ming Rites, p. 205. Italics in the original. Second quotation from p. 
21 1. 
5 Frith revealingly quotes Arthur Danto at one point: 
'To see somethin, -, as art requires 
a kno\\ something the eve cannot decry - an atmosphere of artistic 
theory -led-e of the historv 
of art: an art\N, orld', adding that this is 'the , u*din(, principle of 
the sociolo, -, \ of culture too'. 
(11ciJorming Rites. p. 249. ) 
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speech, a chatty informality which mixes serious academic pondering on *hard' 
issues with personal disclosure (which one may find disarming or 
uncomfortable). The book is 'framed' by two performance 'occasions', an old 
friends' get-together and alone in a hotel room in Berlin, watching pop \, Ideos. 
This self-conscious device - along with the trite stab at closure ("'La Bamba, " I 
think restlessly, this is where I came in"') and the relentlessly colloquial tone - 
make us aware (intentionally, I think) of the book itself as a constructed, reified 
performance. 
Performance Studies in Musicology: (1) Orthodoxy 
We have seen how , in the post World War Two years, social scientists of 
various persuasions appropriated the concept of performance from the theatre 
and turned it to their own explanatory ends. At the same time, an avant-garde- 
inspired art form - performance art - explored an 'anti-ontology' of process 
(often harnessed to a radical political agenda). A substantial body of theoretical 
writing accumulated and the concept of performance acquired a new colloquial 
chic. While much of this writing is not overtly concerned with music, I have 
examined two areas of theorising which take it on specifically: analytical 
aesthetics concerns itself primarily with consistency of linguistic use; and 
cultural studies attempts a sociologically inspired 'top-down' analysis of culture 
at large and music's - particularly popular music's - place within a scheme. 
To an academic versed in Performance Theory and familiar with these 
developments, the nascent sub-discipline of 'performance studies' in 
musicology must present a bewildering picture. Surprisingly little of what I 
have described here has to date left any recognisable imprint on mainstream 
musicology. I hinted above at an orthodox view of performance in music theory 
and in order to make sense of 'performance studies, it would be useful to know 
something of how this orthodoxy arose. 
16 This is the final sentence of Peýforming Rites. 
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I claimed above that for Adorno and his pupil Dahlhaus the history of 
music is primarily the history of musical works. Dahlhaus's argument - w1lich I 
will examine first here - is presented at length in the chapter entitled 'Thoughts 
on Structural History' in Foundations of Music History. " The question 
Dahlhaus is ostensibly addressing here concerns the nature and content of music 
history: how are structures (or 'circumstances'), events, musical genres and 
individual works to be accommodated? He argues that the rise of aesthetics in 
the mid eighteenth century paralleled the emergence of the work concept and 
that, as a result, music came to be viewed '... as the creation of forms rather 
than actions within a social environment'. Hence, 'the fundamental category [of 
music history] is not the "event" but the "work"'. 'A Work', he says, 
... represents... the concrete realisation of an idea in the mind of an individual'. 
Its meaning 'resides in its aesthetic essence', which amounts to a claim that its 
significance is not tied to a particular locus in history. " 
It is instructive to look briefly at Dahlhaus's range of terms for 
conceptualising history. Implicit in his analysis is a hierarchy. At the bottom is 
what he calls the 'teeming mass of process' with which all historians, regardless 
of whether their ambitions are explicative or narrative, are faced. " Processes 
consist of movements,, which in turn coalesce into actions, with events (usually) 
consisting in turn of bundles of actions. Structures are the patternings, broadly 
visible at a distance. ) that emerge when sufficient numbers of actions are 
organised in terms of cause and effect. Note here the complex relationship that 
brings events into being: an event occurs at 'a point at which actions and 
structures intersect'. In other words, events occupy a privileged position within 
a chain of historical causes and effects. Events have often been the stuff of 
political (and specifically military) history. 'Their significance', he comments, 
'lies less in themselves than in their consequences (there is no such thing as a 
political "event" without consequences'. )" So the problem falls into two halves: 
Carl Dahlhaus, Foundations of Music Historv, trans. J. B. Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), p. 129-149. 
Dall lhaus, Foundations, p. 132 
Ibid, p. 117. 
Ibid, p. 13-33. The problem of distinguishing movements, actions and events from each other 
is 
about finding the point at which intentions enter the picture. It is mirrored at the 
level of 
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first, there is the question of which concepts to use to carve up histor)Y into 
manageable 'units' (and here Dahlhaus employs a conventional hierarchy); and 
second,, how to fit human intention into the historical frame. He achieves this by 
distinguishing between events entailing causes and effects, and their prior 
constitutive actions. Ultimately, the structural and the historical are mutually 
implicated and inextricable, he argues, and the term 'structural history' is a 
conscious acknowledgement of the need to mediate between these two 
domains. " 
Musical performances are possible candidates for eventhood within this 
scheme, and,, indeed, examples spring readily to mind (Mendelssohn's revival of 
the Matthew Passion, the premiere of Le Sacre A Printemps). But to conceive 
of music history in terms of performance events is, Dahlhaus avers, impossible: 
... no-one 
has ever so much as tried to write music history 
as a history of events, even though music historians almost 
invariably describe individual events and, in a few 
instances, actually analyse them. On the contrary, texts as 
abstracted from acoustical realisations and social 
surroundings, the institutions that serve as vehicles of 
musical events, and the categories of music reception - it is 
these, and not events, which go to make up the corpus of 
facts that music historians draw upon... " 
The problem, as he describes it, is that in order to talk about processual musical 
performance, it has to be reified into a 'text', or product of some kind. Dahlhaus 
acknowledges that the reality of music is musical events, ('acoustical 
occurrences taking place within social contexts'). However, historically 
speaking, performances-in-themselves must remain inaudible and invisible. 
Within the history of music, then, works provide an ultimate ralson d'ýtre. And 
at the risk of appearing over-reductive, I am, I think, right in drawing a parallel 
between the problem in theorising history that Dahlhaus describes here and that 
facing the ontologist of performance: how to render process into product. 
performance as the pedagogical distinction between neutral technique and 
intentional 
I- 
interpretation. Deciding what constitutes an event is as problematic as deciding what constitutes 
interpretation. 
" lbid, p. 1 -337. 
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Adorno's view's on music history and the role of performance within it 
are easily accessible in Max Paddison's exemplary account and so I w0l limit 
myself to a few summarising comments. 9' Firstly. Adorno. like Dahlhaus, 
regards the Work as the primary vehicle of music history. Paddison summarises 
his view: '[A]lthough the work as performance is more than the work as printed 
score, Adorno insists that the work as transcendental "thing-in-itself' is more 
than both. "' The performance is contingent upon the work and the relationship 
between performer and work is in essence a craft relationship, where the 
interpreter attempts to solve the problems the work poses. 9' It is nonetheless 
problematic: on Adorno's view, musical artworks contain inherently 
contradictory elements - antinomies - which make satisfactory performance 
well-nigh impossible. Adorno uses the concept 'tour de force' to describe the 
performer's grappling with the (incompatible) demands the work makes. " 
Indeed, the performer, in spite of her rational, problem-solving pretensions, is 
'the last refuge of irrational reproduction within the capitalist process'. 97 
Adorno's views can often seem paradoxical, even dangerously close to 
self-contradiction. This is true too of his comments on the processual aspect of 
performance, whose significance he is keen to downplay as far as possible. The 
reason he gives is that work is a fully formed 'congealed object'. Paddison 
quotes Adorno as saying that 'all "becoming" in music is in fact illusory, insofar 
as the music. ) as text, 
is really fixed and thus is not actually 'becoming' anything 
as it is already there. "' But this begs important questions: how does the 
interpreter/performer actually discover form? How does analysis fit in? Adorno 
himself may have fought shy of addressing this problem in detail - he left few 
detailed analyses of works" - or he may have lacked a certain professional 
92 lbid, p. 133. 
93 Max Paddison, Adorno's Aesthetics of Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
19931), especially chapter 5. It might seem odd to call Adorno a 'musicologist', given how much I 
lie contributed to other fields. However, his views fit into the discussion best at this point. 
Q4 Paddison, Adorno's Aesthetics, p. 198. 
9' lbid, p. 196, where Paddison refers to the early (untranslated) essay 'Zur Problem 
der 
Reproduktion'. 
96 lbid, p. 197-8. 
9' lbid: Adorno quoted by Paddison, p. 194. 
9' lbid, p. 19 1. 
" Paddison includes an extended anakl, sis of Berg's Op. I sonata based on Adorno. lbid, p. 158- 
168. 
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expertise. It is significant that his intention to develop a theory of 'reproduction" 
(planned with Rudolf Kolisch in 1935) never achieved fruition. though the 
German pianist and musicologist Eirgen Uhde had access to Adomo's 
(unpublished) notes on this topic while he was preparing a pedagogical work on 
piano interpretation and performance. "' The question of formal articulation is 
really twofold: how to (a) locate it in the work and (b) project it in the public 
performance setting. In the end, it comes back to a question about the 'unit of 
process'; and in addition, it raises explicitly an issue which has obsessed music 
theorists interested in performance: what is the relationship between 
performance and analysis? 
There is much else that could be said about Adorno's theory of 
performance. Perhaps it might more tellingly be described as a theory of 
ýreproduction', linking it explicitly to other forms of representation, such as 
recording. This is a matter I will return to in the next chapter. For the moment, 
however, we might conclude that although it may be impossible to write a 
history of performance as such, a history of attitudes towards performance - of 
which the origins of the early music revival and the issue of performance 
authenticity would be a part - and a history of representations of performance 
(the history of recordings, for example) are perfectly conceivable. 
Performance Studies in Musicology: (2) Recent Developments 
Three immediate criticisms of what I have called the orthodox view 
sketched above might be voiced at this point. Firstly, it is disembodied: the 
performance setting/occasion plays no role in theorising and the audience 
is 
reduced to unseeing, unfeeling 'mono-sensual' listeners. 
Where, too, is the 
performer? What are his responsibilities beyond realising the work? 
Secondly. it 
is evasive: the problems it throws up - of the relationship of interpretation 
to 
performance, performance preparation, the role of analysis, 
the issue of 
"" Jürgen Uhde and Renate Wieland, Denken und Spielen. » Studien zu einer 
Theorie der 
1. 
musikalischen Darstellung (Kassel: 
Bärenreiter, 1988). 
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embodying and 'translating' a text into music - are often glossed over. or at best 
cursorily addressed. And finally, it is patronising: the performer is not artist. but 
artisan, a craftsperson. Where is the space in such an account for performance 
artistry? 
Are these criticisms being addressed and, if so, how? Certainly the 
mainstream view has been questioned more and more often recently and I have 
already examined some of the ways in which this has happened. The current 
state of 'performance studies' is, as Dunsby points out, one of fragmentation. 1`1 
What he means to suggest by this is not the break up of a formerly integrated 
entity, nor even a first stage in a move towards a putative whole. It is something 
quite different, a fact about the interdisciplinary nature of the subject. A 
characteristic product of this state of affairs is a recently published collection of 
essays edited by John Rink entitled The Practice of Performance. - Studies in 
Musical Interpretation. It provides a picture of a discipline acknowledging a 
diversity of approaches rather than searching for a focus. "' Nonetheless, one 
can discern two emphases and a relationship between them. The first is centred 
on the psychology of music and its attempts through experiment and empirical 
study to attain a stabler epistemological base from which to analyse 
performance; and the second is an enduring interest, shared by music 
psychologists, in the relationship between analysis and performance. 
The issue of definition which I have been addressing here is often 
neglected in this study (and this is a particular problem in the more speculative 
contributions). Even the title throws together two key terms in a manner which 
invites explanation: but on the various occasions when explicit definitions are 
given, such as at the outset of Janet Levy's essay, they lack rigour-'O' And what 
... Jonathan Dunsby, 'Acts of Recall', Musical Times (January 1997), p. 12. See also my 
comments on Dunsby's work at the end of chapter one above. 
'0' The Practice of Performance. - Studies in Musical Interpretation, ed. John Rink (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
103 Take, for example, Janet Levy's essay 'Beginning-Ending Ambiguity: Consequences of Z: ý zn Ib 
Performance Choices', in Rink, The Practice of Performance, p. 150-169. Levy begins 
promisingly by pointing out that in colloquial use, the terms 'Interpretation' and 'performance' 
are interchangeable. (This is, incidentally, nicely confirmed by the pianist Roy Howat quotes at 
the be- inning of his article: see Rink, The Practice of Performance, p. 3 ). footnote 2. ) She goes 
on to state: 'Just as evei-y performance is an interpretation, evei-y interpretation is either a 
performance or. when written as analysis and criticism, construable as a set of "instructions" 
for 
a performance... ' (p. 150) Though this is we I I- intended, it ultimately fails, I think-, to make a 
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of the subject matter itselP The practice of using recordings of various kinds as 
prime evidence for performance analysis may well be the only sensible exit 
from an impasse; but generally speaking, contributors to this volume seem only 
dimly aware of the ontological problem I have repeatedly identified: that a 
reification of a performance is never identical with the performance it was 
derived from (but rather the subject of a further performative act in an 
recursive/regenerative cycle). 
Since this collection was published, one of the contributors has gone on 
to develop a theory of performance whose ambition makes it worthy of closer 
analysis, and I turn to this now. 
A Case Study: Cook on Analysing Performance and Performing 
Analysis 
Nicholas Cook's larger project - which has involved a good many asides 
and parentheses - has been to explore the divergence between the rhetoric of 
music theory and the reality of musical practice. A consequence of this has been 
a growing interest in performance. In Music, Imagination, and Culture 
(published in 1990) performance only featured incidentally; but since then his 
writing has made ever more explicit reference to it, culminating in the recent 
article whose title forms the sub-heading above. "' 
Although the central arguments of Music, Imagination, and Culture do 
not revolve around performance, they have strong implications for it. As such, 
they are a useful starting point for investigating Cook's views. 'A musical 
culture is a tradition of imagining sounds as music', he says, continuing that, 'its 
basic identity lies in its mechanism for constituting sounds as intentional 
clear enough distinction between entailment, implication and identity: does a performance I- 
necessarily entail the existence of an interpretation, or is this optional? (And NNhose 
interpretation is it? ). Or are they really just different words for the same thing? At the risk of 
labouring the point let me quote one more example. Edward T. Cone's article in the same I 
collection provides a further example of terminological conflation/confus ion: 'The same I 
resources that lead to valid critical interpretation inform intelligent practical Interpretation 
i. e. 
performance. ' (lbid, p. 242) 
" Nicholas Cook, 'Analysing Performance and Performing Analysis' in Rethinking Ifusic, eds. 
Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford Univerist\ Press, 1999), p. 239-261. 
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objects, from the level of the single note to that of the complete work. "O' The 
key idea, or 'mechanism, is that of reification: composers have to work %\-Ith 
notation, which presupposes reifications of the sonic process into notatable 
obj ects starting with the single note, through the interval. phrase and so on 
up the scale - and hence the internal characteristics of the notational s\, stem 
play an important part in constituting the sounds the composer imagines as 
music. For example, the notion of pitch as a fixed, stable entity is implied by 
notation; and the notational system in all likelihood played a very significant 
part in creating an expectation in the musical culture that pitches should be 
stable. There is, in short, a (positive) creative tension between reified notated 
sound and sound-as-process and a mutual influence, or feedback between them. 
It can be argued that the listener reverses the process, or at least tries to: it is the 
extent and nature of the listener's failure that interests Cook here. How does 
performance fit in? Cook makes the point that reading - and here words and 
music offer a direct parallel - is in both instances a real-time process and to this 
extent a 'performance of meaning5. Imagining music is also a kind of 'inner 
performance' because however synoptic our view of a piece, to imagine its 
sounds entails imagining a process. "' This as we have seen is a matter of 
reconstitution from reifications. A problem arises when people mistake the 
reification - which is an 'artifice of representation' 
107 - for reality. 
Cook does not pursue his arguments here from the performer's point of 
view, but we can imagine how he might. The performer is necessarily tied to 
producing a process as the end-point of her endeavours. On the way to doing so, 
however, mediating reifications and performative processes are constantly 
interleaved,, as the notation is first read (performatively), understood, interpreted 
and stored as reifications, and recalled both mentally and physically as 
processual performance. An interesting question to ask would be whether the 
constraints on composers Cook identifies are equally true of performers. 
In his later work, Cook does not pursue this line of speculation. Instead, 
he emphasises a different aspect of the topic, approaching it 
from a rather 
Nicholas Cook, Music, Imagination, and Culture, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), p. 22-3). 
Cook. Music, Imagination, and Culture, p. 125-6. 
"' lbid, p. 225. 
Iý -I 
unexpected angle. 'O' Instead of examining musical performance -for its o, ýN'11 
sake'. he applies a notion of performance to music theory in general, and 
analysis in particular, preparing the ground by pointing out that contemporary 
music theory is dominated by structuralist approaches. Typically. he says, the 
aim of analysis has been to define structure in musical works. (A structure is, of 
course, a reffication. ) Performance practice has tended to be judged by analysts 
on the basis of whether a/the structure is audible in a performance. an 
authoritarian approach he feels we should distance ourselves from. He (Toes on 
to make his claim that theory in general, and analysis in particular. reveals more 
of its true nature when seen as a performative act: 
My central proposition is that a theory which does justice 
to performance will be at the same time a theory aware of 
its own performative qualities... [W]e need to think about 
what our theory does as much as about what it 
represents. 109 
This contrast needs clarification. The 'representational' aspect of a 
theory is its content by another name: the theorist's striving for the closest fit 
between what is observed from a collection of instances and the verbal 
description employed. How clear, we might say, is the isomorphism between 
the observed and the description? What role do metaphor, analogy, and 
homology play? How do linguistic and diagrammatic transformations fit in? 
Identifying what a theory does, on the other hand, involves describing the 
effects it brings about. Cook is asking us, then, to think of a theory as a 
Dahlhausian 'event', a link in a sequence of causes and effects. Furthermore, the 
effects, or changes, a theory brings about are of political import: theorising - for 
example in the guise of analysis - necessarily involves supporting or 
undermining vested interests. 
The article ends with a well-considered example of how theorising can 
produce possibly unintended political effects. Cook examines an analysis of 
some progressive post-bop jazz (Thelonius Monk and Eric Dolphy). couched in 
"' In the essay entitled 'Analysing, Performance and Performing Analysis'. 
109 Cook, 'Analysing Performance and Perfon-ning Analysis', p. 242. In I 
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the analytical terminology developed for and associated with notated art music. 
The analysis sets about demonstrating that the music contains a calculated 
complexity (e. g. of cross-rhythms). Cook points out how the analyst (Cynthia 
Folio) leads us through an argument - complexity equals superior rational 
control equals quality - which terminates in her claiming that the music has 
value, because it contains and expresses what Western music theorists think 
good music should contain. Much turns on the use of the word 'express: the 
music,, it is claimed in the analysis, 'expresses' certain things. In Cook's vieý, v. 
the confusion here is between 'expressioný - which Folio uses to suggest a 
natural, inevitable relation of cause and effect - and Cook's preferred term 
'representation', which is a matter of construction. This exercise in academic 
canon formation' (as Cook calls it) has the further (possibly unintended) 
consequence of neutralising the music's exotic 'othemess'. 110 In short, this is a 
brilliant demonstration of how the unthinking imposition of one set of received 
values in a novel setting - in this case formal academic analytical techniques 
applied to Afro-American jazz - generates oddly inappropriate results. The 
musicians, it is suggested, are patronised by Folio's imputation that they 
intended what her analysis implies. The 'unmasking' strategy Cook employs 
here is typical, as is the critical aptitude with which it is followed. "' 
One of the problems, then, with this analysis is that calculated intentions 
are being imputed to musicians whose live, improvised music - in recorded 
form - is being subjected to sophisticated, considered analysis. The question of 
what the analysis achieves depends rather on which practice we are thinking of 
and how readers might respond to it. (It might have positive effects on some 
readers. ) The mistake would seem to be Folio's apparently unthinking 
cappropriation' of the music, her assumption that all music can be heard in 
terms of the Western academic theoretical paradigm. After all, Cook does not 
deny the competence of Folio's analysis as such; rather he casts doubt on the 
appropriateness of the chain of causes and effects Folio sets up around them. 
'" Ibid, p. 260- 
... Other notable examples in Cook's output include his article 'Perception: a Perspective from 
Music Theory', in Ahisical Pet-ceptions, eds. Rita Aeillo with John Sloboda (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994). p. 64-99; and 'Music minus One: Rock, Theory and Performance. 
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What is clear is that the relation between 'what a theory represents and what it 
does', between representation and effect, is not straightforward because it 
depends in turn upon the existence of a validating interpretative community. or 
practice. If the effects of a theory are performative, they perform within a setting 
i. e. within a discourse or practice. Without some knowledge of audience and 
setting - who is reading the theory, in what context - it becomes difficult to 
claim that the theory means a particular thing. 
Where does Cook derive the notion that a theory (or analysis) is 
performative because of what it 'does'? His ideas are traceable back to 
Wittgenstem, filtered through various sources. "' Particularly important is the 
role of speech act theory: language, it is argued, does not (only) represent 
reality, it also constructs it. Or to put it another way, the world of language is a 
construction (whose content is concepts) and the 'real' world is a perceptual 
construction which language purports to represent. Representation and 
construction are inseparable: in order to achieve the former, you must undertake 
the latter. The language world consists (in part, at least) of 'speech acts' and an 
example Cook has used is the promise. "' A promise is not a report, it is an act, 
with consequences. Having established this, he goes on to claim that 'an 
analysis is like a promise: it is an action disguised as a statement of fact'. '" 
From here is but a short step to claiming that theories and the analyses which 
support them are performative because they have consequences which are 
politically important. In other words, performances are acts which should be 
judged by their consequences. 
Here I think it useful to return to the distinction between a 'literary' 
ormances which retain a notion of performance and genuinely processual perf 
'" Of further interest here is the article by Joanna Hodge, entitled 'Aesthetic Decomposition: 
Music, Identity and Time', collected in The Interpretation of Music, ed. Michael Krausz 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), p. 247-258, which meditates on the nature of reifications. She makes 
an interesting connection between the conception of human identity and the artwork - 
especially the musical artwork - as both being reffications of processes. 
This article is discussed 
by Cook in Music. - a Fery Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), chapter 
Cook, Music: a Fer. 1, Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 77: 
iii sayin ,g 
-I promise 1. you are doing something, not just reporting on something. ' See also 
Cook, 'Analysing Performance and Performing Analysis', p. 257. 
Cook. 'Analysing Performance and Performing Analysis', p. 2-57. t) Ib 
156 
unity of time, place and action. An analysis in the form of a text is clearl\' an 
example of the former. It is unlike a musical performance in two 'Nuys: firstly 
because it uses language and secondly because the performative moments of 
reading and writing are separated in time and cannot interact. There is no 
possibility of feedback. My reservation about Cook's identification of an 
analysis with a performance arises from this point. Whereas in a processual 
performance the performer can gauge the effect she is having on an audience 
immediately, in the case of a literary text this is impossible: to an extent the 
effects the text has (what it does) are unforeseeable and uncontrollable. 
The problem in applying speech act theory to musical performance is 
similar. The meaning of a speech act depends both on the words used and the 
context within which they occur. But instrumental music has no vocabulary and 
its meaning is more elusive. By applying speech act theory to music we stress a 
compatibility between the two domains. But why should we? As one 
commentator puts it: 
Music, it might be argued, is so utterly and irreducibly 
specific, its meaning so embedded in its essence, that we 
are forced to borrow from other systems of thought in 
order to attempt any kind of description at all. '" 
Cook's theory of performance is based on a couple of overlapping key 
distinctions: between representation and construction, and representation and 
effect. It also moves freely between different modes of representation - speech, 
writing and music-making - applying the performance concept equally to all. I 
propose that we put aside his distinction between 'representations' and 'what 
they do': thinking about a performance in terms of the effects it has is ultimately 
only possible by examining the process of reception (which in the case of a 
literary text is separated from the moment of production). I suggest "ve return 
instead to a weaker opposition between reifications and processes. 
A reification 
is a stored representation (such as a text, a diagram. a recording. musical 
Samson, 'Analvsis in Context', p. 47. 
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notation, a picture etc. ) and by process I mean the processual performance 
entailed in retrieving what is reified in real time. 
By placing performance at the centre of the conceptual network in this 
way, we can see how the culture comes to consist of many different types of 
reified representations constantly being performed and recycled as new, related 
representations. Put simply, we could say that the only things we have in a 
culture are representations and the only thing we can do with them is perform 
them. And it is the performance concept, viewed as process, that can rescue us 
from what Cook sees as 'the greatest danger attendant upon the alignment of 
words with music, which is that of premature closure'. "' 
Postscript: Gould on Performance 
Both Nicholas Cook and Jonathan Dunsby cite Glenn Gould on 
performance approvingly, Cook to provide a contrast with the views of Wallace 
Berry and Dunsby as a general thematic pointer heading a chapter (entitled 
'Recent Thought' on performance) and at one point within the chapter to 
underpin an argument in favour of an organised, scholarly approach to 
performing. "' The point both wish to make in quoting Gould is that a performer 
cannot plan every detail in advance. However, it is interesting to note that 
Gould's original words do not refer to processual performance in front of an 
audience,, but to recording a work in a recording studio. I will quote his words at 
length. The portion Dunsby and Cook cite is in italics: 
Certainly, when you're making a recording you are left 
alone. You're not surrounded by five hundred, five 
thousand, fifty thousand people who are in a position to 
say at that moment, 'Aha, that's what he thinks about that 
work, eh! ' But that seems to me a great advantage. 
Because I think that the ideal way to go about making a 
... Cook, 'Analysing Performance and Performing Analysis', p. 258. 
... Cook, 'Analysing Performance and Performing Analysis', P. 248. He is reviewing Wallace 
Berry's book Musical Structure and Performance (New Haven, 1989) at this point. The 
quotation is acknowledged as coming from Dunsby, 
Performing Ifusic. - Shared Concerns 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1995). chapter 4, p. 39 and 46. 
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performance or a work of art - and I don't think that they 
should be different, really - is to assume that it-hen , 1,0ZI begin, you don't quite know what it is about. You only, 
come to know as you proceed As you get two thirds of the 
way through the session, you are two thirds of the way 
along toward a conception. I very rarely know, when I 
come to the studio, exactly how I am going to do 
something. 
A little further on he adds: 
It makes the performer very like the composer, really, 
because it gives him editorial afterthought, it gives him that 
power... Well obviously, this is something that you cannot 
do in a concert,, if only because you can't stop, as I always 
wanted to,, and say, 'Take two'. 118 
In this passage Gould uses performance in two different senses. The first 
signifies a reified, constructed product: he talks of 'making a performance' out 
of the different takes of a piece he records, compares and assembles into a final 
version which is put out as a recording. The second sense - processual 
performance in front of a live audience - is only implied, but clearly so. Taking 
the interview as a whole, we find instances of his using 'performance' to 
describe both particular recordings (especially Rubenstein's version of the 
Brahms piano quintet) and 'playing before an audience at a concei-C. "' In fact 
what allowed Gould to take this remarkably relaxed attitude towards recording - 
whereby he effectively experimented with different interpretative strategies in 
the studio - was the indulgence of his record company, who were prepared to 
grant him an almost completely free hand in his choice of repertoire and modus 
operandi, in the knowledge that high sales figures were guaranteed. In other 
words, Gould's approach is anything but typical. The fact is that Gould gave up 
public performance because of the - as he experienced them - inhuman 
demands it made on him artistically and physically. In particular, he seems to 
The Glenn Gould Reader, ed. Tim Page (London: Faber. 1988), p. 287. The context is an I 
interview, reported by Gould, with Rubenstein, originally published 
in 197 1. 
"" Throughout the rest of the interview, in which Gould heaps praises on Rubenstein's zD 
recording of the Brahms Piano Quintet, he identifies this recording as a 
'performance'. (See 
I ID Page, The Glenn Gould Reader, p. 288-9). He uses performance in the sense of 'playing before 
an audience at a concert' on p. 285. 
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have felt that the lack of control in the live performance situation fatally 
compromised the musical outcome. All this makes the quotation a decidedly 
less appropriate illustration of the point that in performance 'you don't quite 
know what it is about' and that 'you only come to know as you proceed'. For it 
is in a live, processual performance in front of an audience that this is truly the 
case. 
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Part Three: The Solo Pianist in Performance 
Degrees of Performativity 
Kingsbury has pointed in passing to the terminological problem I have 
pursued at some length: differences between colloquial and various technical 
uses of the term 'performance'. He comments as follows: 
... among conservatory musicians performance usually 
refers specifically to formally framed events in which 
music is sung or played before an audience. By contrast, 
among many anthropologists and ethnomusicologists, the 
notion of "performance" tends to be used to refer 
inclusively to any and all manifestations of the social 
making and doing of music. "' 
In its colloquial sense, then, performance refers to concerts and recital 
giving. Kingsbury introduces the term rendition to cover those instances of 
performing where the audience includes a teacher and peers (or either 
separately). Though this term is not in common use colloquially, it does occur 
from time to time. "' He adds in a footnote to the above comments that the same 
problem pertains to the word 'practice', which has a social science meaning 
derived from the Marxist notion of praxis (to refer to any social activity). 
Conservatory musicians use the word in the sense of 'rehearse' i. e. to apply to 
'training for future musical activity'. To this he adds that 
... the notions of performance, rendition and practice 
form 
a continuum of overlapping categories, and distinctions 
among them are made by musicians with regard to social 
context or frame. 122 
12' Kingsbury, Music, Talent and Performance, p. 115. 
121 interestingly, Kullak's translator uses it in his piano method, presumably as an equivalent of 
Auff0hrung. I am not aware if the term was common currency in the nineteenth centur'. 
Adolph Kullak, The Aesthetics of Pianoforte-playing, trans. Theodore Baker (New York: Da 
Capo, 1972, original edition of this translation New York, 1893). Rendition includes senses of 
ýrestoring' (giving back, returning) and covering (c. f. the 'cover version' in popular music). 
1. 122 Kingsbury, Music, Talent and Performance. p. 187. 
1 
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That performativity comes in degrees is something musicians "-III be %\. ell aware 
of Playing in a lax, disengaged manner in front of an audience is no better an 
example of performance than playing with great concentration and commitment 
for oneself alone. Both are less than 'full' performance. 
A number of other terms have been employed on occasion to (-Yrade 
distinctions more finely. Stravinsky, for example, distinguished between 
(execution' and 'interpretation', whereby the former term stands for that style of 
pure, 'objective' performance upheld as an ideal, widely fashionable in 
Continental Europe in the inter-war years, and associated Nvith 'Neue 
Sachlichkeit'. It was contrasted with the performer's presence as interpreter, to 
be denigrated for adding to and in the process distorting the music: 
It is the conflict of these two principles - execution and 
interpretation - that is at the root of all the errors, all the 
sins, all the misunderstandings that interpose themselves 
between the musical work and the listener and prevent a 
faithful transmission of its message. "' 
One might indeed include the word 'transmission' here as a rough synonym for 
execution. The extreme point towards which Stravinsky's views tend is a notion 
of scrupulous fidelity to the text. However, the suggestion that the notated text 
can be realised as music without any interpretative intervention is logically 
impossible, given the various indeterminacies and ambiguities notation entails. 
The best that can be hoped for is a conception of interpretation graded in terms 
of adherence. 
Richard Poirier's memorable description of performance as 'an 
accumulation of secretive acts' captures rather well the gradual, detailed, private 
preparations needed by musicians - preparations both of the self and the work - 
if public performance is to be satisfactory. Kingsbury's list of overlapping 
categories describing how the performer 'edges into the frame' fulfils a real 
need: performance preparation characteristically involves trials in situations 
123 Stravinsky's words are quoted by Taruskin in Text and Act. - Essays on 
1111sic and 
Petformance (New York: Oxford University Press, 199-5), p. 129. Stravinský discusses 
Performance styles in the 'sixth lesson' of his Poetics ol'Ahisic in the 
Form ol I Six Lessons 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1942). 
162 
which are less extended or less 'integrated' than that of the goal. Students 
-perform' - in this compromised sense of the word - all or only part of a ý%ork 
for their teacher only (a whole programme played through would probably be 
thought of as a rehearsal); one can perform (some, all of the music iii 
preparation) for oneself, or commonly nowadays, for a tape recorder-, for friends 
only in a 'safe' environment; on one's own instrument; or on a different 
instrument in the empty hall; even in intentionally more demanding situations 
(with added distractions, handicaps etc. ). I argued above that the special 
situation of the competition (to which we can add the examination) is also 
something decisively less than full performance, because its judgmental aspect 
encourages an emphasis on exactitude and an added strictness in obeying 
convention. One might even understand Said's characterisation of performance 
as an ý extreme occasion' in these terms. "' 
Here in summary is a checklist of the terms in common use: 
1. Practice: neutral as regards what is played, but normally private. 
2. Play-through: signifies an 'uncommitted trial' or 'dry-run'. 
3. Rendition: a performance where the emphasis is on correctness, possibly in a 
relatively stress-free situation. 
4. Execution: to play with the minimum of interpretative intervention (following 
Stravinsky's use), roughly equivalent in sense to the German 'Ausfiffirung'. 125 
5. Rehearsal: normally used for social music-making or for a soloist who plays a 
whole programme through in a situation close to that of the projected 
performance. 
6. Performance is an act characterised by uniqueness in time and space, which 
The 'extremity' Said is thinking of is not quite what I have in mind here, though they are 
linked: Said is presumably thinking of an element of alienating distance separating audience t:, tý _tý 
and performer. Edward Said's lecture 'Performance as an Extreme Occasion' is the first chapter 
of A hisical Elaborations (London: Chatto and Windus, 199 1). 
12S c AuffUhrung' and Wortragen' are the closest German equivalents of performance in its 
musical sense. The word 'Vortrag' has a similar vocal inflection to our word 'recital'. 
'AusfUhrung' differs from 'Aufffihrung' in the sense that the latter term implies a composition 
notated so completely that improvisation or embellishment is unnecessary. (For a brief 
elucidation, see Goehr, 'The Perfect Performance of Music and the Perfect Musical 
Performance', p. 5. ) Related terms are 'Durchfahren' (=carry out an action, with an emphasis on 
cletting to the end), 'Darstellen' (=portray, as in character or 
display, as in art); 'Proben' 
(=rehearse); Performance is used as a loan word to signif-N, the event- and the technical term 
'Perfornianz' is used in linguistics in a similar way to its English use. 
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necessarily includes an audience and typically invok, es thein. It is 
distinguishable from play-through or rehearsal through the quality of 
intentionality that motivates it: a commitment to express the music's meaning in 
a personal way to particular people in a particular setting. 
Performance Frames 
Fanny Waterman has said that '... any performer must recognise that a 
performance is the sum total of what he plays and that sum total is the message 
his audience will receive. "" What exactly is it the sum of? Viewed from the 
performer's perspective, it presents itself as a series of frames within frames, 
where each frame (or level) focuses on a smaller time/space unity. "' From the 
performer's point of view the key question is: how much control do I exercise 
over each frame? Beyond this, how can I bring a series of potentially disparate, 
fragmented acts, objects and people together so that they add up to a 
performance? Here we might distinguish between conventional elements of the 
performance occasion and those that the performer actively takes responsibility 
for. The theme here is control as an expression of the commitment the performer 
brings to the performance occasion. The performance principles I proposed 
above require him to do this and I repeat them here: 
1. To perform a work in such a way that a considered personal interpretation is 
audibly manifest. 
" To derive a personal interpretation as far as possible from the evidence the 
work and its tradition of performance provides. 
3. To perform with personal commitment and a heightened sense of awareness 
of what is taking place; to respect the uniqueness of the occasion and each 
moment within it. 
4. To exercise whatever control one can over the content and context of the 
126 Wendy Thompson with Fanny Waterman, Piano Competition: The Stoty ()/ Leeds (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1990), p. 39. 
127 See my comments on Marvin Minsky's \\ork in chapter one (under 
Some Competing 
Definitions of Performance: (1) The Social Sciences, point 4). 
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performance occasion such that the other virtues are readily perceivable. 
We can best describe this desire for control as occurring on seý'eral 
levels. It is useful to distinguish three levels of possible 'performance unity' and 
a fourth contextualising level. There is the contextualising level of career; 
followed by the levels of occasion, programme and work. The level of career 
invokes the issue of narrative unity of lived life addressed by Macintvre. At the 
next level down - the occasion -a performer's control has already begun to 
accede to outsiders, such as agents and organisers. Here a whole raft of factors 
might be inVestigated, including, for example, the role of texts (advertisingy. 
programme notes), the choice of venue and instrument, or dress codes. Some of 
these matters are discussed by Heister and Lebrecht. "' 
I will devote some space to a few comments on the level of the 
programme. The first point to be made here is that, regardless of the orientation 
within the practice the performer has, the work is likely to remain the dominant 
level: 
What matters is not how one plans music but how one 
actually makes it. A single satisfactory performance of a 
truly great work, such as a Beethoven symphony - and 
how rare such performances are! - constitutes a better 
"' Hans-Werner Heister, Das Konzert. - Theorie einer Kulturform in two volumes 
(Wilhemshaven: Heinrichshofen, 1983). Norman Lebrecht, When the Music stops... Managers, 
Maestros and the Corporate Allurder of Classical Music (London: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
As an example of how pianists deal with the difficulty of having to play different pianos at each 
concert, I will quote Andre Watts, who talks revealingly about this in interview with David 
Dubai. See David Dubai, The World of the Concert Pianist. - Conversations with 35 
Internationally Celebrated Pianists (London: Victor Gollancz, 1985). The following quotation 
is from p. 326-327. It is his description of his 'method' for getting to know the piano he will 
play his next concert on: 'When I arrive at the hall I calmly gaze at it for a long moment. This is 
rny way of saying "hello" to it. I never touch it right away. But then I sit down to play and the 
piano reveals its qualities to me. Very quickly I find out if the bass is muddy or the treble is 
weak, and here begins my psychological adjustment to the instrument. I now have to make a 
choice. Will I be friends with the instrument or will I spoil a whole evening fighting with it? In 
order to make friends, I must accept the weaknesses of the instrument. This is the state the piano 
is in. It's not trying to get you. It's not trying to do you out of your success with your concert. 
Of course this state of mind isn't easy to achieve - it involves a very critical kind of adjustment. 
It's heartbreaking to realise that so many of the effects VOU have worked your guts out for will 
be lost. But there \vill inevitably be sorneplace in the piece you're playing where a pianissimo 
will create a wonderful wash of sound. So you must allow yourself to feel that somehow the 
piano will help you. ' There are a few pianists who have toured with their own pianos in an 
attempt to avoid this ultimately insoluble problem. They are rather rare exceptions, even today. 
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programme than all 'thematic' programmes put together. 
This is the moment, the only moment. when we discover 
whether or not a concert has become a true experiential 
reality. "' 
These comments were made by Wilhelm Furtwdngler, in an essay originally 
published in 1930. His prime interest is the orchestral concert, but what he has 
to say applies to the solo recital. It is beyond the scope of this study to undertake 
a review of how programming practice has changed over the last century and a 
half and concert programming is one of those practicalities of performance 
which have generated relatively little comment. Nonetheless there are certain 
recurrent issues which are worth pointing to. 
The first example concerns the relationship of unity to diversity. Two 
modes of programme unification occur regularly. The first is to treat the 
programme as homologous with the history of music, placing works in 
historical order so that for example, the level of dissonance is leavened. 130 
Among pianists, recitals (or recital series) which attempt historical surveys were 
an early variant of this, popularised in the nineteenth century by Anton 
Rubenstein and others. A second is to view a programme in terms of some other 
metaphor of process or consumption, such as the menu. Alfred Brendel quotes 
these comments by Schriabel on programming: 
... the 
first condition of a good menu is that all dishes 
should be prepared by the same chef or several chefs of 
equal merit; that all should be prepared with first-class raw 
materials, and that the gourmet should concentrate with the 
same seriousness on all of them. 131 
Others, such as the virtuoso Jorge Bolet, use the menu metaphor to argue in the 
opposite direction: the concert should be home not just to great works but to 
121) Wilhelm Furtw5ngler, Furtwdngler on Music. - Essays and Addresses, ed. and trans. Ronald 
Taylor (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1991), p. 3-7, (p. 6). 
"0 Furtwangler's example is Haydn and Tchaikovsky symphonies. which in his opinion onk 
work well in historical order. 
13 ' Brendel's essay is in Ilusic Sounded Out. - Essays, Lectures, Intervicit's, A. 
/terthoughts 
(London: Robson, 1990). p. 208-217. The quotation from Schnabel is on p. 209. The 
'performance-as-recipe' metaphor is explored at some length by J. 0. Urmson in 'Tlie Ethics of 
Musical Performance', in Krausz, The Interpretation oflhisic, p. 15--164. 
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well composed lightweight music (, bonbons' ). 132 Viewed in terms of Goehr"s 
double practice, there is a tendency for work-orientated pianists to favour 
edification and virtuosi entertainment. This is nicely exemplified in the views 
and practice of Schnabel on the one hand and Bolet on the other. 'Edifiers' plan 
surveys and 'entertainers' find the appropriate response to the moment. The 
extreme virtuoso practice would involve doing away with prior programming at 
all and making the choice of works appear spontaneous. The practice of playing 
encores effectively smudges the performance frame in just this way, creating a 
kind of 'structural' spontaneity. In this respect the themes of reification and 
fluidity are echoed at the programme level - 
In fact Furtwdngler stresses the importance of what he calls 'creative 
contrast' over programmes which are organised around unifying 'themes'. such 
as one genre, or one composer. The performer, he says, cannot allow himself to 
be drawn by either historical or systematic intellectual principles in shaping 
programmes: 
Music is not there to be perceived, reviewed or categorised 
in terms of historical contexts. It is there to be enjoyed. If a 
thematic programme is successful, whatever its nature, 
then it is in spite of its theme, not because of it. Any 
concept of unity cannot but be at odds with the fact that, 
emotionally and by its inner nature, music lives by 
contrasts. 133 
Furtwdngler's comments here, opposing a mode of listening whicli categorises 
music historically against a mode which champions 'enjoyment' do not so much 
anticipate Cook's exploration of the same theme (in Music, Imagination and 
Cidiltre) as demonstrate the recurrence of this issue throughout the history of 
the concert. "' Any attempt to draw a systematic distinction between (performer) 
entertainment and (listener) enjoyment is likely to fail, however. 
Alfred Brendel's essay on the same topic, published nearly sixty ý-ears 
" Elyse Mach, interview with Jorge Bolet in Great Pianists Speakfor Themsell-cs (New York: 
Dover, 199 1, two volumes issued as one), volume 2, p. 21-4 1, esp. p. 34. 
13 1 FurtNvingler, FurtivJngler on 1 hisic, p. 4. 
Stephen Davies points this out in his cornments on Cook's work in Alusical Alcaning and 
E, xIn-cssion (Ithaca: Cornell UnIN ersity Press, 1994), p. footnote 11. 
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later, reiterates many of the points his predecessor makes. At the same time. 
changes of emphasis, mostly relatively minor, suggest a shift aýN-ay from 
enjoyment' towards 'edification' in his views. Brendel's guiding principle is 
not 'creative contrast' but contrast and connection. "' In general he is more 
willing than Furtwdngler to countenance 'thematic' programmes. such as those 
based on 'variations' or a single composer's output. "' He links this in turn to 
the need for the performer to follow her own taste and convictions. The solo 
piano repertory is so large, he says, that no individual can hope to master more 
than a portion of it. One must be selective. 'The performer should not dodge the 
obligation to be edifying' he advises sternly: 
His sense of quality has to inform the audience. In his 
programming, he should not give in to commercial 
demands. The more uncompromisingly a performer 
follows his own convictions, ' the better for his self-esteem 
and, in the long run, the esteem in which he is held by 
others. "' 
From Brendel's perspective, entertainment is a negative value, dirtied by its 
association with commerce. It threatens the integrity of the musician and the 
whole individualist ethos of art music concert-giving. 
The traditional oppositions of unity vs. divers ity/contrast, 
enjoyment/entertainment vs. edification and planning vs. spontaneity have in 
more recent times been supplemented by a value which is indicative of the age 
of the practice. 'Defamiliarisation' as a performance strategy is associated with 
13ý Brendel, Music Sounded Out, p. 210. Following Furtwdngler, Brendel mentions the 
importance of developing an instinct for what works together, for example in deciding the order 
of items; on the need to give contemporary music serious consideration in programming; or, 
more mundanely, on ensuring a contrast of keys between works. He points to the reduced length 
of modern programmes, the demise of the menu-style programme of pieces (light, hea\/y, 
frivolous) and the reduced importance of the show-stopping finale. Quiet endings can point I 
towards the transcendental: indeed, no other programming position is appropriate, he argues, for I It) 
works like the Beethoven Diabelli Variations, or the Op. III sonata. Opening pieces similarly 
need careful thought, both for the (physical) demands they make on the pianist and tile 
audience, as yet to acclimatise (he provides a list of possibilities); or which juxtapose starkly 
contrasting styles. This last point hints at the theme of 'defamiliarisation'. 
IR, This may also reflect the 'elitist' nature of the piano recital, as opposed to more 'populist' 
forms like the orchestral concert. 
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the rise of the 'performance authenticity' issue. "' 
137 Brendel, Allusic Sounded Out, p. 216. 
Taruskin, Tev and Act and Bernard D. Sherman, lnside Ear4i' Iliisic: Conversations with 
Petforiners (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) are useful sources here. 
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Chapter 4: Interpretation 
Part One: Interpretation 
Introduction 
One of the aims of this study has been to investigate the meaning of key 
terms surrounding the discourse of performance. My strategy in the previous 
chapter was to examine and compare existing definitions and pursue the causes of 
difference. At issue is the question of specificity: what is the range of a definition? 
How large is the class of specific instances it wishes to generalise on/from? There 
are two points to make here. We have seen how in the case of performance theories 
varying inflections and nuances both cause and allow the theorist to deal with quite 
different, even mutually exclusive phenomena in the name of 'performance'. In 
other words, different theories serve different fields. Secondly, it is clear that ever 
more technical definitions aim to account for fewer instances. For example, the 
phenomenon of classical art music performance is a rather special kind of 
performance which might be subsumed within a larger area of traditional high art 
performance (including, for example, theatre and dance) in which the roles of 
performer and audience are relatively discrete, predictable and prescribed. 
There are two structuring metaphors in play here. Firstly, there is the 
familiar notion of the hermeneutic circle. ) 
in which a classification of phenomena is 
created by an act of defining and labelling and kept alive by ongoing redefinition. ' 
Behind this lies an ontological debate about essence and construction. A second 
metaphor is that of levels or layering, which raises a more general question about 
how far one level can be reduced to another. With these comments in mind, I will 
now glance briefly at two general commentaries on the concept and meaning of the 
subject of this chapter: interpretation. 
A recent example of such a critical analysis is Terry Eagleton's essay on the concept of culture, It) 
The Idea of Culture, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). 
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General Definitions of Interpretation 
I want to move towards a view of interpretation which acknowledges m-o 
opposing tendencies, those of uniqueness of content and similaritý, of form. 
Interpretation has a subjective, mental aspect. It is at home in the mind and 
inseparable from the individual who carries it within him. The fact is that the 
contents of mind are unique and crucially inaccessible to all but the subject himself. 
On the other hand,, minds share many features in the way they store and process 
information. I will make one guiding distinction at the outset. It is between 
interpretation as a receptive act, whose goal is the creation of a mental 
representation, and productive performances of this mental representation. This 
distinction - between 'receptive' and productive' forms of interpretation - will 
recur below. 
Let me begin by quoting Daniel Dennett's 'perception level' description of 
interpretation: 
... there must 
be a process (or perhaps a variety of processes) 
for turning raw or crude information into the useful materials 
from which 'we' can construct our beliefs and plans. This 
refining/transforming process is largely if not entirely 
unconscious, and is often called interpretation. Its product is 
traditionally called understanding. 2 
Dennett's formulation suggests we think of interpretation as a process or 
transformation, with understanding as a product: it is a clear statement of 
I receptive' interpretation. From a terminological point of view, this idea seems 
most familiar when applied to the listening process, the reception of music. The 
adjustments necessary to bring it in line with what I have said about performance 
above are, as I have implied, quite superficial. Nonetheless, they can appear 
unsettling. An interpretation of a piece of music - in the sense in which I am going 
to use the term - is the outcome of the process of 
interpreting. At the same time. I 
identified real time processes as central to the ontology of performance: the process 
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of interpretation can also be viewed as a kind of performance. We would have to 
specify a model of how to listen, including, for example. details of the occasion. the 
frame, the audience (the self-conscious self in this case? ) to reformulate listening, as 
a kind of performance. (One example of this might be what has been called 
(structural listening'. 3) 
This may seem to complicate matters unduly. Dennett's description makes a 
distinction between a process, which he calls interpretation, and a product, labelled 
understanding. I will not be using the verb 'to interpret' in this processual sense. 
Rather I will reserve the term 'interpretation' to describe a mental structure with a 
certain stability, equivalent to his concept of 'understanding'. Beyond this, I would 
like to retain his distinction between three stages. First there is the 'raw data' of the 
external world; then there is the transforming process occurring within the 
individual in the act of interpreting; and finally there is the individual's mental 
product. 4 
1 have already referred to Charles Taylor's well-known article on 
'interpretation and the sciences of man'. 5 Though his terminology is rather 
different, I think we can discern a rather similar set of conditions in play. Taylor 
sees the goal of interpretation as 'an attempt to make clear, to make sense of an 
-) 6 ies three conditions. object of study . 
In order for this attempt to proceed, he specifi 
2 Daniel Dennett, Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 60. 
3 Felix Salzer's book Structural Hearing: Tonal Coherence in Music (New York: Dover, 1962) 
prescribes such a pedagogy of how to listen, or rather how to perform the perfect act of listening. 
The preface begins with these words: 'To the gifted and experienced musician, music is a language 
- to be understood in sentences, paragraphs and chapters'. In chapter three (Narrowing the Focus: 
Theories and Descriptions of Musical Performance) I mentioned Simon Frith's view that 
listening is a kind of performance (Performing Rites: On the Value of Popular Music (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 203-4). 
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acknowledge the tendentious quality of the phrase 'raw data' and its implication that there is a zn 
neutral, unambiguous, objective level which we can all refer to as perceiving individuals. Rather 
than embark on a philosophical debate about the reality of the noumenal world (and by implication 
the origins of Idealism) I suggest we think of raw data as a level of input, distinguishable in 1714=1 ID 
principle at least from the two subsequent stages of transformation and storage. For those wishincy to 
pursue the topic of the noumenal/phenomenal, Roger Scruton's study of Kant (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982) provides a convenient way in. See chapter 4: 'The Logic of Illusion'. 
Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, reprinted (with some sli2ht alterations) 17, 
as 'Hermeneutics and Politics' in Critical Sociology, ed. Paul Connerton (London: Penguin, 1976), 1 
p. 1531-193). I have taken the quotations from the latter source. See also chapter three above 
(Some 
Competing Definitions of Performance: (1) The Social Sciences). 
6 Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', p. 1533 - 
17"' 
First, he says, there must be 'an object, or field of objects. about whIch we can 
speak in terms of coherence or its absence, of making sense or nonsense I. 7 This 
corresponds roughly with Dennett's 'raw data'. Second, there must be a distinction 
between an original and a (clarifying) interpretation of it (bridged by Dennett's 
transforming process). Taylor claims that the distinction between an original and an 
interpretation entails a further distinction between what something means and how 
it is expressed. This distinction between meaning and expression, he says, is always 
relative and contains an element of arbitrariness. This is Taylor's acknowledgement 
of the impossibility of total identity between objects or events across time and 
8 space. 
For my purposes we need to hold fast to a link between the creation of a 
mental product and its subsequent performance. (Tortuous though the logic may be, 
it is quite possible to describe this creation as a 'performance' of a kind too, as it is 
itself a process. ) Using my terminology, Taylor's 'expressions of a meaning' 
become 'performances of an interpretation'. The practical impossibility of 
synonymy between meaning and expression echoes the impossibility of total 
identity between performances. Again, there is an echo of Dennett's notion of 
transformation,, linked now to Taylor's element of arbitrariness. His third condition 
is that there must be a notional subject (in the sense of individual) in whom an 
interpretation resides and for whom it makes sense, or coheres. Compare again 
Dennett, who problematises the role of the subject by his use of scare quotes, 
referring to 'we' in the quotation above. 
In short,, I take both Dennett and Taylor to be distinguishing between three 
stages in the construction of an interpretation: input, transformation, and mental 
outcome. I have hinted at some of the adjustments that have to be made to such 
models if we are to employ the concept of processual performance within them. 
Performance itself would be a further stage following outcome: real time output 
(accompanied by a further transformation). If we accept the definition of 
performance as a real time process, a musical interpretation becomes a member of a 
7 lbid, p. 153. 8 lbid, P. 154. 
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rather diverse class of products which are nonetheless united by a common 
function, which is to provide storage for representations of music. There are 
basically three categories of storage, each with a variety of subcategories. These 
are: 
1. Spatial notation, including manuscripts, published editions and any other notated 
versions of music, paper based or otherwise, accessed visually. 
2. Audio recordings of various kinds, including the whole diverse history of 
analogue and digital disc and tape recording, but also other mechanical forms of 
storage, such as piano rolls. 
3. Mental representations of music: above all the conception of a performer's 
interpretation of a piece. 
These categories are not completely separable. For example. arrangements, 
transcriptions and reductions of music may or may not be notated. It is also 
possible to notate music spatially, but to access it through some other sensory mode 
than vision (e. g. in braille). The categories above also imply different kinds of 
performances by different kinds of 'performer'. 9 Documented analyses pose a 
special problem of categorisation. In certain circumstances they may overlap with 
the editing process, as they do for example in Schnabel's editions of Beethoven. 
The problematic role of analysis per se in musical interpretation and performance is 
one that I will discuss presently. In the third part of this chapter, I will return to the 
subject of musical representations in a discussion of forms of cultural transmission. 
The initial opposition between storage (= representation) and retrieval (= 
performance) I am setting up here is a crude one. Dunsby has warned of the 
9 We may balk at the use of the term in certain instances, of course. An example I have already 
mentioned would be where no real skill is involved (skill being linked to real-time feedback and 1: 1 
control): we operate a CD player, rather than perform on it. This is discussed bý' Stan Godlovitch in 
,A lusical Performance: a Philosophical 
Study (London: Routledge, 1998), chapter 1, especial 1ý p. 26. 
(See also chapter three, Narro,, ving the Focus: Theories and Descriptions of 
Musical 
Performance above. ) 
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dangers of simplistic binary thinking about performance. " We should note 
immediately that mental representations of music (as opposed to the other 
categories of representation mentioned above) are a special case. In a sense they 
represent a raison d'ýtre for the phenomenon of music. They are at least minimally 
implicated as an adjunct or partner of the other categories of representations: none 
of them can mean anything without human action and involvement. I "-III argue 
that the practice of art music performance - within a particular historical windov., - 
gains a portion of its intrinsic interest and richness from the mutual 
interdependence of a highly structured, considered mental interpretation and a 
unique performance occasion. Beyond this, there is the issue of how different 
modes of storage and processes of retrieval have affected performances in 
systematic, predictable ways and the extent to which this explains cultural 
preferences for particular kinds of performance. In the following sections I examine 
briefly the emergence and history of the concept of interpretation as applied to art 
music before pursuing the topic of analysis and its relationship to interpretation. 
Musical Interpretation: Modes and Emergence 
Hermann Danuser notes that the emergence of musical interpretation is a 
consequence of musical notation, drawing attention to the precedent of textual 
interpretation. He comments that this concept of interpretation arrives in music 
relatively late, becoming 'possible' initially in the nineteenth century and 
6 necessary' in the twentieth. 
" Interpretation, as an intentional act (or 'mental 
object'), was thus not always present in performance in the past, and need not 
be 
today. Jerrold Levinson discusses this in more detail. 
12 In the foregoing I 
preshadowed his primary distinction, which is between 'hermeneutic' and 
10 See Dunsby's article 'Acts of Recall' in Musical Times, (January 1997), p. 
12-17. 
" Hermann Danuser, 'Interpretation', in Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart (MGG) volume 
4, 
(Sachteil), (Kassel: Barenreiter, 1998), p. 1054-1070. Of related interest here 
is the article entitled 
'Vortrag', also by Danuser, in Musik in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart (MGG) volume 9, (Sachteil), 
(Kassel: Bdrenreiter, 1998). p. 1821-18-3) 5. 
12 Jerrold Levinson, 'Performative versus Critical Interpretation in Music' in 
The lnterpretati . on ol 
Music: Philosophical Essays. ed. Michael Krausz (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1993), p. 333-60. 
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'performative' modes of interpretation. each mode exhibiting further subcategories. 
Hermeneutic interpretation is receptive, aiming to generate understanding. XN-hile 
performative interpretation is production-orientated, concerned ýN-Ith musical 
expression. Danuser's hermeneutic/receptive modes of musical interpretation are of 
three kinds: structural, associative and stylistic (respectively). He labels them as 
follows: 
1. Interpretation as understanding of internal structure. 
2. Interpretation as the linking of external factors (biographical, historical) to the 
musical work. 
3. Interpretation as a positioning of the work within a larger body of music (taking 
in the issues of style and canonicity). 
Performative/productive modes of interpretation also number three in Danuser's 
scheme. These are: 
1. Interpretation as historical reconstruction. 
2. Interpretation as the continuation of a tradition or practice. 
3. Interpretation as updating, or rendering contemporary. 
It will be clear on reflection that these three categories effectively entail each other: 
all performative interpretation (inseparable as it is from performance) is a rendering 
contemporary, within a tradition, of a text of historical origins. 
Jerrold Levinson's classification of interpretation, though analytically rather 
than historically motivated, is substantially similar: for receptive/hermeneutic read 
6 critical% for productive read 'performative'. 13 It is his terminology which I will 
use in my discussion. 
Levinson, 'Performative versus Critical Interpretation in Music'. Levinson's definition of a 
perforniative interpretation is as follows: '... a considered way of playing a piece of music, 
involving highly specific determinations of all the defining features of the piece as given b,, the t) ltý It) lb 
score and its associated conventions of reading'. He adds that such a performative interpretation 
is 
in effect a type of performance, which, like the work itself, may have numerous 
instantiations, as 
when a performer repeats on distinct occasions a PI he has worked out at an earlier time'. 
(p. 
-36) 
Levinson also argues that performative interpretation need not always be present In musical 
perforniance, a matter I discuss below. 
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I have already discussed the views of Dahlhaus and Goehr on what I called 
'the double history of pianism': Dahlhaus was cited above as suggesting that the 
notion of interpreting great works of music was linked to the demise of 
improvisatory, virtuosic approaches to performance: he also demonstrates how 
virtuoso elements of keyboard writing were integrated into compositional practice. 
for example by Liszt. Lydia Goehr contextualises this development within the 
framework of a double history, that of the interpretation/work-centred 'perfect 
performance of music' and the performance/performer-centred 'perfect musical 
performance'. 14 It will be clear that Danuser's bipartite classification echoes that of 
Goehr (and Dahlhaus), without exactly coinciding with it. An emphasis on the 
hermeneutic/receptive coincides with Goehr's work-centred 'perfect performance 
of music' to the extent that they both idealise the work and wish to overlook the 
actuality of the performance occasion. Another way of thinking about Danuser's 
two modes is to ally the hermeneutic/receptive with music-theoretical activity, such 
as analysis. The question is this: how exactly does the performer link the two 
modes together? What kind of understanding underpins production? 
The rise of musical interpretation over the last century and a half has 
involved a gradual emancipation from external factors (be they extra-musical or 
musical- stylistic) as a source of inspiration; accompanying this has been an 
increasing interest in the internal structure of a musical work as a basis for 
performative interpretation. Jim Samson, in his analysis of Chopin reception, talks 
of a 'dispersal of meanings' followed by a 'discernible closure', providing a 
parallel and an exemplification of this historical trend. 15 This shift is apparent too 
in the growing emphasis on the work itself, in isolation rather than in situ, the 
composer's composition at the expense of the performer's performance. Goehr 
herself makes it clear that 'the perfect performance of music' has come to be the 
dominant strand of performance practice. (The museum's curatory ethos inevitably 
favoured it from the start. ) A putative structure in the work comes to be mirrored 
14 See chapter one (History or Histories? ) and chapter two (The Double History of 
Pianism) 
above. 
Is Jim Samson, 'Chopin reception: theory, history, analysis', in Chopin Studies 2, eds. John Rink 
and Jim Sarnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), p. 11. 
It) It) 
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by an ever more fixed mental representation of the music to be performed: we 
might call this gradual congealing of process into product "cumulative fixation". 
Schoenberg and his circle have been an important influence here. 16 Incidentally, the 
association of performance with risk - rather than opportunity - is a reflection of 
the fixed nature of interpretations, which, when highly determined. offer i-nore 
scope for error (and anxiety). 17 There have been various challenges to this 
development, such as that obliquely posed by the 'historical authenticity' 
movement (though the authenticists in practice update as much as they 
contextualise). 18 The most recent thought on performance and interpretation (by 
Cook and others) questions this by now we II-establi shed reliance on a notion of 
internal structure, for example by attempting to undermine its objective status. 
Rethinking Interpretation: the Avant-Garde 
As far as the history of interpretation is concerned,, the post-1945 avant- 
garde marks a watershed. By this point the task of musical interpretation and 
performance in tandem as a 'bringing to life of the internal structure' was firmly 
established, though, as comments by Hindemith and Stravinsky show, the balance 
between performer subjectivity and interpretative fidelity was aggressively 
16 Nicholas Cook draws attention to this in 'Analysing Performance, Performing Analysis', in 
Rethinking Music, eds. Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
p. 247-248, especially in footnote 44.1 would mention here also the Schoenbergian Erwin Stein's 
important book Form and Performance (London: Faber, 1962) It is discussed (with somewhat 
grudging approval) by Jonathan Dunsby in Performing Music: Shared Concerns (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995), p. 43-45. 
17 Jonathan Dunsby's attitude both reflects this and reflects on it, to sobering effect. '[Mlusic is 
always a risk', he comments, adding that 'we are afraid of musical accidents'. (His emphasis. ) See 
chapter 3, 'Anxiety and Artistry', in Performing Music: Shared Concerns, p. 29-38. The quotations 
are from p. 35. 
As I su,, orested above, the three categories of performative interpretation are mutually implicated: 
all interpretations which are performed necessarily update. Richard Tartiskin has demonstrated the 
overlap of interests in practice, showing how contemporary attempts at historically authentic 
performance are driven by idealising structuralist aims as much as by a Nvish to reconstruct the past. 
The aesthetic desire to update takes the form of its contrary, to anachronise: 
historical reconstruction 
simply is the preferred form of rendering contemporary. See Richard Taruskin's essay 'The 
Pastness 
of the Present and the Presence of the Past', reprinted in Text and Act: 
Essqvs on Music and 
Petfiýrmance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). p. 90-1 54. 
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policed. 19 In contrast to this, contemporary compositional practice in its more 
progressive guises rendered such an approach impossible. The new music, purged 
of its last vestiges of tonality and its associated linguistic components, breached the 
limits of what is mentally storable with the degree of accuracy required to Justifý' 
the application of the term interpretation. Interpretation thus gives way in this 
repertoire to 'execution' or the naked realisation of the instructions contained in the 
score. (The echoes of Stravinsky and Hindemith are more than fortuitous. ) Nicholas 
Cook makes this point in his discussion of Stockhausen's orchestral piece Gt-ul)pen: 
In fact none of the instrumentalists in a work like Gruppen are 
really playing together: rather, each of them is playing 
individually with the conductor. They are not to any 
significant degree interpreting their parts; they are merely 
executing them with greater or lesser accuracy. And this 
means that neither the musical beat not the symbols of the 
score are being abolished in performance; they are being 
realised. 20 
What Cook says is doubtless equally applicable to solo piano performance. There 
are degrees of 'interpretation' and it will not always be easy to say at what point a 
performer's interpretation accedes to execution. Fred Lerdahl's 'cognitive 
constraints' provide a firm dividing line - certainly firmer than I would wish to 
specify - and his provocative attempt to link a music's assimilability to human 
perceptual limits is of relevance here. 21 As I hinted above, the feasibility of 
performance from memory is as good a practical indicator as any, because it 
requires the performer to have a nominally continuous and complete mental 
representation of the work: Schoenberg and Webern's piano works mark the outer 
19 They were both anxious to defend the work against over-subjective interpretation. Taruskin, 'The I 
Pastness of the Present and the Presence of the Past', p. 129. 
'() Nicholas Cook, Music, Imagination and Culture, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), p. 132. 
21 Fred Lerdahl, 'Cognitive Constraints on Compositional Systems', in Generative Processes in 
I Iusic: the Ps), choloD, of Performance, Improvisation, and Composition, ed. John Sloboda 
(Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), p-23 1-259. 
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limit and the piano works Boulez and Stockhausen composed in the 1950s certairily 
exceedit. 22 
Dieter Mersch discusses the same phenomenon from a different perspective. 
Post-modern art productions are, he argues, characteristically events, rather than 
works; events are performative acts: 
Generally, they cannot be described any longer using the 
familiar aesthetic categories such as 'form', 'structure', 
'intentionality', or 'duration'; rather, their primary structural 
features consist of 'singularity', 'unrepeatableness', 
'uncertainty' and 'momentariness'. [ ... ] They [i. e. such 
events] correspond to immediate aesthetic experiences, which 
are not primarily deducedftom interpretation, but rather from 
participation and direct physical presence. 23 
The link here is with performance art, and I have already in the previous chapter 
considered the exemplary theoretical work of Peggy Phelan. We can see how the 
delicate mutual interdependence - call it an ecology - of performer- i nterpretati on 
and performance occasion has been disturbed. In the new conceptual network, the 
audience is invited, or rather challenged, to invent its own interpretation of events. 
Contrast this with the way in which listening strategies were prescribed in the 
past. 24 In fact Mersch goes on to argue -I think compellingly - that the uniqueness 
and uninterpretability of such performance art reinstates the aura Benjamin claims 
had been lost through the mechanical reproducibility of art. 25 (Perhaps there is a 
parallel to be drawn here with the advent of the individual interpretation 
maintaining the aura of a work in the face of the threat of mass print reproduction. ) 
It is not simply a question of the demise of interpretation and I am not 
suggesting that contemporary repertoires are the poorer for this 'loss: and the 
22 1 am skating over the issue of how precisely this continuous and complete representation is 
constituted. For example, to what extent does motoric memory play a role? 
2, 
-' Dieter Mersch, 'Ereignis und Aura: Zur Dialectik von ästhetischem Augenblick und kulturellem 
20 3 Gedachtnis' in Musik undAsthetik, Jahrgang 1, Heft 3) (1997), p. - -37, quotation from the English 
language summary on p. 37 (my Italics). 11 24 Relevant here are Lionel Salter's comments on how to listen, discussed in chapter oiie (Review 
(5): The Concert, Again). 
25 Walter Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', in Illuminations, 
ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zolin (London: Fontana, 1992). 
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performer is working as physically and mentally hard (even harder) than ever. 
Rather, the concept of interpretation in the work of later composers is often 
radically rethought. There are many explorations of this theme. in the works of 
Cage, Feldman and Earl Brown in America, or Scelsi, Bussotti, Kagel and Dieter 
Schnebel elsewhere, any one of which could provide the subject matter for 
digressions on how interpretation has been rethought. I will discuss one example. 
Brian Ferneyhough's compositional practice - of an extreme, virtuosic complexity 
- specifies interpretative strategies of a strikingly novel, one might even say alien, 
kind. Here the performer is presented with a score so bafflingly complex that only a 
peculiarly systematic approach to the work - characteristically involving phases of 
engagement with orientation, detail and larger form - will generate a satisfactory 
performance. Ferneyhough effectively writes this staged interpretative process into 
the score, the aim being simultaneously to provoke an extreme commitment to t 
work on the part of the performer, who is required consciously to go beyond a mere 
executive notion of performance as the 'realisation of instructions' (this being in 
any case literally impossible); and to wipe away any trace of the discredited 
subjectivity associated with the traditional approach. 
Ferneyhough's investigation into the nature of interpretation in a sense 
reformulates the conflict between composer/work and performer/performance as a 
productive dialectic. In his case he composes music which is so difficult to perform 
that any serious attempt to recover structure is irredeemably subjective. The 
paradox is that this subjectivity is an incidental consequence of the interpretative 
endeavour. 26 
The notion of musical interpretation as a fixed, stable mental representation 
has historical limits, which coincide roughly with the rise and fall of tonality. We 
should note in closing that interpretation, however desirable, is by no means a 
foregone conclusion in the performance of this repertory: it is possible to perform 
26 Brian Ferneyhough's views on the role of notation for interpretation are variouslý- expressed in 
Brian Fert? c , i, 
hough. - Collected Writings, eds. James Boros and Richard Toop (Amsterdam: 
Harwood, 1995), accessibly in 'Aspects of Notational and Compositional Practice', p. 2-1 -3 ). 
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without interpreting. 27 How, then. is the performer to go about creating her 
interpretation? Insofar as interpretation reflects musical structure, musical analYsis 
has provided the tools for locating it. In the following section I will examine this 
interaction more closely. 
27 Jerrold Levinson provides examples of performance without performative interpretation: '... (a) 
performing by rote, without monitoring, letting the phrasings just fall out of one's fingers, by habit; I t: 1 -b (b) performing an unfamiliar piece in a crunch, hurriedly, but adequately; (c) performing by slavish 
or unreflective imitation, as when an awestruck pupil mimics the master's reading. ' 'Performative 
vs. Critical Interpretation in Music', p. 47. The experience John Sloboda describes as 'floating' -a 
level of physical familiarity with a piece so great that one can effectively play the piece without 
consciously guiding the technical process - similarly does not require the existence of a 
perfon-native interpretation. See The Ahisical Mind. - The Cognitive Pslychology of. lfusic (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1985), p-96- 
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Part Two: Interpretation and Analysis 
Analysis in Context 
What is the relationship between analysis, interpretation and performance? 
How can we best approach this controversial topic? The familiar question again 
poses itself. how are we to understand the term 'analysis'? Broadly, in the manner 
of a dictionary definition, or narrowly, in the specific technical senses in which 
music theorists employ it? 
One approach would be to review the emergence of music analysis as a 
subdiscipline of academic musical culture, in the hope of demonstrating how an 
abstract idea - the broad dictionary definition of analysis as 'a division into parts 
with a view to establishing their relationship' - has acquired an idiosyncratic 
history of use. Jim Samson has attempted such an outline. He points to an 
alignment between analysis and music theory, contrasting it with performance as 
praxis. Thereafter, he links the emergence of analysis as a music-theoretical tool in 
the nineteenth century to the themes of organicism and the unity of the musical 
work,, which comes to be identified with a notion of form, or, later, structure: 
From early beginnings in theorists such as Adolf Bernhard 
Marx to later formulations in Riemann, Mersmann, 
Schoenberg, and Schenker, the idea of a structural sense of 
form gained unstoppable momentum, sweeping music theory 
before it, and in the end building on its premiss the entire 
edifice of a newly independent discipline, music analysis, 
essentially a discipline of our age. Unity and wholeness, 
whatever these may mean in a temporal art, were assumed a 
priori, and the analytical act was their demonstration. The 
work became a structure,, and in that lay its value. 28 
Throughout this essay, Samson is at pains to make us aware of the 
precariousness of the analytical endeavour in its attempt to integrate objectivity - 
28 jiM Samson, 'Analysis in Context', in Rethinking Music, eds. Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3-3-54, quotation ftom p. 41. 
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the work - and subjectivity - its individual perception - and ultimately to shore up 
the work's aesthetic autonomy (the ironic acknowledgement of music's temporality 
in the quotation above typifies this). There is no doubt, ho\N-e\-er, that the 
connection between structure, analysis and value outlined here has exercised an 
overpowering influence over thinking about how perfonners should go about 
preparing their interpretations. The actuality is, I suspect, quite another matter. An 
apparently sincere devotion to an ideal often turns out to be nothing more than a 
brief genuflexion. Performers have themselves been among the most easily 
29 deceived 
. 
In fact, the idea that analysis can establish anything approaching justified 
true belief - the facts, as it were, about the 'logic' or 'unity' of a work of music - 
has been if not completely discredited, then heavily qualified . 
30 There was a 
growing realisation in the post-war years that the analytical endeavour was not a 
rigorously scientific one; and that, in consequence, there was no real justification 
for the perceived tendency for analysts to dictate to performers in an authoritarian 
manner. 31 Commentators (some of them performers) began to suggest that the 
findings of analysts might have only limited use for performers. It is now widely 
acknowledged that performers and analysts set out to achieve different things: 
29 1 have discussed the pedagogue David Barnett's endorsement of analysis in general and Schenker 
in particular. (David Barnett, The Performance of Music: a Study in terms of the Pianoforte 
(London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972): see chapter one, Review: (1) Pedagogy meets Performance 
Theory above). It is a heartfelt yet shallow appropriation. As a further example of a performer's 
views on analysis and its importance, the comments of Artur Schnabel are of interest. See 
'Interpretation of Character and Structure', in Konrad Wolff, Schnabel's Interpretation of Piano 
Music (London: Faber, 1972, second edition 1979), ch. 10, 'Interpretation of Character and 
Structure', p. 120-153, especially the summary on p. 127-8. Jennifer Chee Yee Tong's PhD thesis 
'Separate Discourses: a Study of Performance and Analysis' (University of Southampton, 1995) 
elaborates on this cleft between rhetoric and reality and includes a discussion of Schnabel's views 
(p. 138 and following). 
'0 There are a number of useful discussions of analysis in Cook and Everist, Rethinking Music, 
especially the chapters by Jim Samson, 'Analysis in Context' and Nicholas Cook himself, 
'Analysing Performance and Performing Analysis'. Further thoughts on this topic are provided by 
Roger Scruton in The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chapter 13, I 
p. 39 )-437. He points to the role of analysis in music perception and music criticism as well as to 3 
what I label 'pure' analysis below, commenting that '[ajnalysis attempts to build a bridge 
from the 
sound structure to the aesthetic experience'. (p. 396) 
For example, see John Rink's review of Wallace Berry's Musical Structure and 
Performance 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989) in Music Analysis, 9 (1990), 33 19-33-339. Nicholas Cook's 
39- 
essay 'Analysing Performance, Performing Analysis' in Cook and Everist, 
Rethinking Vusic, p. 2 3 
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performers produce a continuous sounding version of a work on a particular 
occasion and analysts a schematic document. (Nicholas Cook has. as we saw in the 
last chapter, gone one stage further and declared that analysis itself is a type of 
performance, reversing the direction of dependence. ) What is analysed is itself a 
' schematic structure'. 32 The invariant patterns which constitute structure are, in a 
sense, atemporal, independent of the flow of time. Against this, the performer's 
interpretation manifests itself as a stream of nuance within or through which the 
structure is heard. In the meantime, a whole new school of analysis has been 
emerging, taking recordings of performances as their material and searching for 
correspondences between 'deep' structure (or salience, at least) and nuance . 
33 1 Will 
return to this opposition between structural shape and temporal flow presently. 
All of this leaves the question of how analysis relates to a performer's 
interpretation wide open. How, if at all, do they bear on each other? To reiterate: if 
we take the broad, dictionary definition above as a guide, performers can hardly 
avoid doing something like 'analysis' (and its contrary, 'synthesis'), and doing it 
often. This very general, inclusive view of analysis comes close to a notion of 
perception (the interface between analysis and perception being another 
problematic area). 34 The opposite perspective is no more enlightening: research has 
shown that the analyses - so-called - performers such as Alfred Brendel have 
produced for publication lack the rigour and density of the professional music- 
analytical product. 35 If, on the other hand, we consult books on instrumental 
26 1, contains a large number of relevant references for the field of performance and analysis. See 
especially footnote 1, p. 239. 
32 Jim Samson, 'Analysis in Context', p. 44. 
33 Eric Clarke's work, as for example reported in 'Expression in performance: generativity, In 
perception and serniosis' in The Practice of Performance. - Studies in Musical Interpretation, ed. 
John Rink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 21-53, provides a distinguished 
example. 
34 There is a traditional hierarchy of sensation, perception and cognition, which reflects the motion 
of information from the environment to the individual. Presumably analysis is a cognitive act. For 
further thoughts on analysis and perception, see Nicholas Cook, 'Perception: A Perspective from 
Music Theory' in Musical Perceptions, eds. R. Aiello and J. Sloboda (Oxford: Oxford Universit\ 
Press, 1994), p. 64-95; and a recent article by Ian Cross in Music 4nalysis, 17 (1998), 33-20, entitled 
'Music Analysis and Music Perception', which also contains a useful bibliography on this topic. 
35 Jennifer Tong discusses this in detail in chapter 4 (p. 127-164) of her thesis 'Separate Discourses'. 
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pedagogy, we will be struck how few direct references there are to musical 
analysis. 36 
Clearly we need to examine the process of performance preparation afresh 
and I suggest while doing so we engage and elaborate on what I think turns out to 
be a useful distinction implied at the outset of this discussion between 
'pure/technical' and 'applied/general' analysis. So by 'pure' I will mean two 
things: analysis as an end-in-itself, where the analysis is the final product, a 
storable representation; and, secondly, analysis as a special kind of knoxvledge 
about a piece of music, normally referring to knowledge of musical structure. 
Applied analysis is, in contrast, an ad-hoc activity undertaken in order to achieve 
some other end - such as performance - and is provisional, partial and unpreserved. 
In all likelihood it will link structural factors to other mental representations of 
music implicated in performance technique (such as the range of movements 
involved). Such analysis may be a barely conscious activity, informed by intuitions, 
almost continuous with perception, an acquired set of sense-making skills which 
we only reflect on when they are in danger of failing. 
A second related point is one that Jim Samson gives some space to. 'Pure' 
analysis, a relatively young sub-discipline of academic music, has in its short life 
developed into a separate practice, a 'coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity' (in Macintyre's words 37) with a distinctive 
history, protective institutions, stable standards of excellence and a pedagogy of its 
own. 38 In this technical sense, both pure 'music analysis' and 'art music 
36 A study which bridges the gap between 'schematic' analysis and approaches more suited to 
performance i. e. with a more processual perspective is Airgen Uhde and Renate Wieland, Denken 4=1 
und Spielen. - Studien _711 einer Theorie der musikalischen Darstellung (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1988). 
This ambitious work includes extended discussions of the shaping of musical time, the nature of Z: ) 
expression and its relationship to musical structure and character, the performer's 'inner 
programme' and sound/texture. The text is clothed in an Adornian metaphysics (it draws on 
Adorno's unpublished notes on performance theory). There are numerous musical references; many 
analyses tackle the process/product barrier by deriving an overall framework of nuance from 
rnotivic/thematic workings (for example in the section on the 'inner programme', p. 415-454). 
37 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth 198 1; second edition 1985), p. 187. 
1 38 Notable pedagogic texts on musical analysis include Nicholas Cook, .4 Guide to Musical. Anaývsis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) and Jonathan Dunsby and Arnold Whittall, 1111sic Anall'sis 
in Theory and Practice (London: Faber, 1988), both of which contain useful suggestions for further I 
reading. Nowadays university music courses in the UX are likel% to contain an anaksis option 
which N\, ill take students through tried and tested approaches. There is a well-established 'ournal for Ii 
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performance' nowadays can claim to fulfil these conditions. but to a significant 
degree they have done so in isolation from each other. It is this branching (or 
fragmentation) of musical sub-disciplines that has made possible the recent conflict 
concerning the responsibilities of performer and analyst, exacerbated by formerly 
widely held positivist views to the effect that analysis was a scientific, performance 
a pragmatic, endeavour. 
In the following sections I will be looking at the way in which performers 
prepare their interpretations within different time frames. 
Analysis into Performance: (1) Initiation into the Practice 
One way we might describe the putative analysis-interpretation- 
performance interaction is by examining the way we acquire musicianship skills (a 
topic which will receive more extended attention in the following chapter). It seems 
that musicologists have tended to favour investigations of the creative process at 
the expense of the re-creative (which is very much in line with the emphasis on 
composition rather than more 'peripheral' materials connected with music's 
39 production and reception). It has been left to music psychologists to describe the 
acquisition of musical competence, which they have typically linked to 
developmental psychology. 40 1 will make no such direct link between the levels of 
sophistication I propose in what follows and the relative maturity of the aspiring 
music analysts and a round of conferences at national and international level pursuing analytical 
issues. 
So a great deal of scholarly effort has gone into the elucidation of compositional sketches 
(Beethoven's for example). At the same time, the thoughts of performers about their art have tended 2-D 
to invite patronising or even dismissive comment. Dunsby points this out in reference to comments 
by Joseph Kerman on this topic, in Performing Music. - Shared Concerns, p. 47. Kerman's comments, 
and his claim that performers are 'doers' not 'talkers' is to be found in Musicology (London: 
Fontana, 1985), p. 196. 
40 What I say here leans heavily on their models. Two important sources on this topic are 'The 
Development of Artistic and Musical Competence' by David Hargreaves, collected in Ifusical 
Beginnings. - Origins and Development of Musical Competence, eds. Irýne Dell&ge and John 
Sloboda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 145-168; and 'Environmental Factors in the 
Development of Musical Performance Skill over the Life Span', by J. W. Davidson, M J. A. Howe 
and J. Sloboda, in The Social Psvchology of Music, eds. D. J. Hargreaves and A. C. North (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 188-203. Sloboda's earlier book, The Musical Ilind also contains 
a chapter on this theme (entitled 'Musical Learning and Development' p. 194-23 ) 8). 1 
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musician,, though there is bound to be a strong correlation between them. I suggest 
we think of the process of initiation into the practice as traversing three le'vels: 
1. Basic Musical Literacy. This covers the ability to decode notation. Whatever the 
arguments among teachers may be as to how and when exactly music reading skills 
should be introduced, they are high on the list of priorities and their acquisition \N'ill 
almost certainly occur early in the learning process. At the most fundamental level, 
identifying musical structure amounts to no more than identifying construction 
materials: the note, its pitch and length. But building meaningful music out of 
reified tones involves coordinating a basic pre-structural (literal) decoding with 
both an emerging sense of how notes fit together into larger structural units and the 
technique to turn them into sounds. 41 To achieve this, instrumental teachers 
overseeing the learning process will characteristically stress the primacy of musical 
imagination (by which I mean the pupil's ability to imagine and retain notated 
sounds in her 'inner ear') over their mechanical (technical) realisation. The powers 
of imagination should ideally determine the outcome, and not the weakness of the 
flesh. Pupils are shown how to bridge the gap between notation and its realisation, 
for example by being encouraged to imagine sounds in terms of the rhythms and 
stresses of language - primarily through song - or gesture (dance). The analytical 
division of what is notated into meaningful units, on the linguistic model of word, 
phrase, sentence, paragraph etc. is a precondition of effective practice and, 
artistically, of meaningful synthesis, or the creation of plausible, coherent 
processual continuity. 
2. Stylistic Awareness. As a pupil's repertoire grows, works come to be grouped by 
common features, such as composer, genre, epoch, form, mood, texture, etc. There 
is no particular analytical moment that can be isolated from the classification 
process, but rather a sequence of more or less memorable analytical encounters 
41 Schnabel distinguished between three levels of analysis: analysis of the structure of units, the 
II ul*ar'ties of the work. partitioning of the music into phrases and sections and the individual pec ii 
Wolff, Schnabel'S 1nterpretation of Piano, llusic, p. 127-8. 
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with individual works, 42 framed within an ongoing dialogue \N-ith other 
representatives of the practice (or what have been called *significant others': above 
all the instrumental teacher, but also peers 43 ). Out of this each pupil builds up a 
kind of database of many different kinds of knowledge, including the analytical. 
which gradually enables her to achieve independence. The key association here is 
thus between the meaning expressed in performance and a background of genre 
indications. At the same time,, a general awareness grows of music's potential to 
take on multiple meanings, of which structure is but one (important) example. 
3. Interpretative Competence. This is the ultimate goal of all performers. Here 
individual works of artistic merit (as opposed to functional pedagogic study 
material) are problematised against a background of levels (1) and (2). Gaps which 
remain at these levels are slowly filled in. The demands of each individual work, its 
excesses, peculiarities, divergencies, anomalies - the facts of its particularity - are 
scrutinised in detail. After all. ) the performer cannot refer outside the work in the 
process of performing it. Thought of in terms of perceivable layers of meaning, a 
performance contains an interpretation, which in turn may possibly contain a 
formal analysis. While we can hope, even expect, to be able to separate out the 
'accidental' (mistakes) and performance-specific from a consistent interpretation, 
the shadow of an analysis behind the interpretation is so faint as to be barely 
perceptible, as much an imaginative creation of the listener as a fact about the 
sounds of the music. To put it another way: it may well that the performer makes 
use of a formal analytical technique at this level, but a performance will never be 
conclusive evidence of this. 44 
42 Jim Samson uses the term 'analytical moments', which he attributes to Ian Bent, to describe early 
precursors of what I have in rnind here. 'Analysis in Context', p. 39. 
43 See Davidson et al., 'Environmental factors in the development of musical performance skill over 
the lifespan', especially p. 197-203. 
" Consider the pianist Murray Perahia's by now well-known enthusiasm for Schenkerian anal\ sis: 
can one in all seriousness claim to hear the analysis out of 
his performances, or the recordings" 
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These three levels overlaps and emerge out of each other. The third represents the 
kind of maturity and autonomy we expect expert adult performers to possess. 45 
In deciding where, and how conscious, the analytical act is, we might 
usefully borrow a distinction from language pedagogy between acquisition and 
learning. 46 The former term has been used to describe language behaviour 
individuals take on board with no conscious filtering attention to form. Children are 
said to acquire speaking and listening skills in their first language: in contrast, the\, 
have to learn how to read and write. Perhaps some music analytical skill may be 
acquired rather than learned. Even supposing that all analytical acts were initially 
conscious, it is clear that analytical knowledge subsequently recedes below the 
47 threshold of consciousness . Both of these factors contribute to what John Rink 
has called 'informed intuition',, something performers seem to rely on heavily. 48 
Analysis into Performance: (2) Preparing a Work for Performance 
Preparing a piece for performance is not quite the same thing as preparing 
an interpretation, because interpretations exist at a level which transcends the 
individual performance occasion. Performers have finite resources in real life and 
any particular occasion will in all likelihood have been compromised, viewed by 
the performer as less than ideal. Nonetheless, there are, I would claim, preferred 
ways of going about creating an interpretation, though on the surface, it is the 
45 For a categorisation of levels of performance expertise, see R. T. Krampe and K. Anders Ericsson, 
'Deliberate practice and elite musical performance' in Rink, The Practice of Performance, p. 84-102. 
46 The distinction between learning and acquisition is discussed in N. Lightbourn and N. Spada, 
How Languages are Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chapter 2. Of particular 
interest here is the work of Stephen Krashen, who claims a pre-eminent role for acquisition. 
47 Music psychologists refer to the phenomenon of 'chunking'. A different way of thinking of this 
would be in the distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge ('knowing how' and 
'knowiner that): a musical interpretation is the gradual transmutation of procedural into declarative 
knowledge, a further instance of the dialectic of process and product. I have referred to this 
elsewhere as 'cumulative fixation'. It has both a historical and individual aspect (i. e. ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny, in Ernst Haekel's famous phrase). 
49 John Rink discusses 'informed intuition' in his review of Wallace Berrý's J111sical Structure and 
Performance and in 'Authentic Chopin: history, analysis and intuition in performance', in Rink and 
Samson, Chopin Studies 2, p. 214-244. 
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differences rather than the similarities which stand out in descriptions of how 
performers practise. 49 Our interest here is in establishing how exactly analysis fits 
into the preparatory phase. 
Where conditions are favourable, performance preparation will tend to 
organise itself in predictable ways, with strong cyclic and sequential (linear) 
elements. I will begin with an example of a cyclic element, because it makes clear 
how important modified repetition is at the moment-to-moment level when 
practising. The German cellist Gerhard Mantel has developed what he calls (in my 
translation) 'the principle of cyclic attention' (das Prinzip der rotierenden 
. 
50 
ragments Aufmerksamkeit) Mantel describes a method of practising the smallest f 
of music: 'gestalts' of a few tones, which can be thought of as the smallest units 
which entail interpretation, as at the level of the single note, interpretation threatens 
to dissolve into pure technique, just as, in parallel, music collapses into sounds, 
critical interpretation into perception and structuralism into literalism. In essence. 
the idea is to work on these tiny gestalts in a variety of different ways, paying 
attention to different musical parameters each time. If this process is successful, the 
interpreter-performer gradually gains control of the material to an extent which 
allows ever more fresh interpretative choices to be made. A cycle, or feedback 
loop, is established, with the successfully practised materials constantly bedding 
down and built upon. This is the fertile soil from which 'informed intuitions' 
spring. 
Practice,, of course, consists largely of modified repetition. The model I turn 
to now contextualises this in a phased, linear macro-model of performance 
preparation. The German music psychologist Wilfried Ribke distinguishes phases 
of orientation,, text decoding, partitioning for practice purposes, practising and 
41) The very varied descriptions given by pianists in David Dubai's interview collection, 
The IForld 
of the Concert Pianist: Conversations with 35 Internationally Recognised 
Pianists (London: Victor 
Gollanscz, 1985) are evidence of this. See also Pianists on Playing: Interviews with 12 Concert 
Pianists, ed. Linda J. Doyle (New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1987); and 
Elyse Mach. Great 
Contemporary Pianists Speakfor Themselves, volumes I and 2 (New York: Dover, 199 1). 
50 A full statement of Gerhard Mantel's theory of how to practise 
is contained in Cello iiben. - Eine 
Methodik des Obens nicht nur fiir Streicher (Mainz: Schott, 1987, revised and updated edition 
1999). 1 refer here to the 1999 edition. The 'principle of cyclic attention' 
is discussed on p. 171-4. 
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memorising and, finally, manufacturing hierarchies and integration of elenlents. ý I It 
may not be clear how much of the sequencing in his model is (prescriptive) 
idealisation, remote from praxis; but it is surely clear that many of the elements in 
this scheme cannot be transposed randomly. Analysis is not mentioned explicitly in 
his scheme either; but the scheme confirms that a key analytical moment occurs 
when the performer makes decisions about how to carve up the text into 
manageable practice units. It would be too much to claim that this act of 
partitioning is a necessary (let alone sufficient) condition of interpretation; on the 
other hand,, it is difficult to imagine a situation where it does not play a decisive 
role. 52 
By way of interim summary, we might contrast two underlying conceptions 
of unity cherished by analyst and performer. (Here I admit to expedient 
oversimplification, as analysts today are increasingly willing to question the 
ýI 
" Wilfried Ribke, 'Uben', in Musikpsychologie. - ein Handbuch, eds. Herbert Bruhn, Rolf Oerter and 
Helmut R6sing (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1993), p. 546-558 (p. 553). I have also seen a similar model 
outlined by JUrgen Uhde in an article entitled 'Eine Theorie des Obens am Klavier' though I have ZZ-) 
been unable to locate the source of this. He proposes a five stage model as follows: 1. Orientierung. 
2. Einrichten. 3. Lernen. 4. Einspielen. 5. Darstellen. (These translate roughly as: orientation, 
technical organisation, learning, memorising, performing. ) 
52 To cite an instance where it apparently did not occur, Glenn Gould claims to have prepared for 
one of his last recordings - of the Brahms Op. 10 Ballades - by simply playing the four pieces 
through (twice over) on a number of occasions. Interpretative decisions were taken in the interim 
between practice sessions. I think there is ample reason to doubt Gould's self-reporting: his 
ideological agenda here and elsewhere is to suggest that music is a mental abstraction rather than a 
sensual product; and the suggestion that he did not need to practise, so complete was his keyboard 
control, all too obviously serves a mystique of genius (and feeds his vanity). We should also note 
that the interpretation Gould was preparing here was for a recording, not a performance. (See 
Michael Stegemann, Glenn Gould, Leben und Werk (Munich: Piper, 1996) p. 386-7. ) Add to this 
Gould's mastery of cutting techniques in the recording studio and his championing of them as 
legitimate means to create the desired (interpretative, performative) effect, and his claims perhaps 
seern more sustainable. Incidentally, Gould's comments on how to play the piano are equally absurd 
(as Edward Said notes, in Alusical Elaborations (London: Chatto and Windus, 1991) p-30), 
amounting to a statement of how little there is to know about it. Match these comments against the 
difficulties he is reported to have had with his technique in the mid 1970s (in the aftermath of his 
mother's death) and one realises how much of a front this is. Gould's technical problems are 
discussed in Peter Oswald, Glenn Gould. - the Ecstacy and Tragedy of Genius (New York: Norton, 
1997), p. 298-307. Also relevant here is the famous story of Gould's 'vacuum cleaner epiphany' 
(where he claims to have resolved a technical problem in the last movement of Beethoven's Op. 109 
sonata by practising with the vacuum cleaner on, so as to render the sounds lie made inaudible. 
freeing him to 'irnagine' the music more clearly in his head). This is reported in Oswald, Glenn 
Gould, p. 76-78. 
Not all public performance involves the physical familiarity with the work that John 
Sloboda describes as 'floating' (The Musical A4ind, p. 96. ) I have commented on this in footnote 27 
above. 
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concept of unity and its relevance to the analytic endeavour. ý3 ) The former is 
concerned with notions of structural unity: conventionally, analyses are spatial 
objects, derived from a schematic, spatial notation of the work. Even in those cases 
where the performance process is under investigation, the resultant analyses are 
presented in graphic -- i. e. spatial - form. The performer's notion of unity has one 
minimal condition: that the work sound from beginning to end without interruption. 
Unlike the analyst, the performer is obliged to reproduce every detail of the piece. I 
have already described what the performer hopes to achieve more positively as the 
creation of an at least plausible, at best persuasively coherent processual continuity. 
What does he have to add to achieve this? Where does 'structure' end in a 
performance, and what else comes into play? 
Structural and Non-Structural Features of Music 
A rough distinction is commonly made between those elements of music 
which are structural - pitch and rhythm - and those which are not. Diana Raffman 
provides a sharpened version. 54 Her arguments make extensive use of the notion of 
'ineffability', which she employs to mark a cut-off point between that which counts 
as knowledge (the 'effable') and that which is available to perception but beyond 
description. Structural features of music, she claims, 'constitute a system of 
elements whose tokens are (1) discrete, (2) type-identifiable by some finite 
mechanical procedure, and (3) combinable in certain rule-governed ways'. ý 5 Non- 
structural features of music include dynamics, tempo and timbre. On closer 
inspection it turns out that pitch and rhythm are not wholly independent of these 
non-structural features. Their interaction is complex: pitch and rhythm have a dual 
character as type-abstractions and nuanced particulars. In other words, a particular 
heard example of a pitch or rhythm always exhibits the non-structural features of 
dynamic, tempo and timbre as well. We always encounter nuanced versions of an 
13 See for example Fred Everett Maus, 'Concepts of Musical Unity', in eds. Cook and Everist, 
Rethinking Music, p. 171-192. 
5' Diana Raffman, Language, Music, andAfind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT press, 1993). 
55 Raffman, Language, Music, and Mind, p. 25. 
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ideal type. In order for us to perceive particular instances of pitch or rhythm as 
exemplars of a type, we must have a mental representation of the typical pitch or 
rhythm of which the performed particular is an example. A process - perceived 
sound - is matched against a product - the mental representation, which functions 
as a psychological 'go-between'. 56 
Although it entails it, I have argued that structuralism is not quite the same 
thing as literalism. When we think of structure, we tend to think not of individual 
notes, but of a hierarchy of abstractions derived from note groups: pitch/rhythm 
complexes, such as motivic cells, or progressively larger units. such as phrases or 
formal sections (recapitulations, episodes, etc. ). In an interesting extension of lier 
argument, Raffman speculates on the reasons why objective structures seem to be 
compatible with subjective interpretations. Where simple structures can in principle 
be exhaustively described, heard and reconstituted by a listener - this is a condition 
of calling them structures - at a higher level (i. e. over longer time spans) an 
interpretative gap opens up and 'subjective' descriptions of structure become 
possible. It is this fact that makes interpretation possible. As I understand Raffman, 
she is claiming that the number of plausible coherent structural descriptions at the 
global level increases to a point beyond which the individual can meaningfully 
adjudicate. No individual. in other words, can weigh up the structural options 
adequately, especially in the moment of listening. Individual listeners are also 
likely to be inconsistent about how they parse the music on different occasions. 
Raffman provides a number of reasons why this seems to be so, of which musical 
aptitude and training rank high. The process of real-time listening is necessarily 
influenced by all manner of particularities, such as the nuances of the performance 
you are hearing, or the number of times you have heard the work before. Raffman 
describes this phenomenon as 'structural ineffability'. 57 
56 lbid, p. 68 for her description of interval schemas as 'go-betweens'. 
57 Structural ineffability is discussed in Raffman, Language, Music and Mind, chapter 2, especially 
p. 27-35. I am not absolutely convinced that what she is describing here is a unitary phenomenon: I . 71 
take her point that 'Ineffable' structural mysteries can sometimes be solved through introspection or 
with help. But isn't what she says just evidence of structural ambiguity? To call it ineffability makes 
it sound as if there is always a decisively better description of structure to be had. This is a point that 
Stephen Davies's careful review (Journal ofAesthetics andArt Criticisin, 52- 1994, p. 360-362) does 
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Important research in the field of music psychology has established that 
there is significant correlation between certain notions of structure and nuance in 
contemporary performance practice. Eric Clarke calls this correlation 'iconic'. 58 
For example, cadences and phrase boundaries in tonal music provoke predictable 
deviations. Motivic and thematic units are generally presented consistently, with 
the same articulation and phrasing. At a certain level of complexity and scale, the 
correlation can be called into question, however. Music psychologists can in any 
case only deal in statistical regularities, rather than unique artistry. To put it another 
way, performers do not so much establish causes for their interpretations as find 
reasons. 59 
Notation and Nuance 
Let us assume that the notation of pitch and rhythm in the text is complete 
(a rare enough case, to be sure: consider the matter of ornamentation). A 
performative interpretation, whatever its relationship to structure, manifests itself 
otherwise largely as an assembly of nuances. This manifestation is, of course,, the 
performance: it is the only evidence we have that a mental representation exists. 
Because the performer's contribution apparently consists of nothing more than 
nuance, performing has traditionally been seen as a 'recreative' - and hence 
Quncreative' - activity. Nuance is fine detail of sound reflecting fine precision of 
movement, identifiable as such only as a variation on an ideal. At some point it 
becomes only perceptible, beyond description (it can only be indicated 
ostensively); then it shades into the imperceptible, or following Raffman, becomes 
not take up, though he does draw attention to a further symptom of the same problem - call it a 
tendency to idealise - in Raffman's rather narrow view of what counts as music. 58 The term is employed in the serniotician C. S. Peirce's sense (to contrast with indixical or 
symbolic relationships). See Eric Clarke, 'Expression in Performance: generativity, perception and 
serniosis', in ed. Rink, The Practice of Performance, p. 21-54, especially p. 27. 
59 John Sloboda discusses these matters in The Musical Mind, chapter 3), 'The Performance of 
Music'. See also Eric Clarke's overview 'Generative Principles in Music Performance' in ed. John 
Sloboda, Generative Processes in Music. - the Psychology of Performance, Improi, isation, and 
Composition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 1-26; and Clarke's essay 'Expression in 
performance: generativity, perception and serniosis', which contains two detailed analyses. Clarke 
makes the point about the limits of the music psychological endeavour on p. 52- t) I 
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'ineffable'. Nuances are classifiable in terms of rhythm and/or dynamics. includin(-, 
agogics and rubato (rhythm); articulation (rhythmic and dynamic): and textural 
matters such as chord balancing and tone colour. Tempo is a higher order 
organising factor. How far are these factors visible in notation? 
Although it need not do, and has not always done so, musical notation often 
goes beyond a simple representation of the 'primary' structural elements of pitch 
plus rhythm to include 'secondary' indications of how they should be realised. 
Indications of how to handle nuance - or how to 'express' the music - include 
tempo and character indications and dynamic markings. At one end of the scale 
there are titles, at the other markings which qualify individual notes, or processes 
within them (fermata, crescendi etc. ). Some of these are verbal, others 'Iconic' 
(such as hairpin dynamics), others 'causal', or in Peircian terms 'indexical, (like 
fingerings). The question as to which elements are mandatory, which optional is the 
stuff of interpretative argument. (Repeat marks are a good example. ) In other 
words, notation is actually a mixture of different systems, with elements of binary 
code sitting alongside poetic allusion. Some writers distinguish between 
prescriptive and descriptive elements, though it is rather difficult to draw the line 
clearly here. This implies a distinction between an instruction and a description. 
But what exactly is it? The answer can hardly avoid the moral terrain. Are a 
composer's indications of fingering 'prescriptive'? It might seem so. Yet fingerings 
depends so much on individual anatomy that they can hardly be taken as 
mandatory. 60 
Of course, we can observe a broad tendency in recent compositional history 
towards ever greater specificity (though individual composers vary greatly in their 
notational precision). By 1900, the notation of nuance has achieved a level of 
almost whimsical over-definition in the practice of some composers (Debussy 
provides good examples). Attempts by pedagogues to specify details of articulation 
can also lead to absurdly overloaded texts, which , if taken 'literally', would simplýý 
60 A brief discussion of the functions and characteristics of Western notation is to be found in 
Nicholas Cook, ilfusic. - A Ver. v Short 1ntroduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), chapter 
4, 'An Imaginary Object' (p. 54-74). See also Roy Howat, 'What do we performT, in ed. Rink, Thc 
Practice qf Performance, p-33-20, especially p. 7 on 'prescriptive' and 'descriptive' notation. 
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generate robotic performances of a slightly fussier kind than the unadorned version 
of the score. 61 By the time we reach the middle of the twentieth century, notation 
has become the subject of experiment in its own right, as my coi-nments on 
Ferneyhough and his contemporaries above suggest. They have moved well beyond 
an implicit notion of notation as a performance aid - in principle maximally 
transparent - to something which commands attention in itself. 62 
Nuance and Spontaneity 
I would like now to pursue the topic of nuance and 'nuance ineffability' a 
stage further, to demonstrate how it links in with a performance issue I have 
already touched upon. My question is this: why is it that we value spontaneity in a 
performance of a musical work? Or rather, why is it that the illusion of spontaneity 
is so important? 63 
This time I would like to illustrate the problem with a brief anecdote. 
Although this is a personal recollection, I am sure the principle it purports to 
demonstrate will be familiar to most seasoned concert-goers. Late in October 1998, 
1 saw the pianist Anne Queffelec perform Ravel's Miroirs live in a BBC lunchtime 
concert. Her interpretation of the fourth piece in the cycle, Alborada del Grazioso, 
contained an idiosyncratic moment: there is a passage in 9/8 which breaks down 
metrically into a 6/8 segment stressed on the first, third and fifth quaver, followed 
by a 3/8 fragment (see bar 33). In other words, there is a herniola effect. The 
repeated note figure in the first half of the bar is an unmistakable imitation of 
flamenco castanets. Queffelec introduced a 'Luftpause' at the end of the bar, 
61 For an example of detailed notation of articulation, see Paul Badura-Skoda's annotated version of 
the Prelude and Fugue in E flat minor/D sharp minor (WTK, Book 1), in Interpreting Bach at the Z., 
KcThoarcl (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 228-242. In this connection, one might also 
examine Webern's annotated version of his piano Variations, op. 27, which contain unambiguously I- 
'mental' abstractions (such as crescendi through rests): one can see the seeds of Ferneýhough's 
experiments with interpretation here. 
62 Musical notation has not always restricted itself to this single function by any means, of course. 
See Stanley Boon-nan, 'The Musical Text' in Cook and Everist, Rethinking Alusic, p. 403-423. 
especially p. 405-414. 
631 have already touched on this subject briefly. See chapter two, Case Studies 
in Performance 
Virtue: (1) Performance from Memory. 
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effectively turning it into 10/8. Having heard the piece many times. I had no 
difficulty 'reading' this interpretative moment as positively expressive. I v1suallsed 
the flamenco pirouetting figure momentarily frozen in mid air while the D7/13 
chord resounded. It was as if the 'dancer' was briefly displaying herself in a 
moment of theatrical poise. This gesture is repeated on numerous occasions within 
64 the piece and each time Queffelec treated it similarly . It was a striking effect, 
plausibly rendered. A few weeks later, I noticed that Radio 3 were to broadcast 
Queffelec playing the same pieces and decided to make a special effort to hear once 
again what I had thought to be outstanding playing. Though the playing was 
somehow less accurate than I recollected,, in all other respects it lived up to my 
memory of it and Alborada del Grazioso had precisely the same idiosyncratic 
agogics. However, I established at the end of the broadcast that this had been quite 
another performance occasion (a recital given sometime earlier in Ireland). In an 
eerie double-take, the unique sense of occasion I associated with the live 
performance evaporated: what had seemed at the time to emerge seamlessly out of 
the musical flow now became nothing more than a distorting mannerism. Viewed 
as a piece of performative interpretation, it was of course effectively inaudible to 
anyone unfamiliar with the score. Indeed, Queffelec's internalised performative 
interpretation had become so automatic that from my point of view, it had ceased to 
be perceived by her as an interpretation as such, and had become fused with the 
text. What I had taken to be just for us, unique to the occasion, turned out to be 
mechanical, a calculation, a ploy. 
As we have seen, a processual conception of performance requires a 
concrete space/time context: everything that happens is unique in the sense that it 
has unique space/time coordinates. To turn a performance into some form of 
storage - to reify it - is to attempt to preserve its identity as completely as possible. 
Above I referred to such stored forms as representations, of which notated texts, 
64 If one compares all the different notated versions of this passage, it becomes apparent that the 
herniola termination is one of a pair of continuations. In the other one, the melodic line is not left 
hanging, but dissolves into glissando figures. (e. g. bars 43-44). Queffelec's interpretation threatens 11 Z-) 
to destroy the rhythmic contrast between them. Incidentally, the BBC lunchtime concert was givell 
in St. George's, Brandon Hill on Thursday, October 29,1998 and the live broadcast of the recital 
from Ireland I refer to below was on November 21,1998. 
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recordings and mental representations - i. e. interpretations - are the chief varleties 
in the musical world. An interpretation therefore comes into existence in a sort of 
interactive performance space in which the audience, the concert hall, the acoustic 
and so on all have an effect, however minimal, on the result. So the interpretation 
itself may be highly determined, but nonetheless displays a certain flexibility. 
Consider what our impression would be if this were not the case. We would 
know in advance exactly what the outcome of the performance would be, so there 
would be no particular reason to listen closely on this occasion (or any other) 
because all performances of the work by that performer would be the same, 
anytime, anywhere. There would also be no way for the performer to convey any 
sense of commitment on any particular occasion, as the interpretation would be 
completely fixed in advance. This loss of commitment is a justification for the 
moral argument for live performance over recorded music. The commitment is both 
to the work and the occasion, and those present at it. As such it is an indicator of 
trust and trustworthiness. The completely predetermined performance would be an 
automated, mechanical rendering, independent of context. What I am describing is 
something like what a recording has come to be. 
In practice, an interpretation is prepared in detail in advance, but it is not 
possible to achieve total interpretative fixity. Nor does the mind store information 
digitally, in the manner of CD recordings. And as the Queffelec example shows, 
there is the danger of our perceiving a performance as mechanical and therefore 
sterile if we are not convinced that what is happening is uniquely tied to the here 
and now of the occasion. Here Diana Raffman's concept of nuance ineffability 
provides a psychological account of a moral necessity. The uniqueness of every 
percept only makes sense when measured against a background of mental schemata 
(which we can verbalise). There is an uneasy margin in which we can sense 
minimal differences in nuance but cannot report them. (In marginal cases 
differences can only be pointed to ostensively. ) We can distinguish nuance from 
structure (for example, we normally know which class an 
interval belongs to. 
regardless of whether it is played in tune or not, and the same principle applies 
to 
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the classification of rhythmic cells); but there is a point at which nuance is 
perceived but is no longer reliably classifiable. 
What makes 'live' performance spontaneous is the way in which each 
moment in the performance process depends on what precedes it. There is that 
sense of seamless emergence we have about any human behaviour we are 
confronted with and interact with socially: above and beyond planned intention, we 
interpret each moment in a stream of behaviour as being caused or modified by 
what came immediately before. The more context causes behaviour, the more it 
appears 'improvised'. The more it modifies it, the greater the evidence of a 
preformed intention, or in the musical case, performative interpretation. In just this 
way the plausibility of a performative interpretation relies on context. For example, 
the basic tempo of a performance may depend in part on the acoustic of the concert 
hall. Details of pedalling, dynamics and agogics will all require some fine-tuning 
(or 'running repairs') as the performance proceeds. 
Danuser points out that the notion of 'an' interpretation of a work, rather 
than interpretation- as- spontaneous -process is a historical one. The distinction also 
has a purely logical dimension, as Levinson makes clear. In part, it is a matter of 
degree: the extremes of complete predetermination and total spontaneity are 
logically impossible. We can also think of this in terms of Goehr's dialectic of 
performance practices. Those pianists who foreground the uniqueness of the 
occasion - those who favour the perfect musical performance - will naturally stress 
flexibility. If the sense of occasion is to play a greater role, their preparation must 
take the form of meeting eventualities. They will specialise in spontaneity. Their 
practice will be of adaptive, interactive strategies and tactics rather than of a fixed 
representation of the work. Such an approach to performance was suited to a tinle 
when concert conditions were less standardised than they have become today. Here 
we might contrast the approach of Gould, whose felt that his desire to desion an 
interpretation was compromised by the vicissitudes of the live performance 
occasion; and Shura Cherkassky: his extraordinary spontaneity made each 
performance a unique instance of an interpretative manner which reached back to 
the late nineteenth century in many respects, including his choice of works, his 
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habit of 'preluding' (improvising modulating arpegglated chords before and 
between works), as well as his grand 'romantic' keyboard manner. 65 For earlier 
generations,, Busoni and Schnabel theorised the middle ground in different WaN's. 66 
Where Gould created interpretations on record, completely bypassing the concept 
of performance, Cherkassky, especially in his last years, has left us numerous 
recordings of performances which are effectively identical with their 
interpretations. For Gould, performance was fraught with risk, for Cherkassky a 
singular opportunity. 
Although my account does not focus on it, this important historical 
dimension should not be overlooked. What I called 'cumulative fixation" in 
interpretation issues in an extreme situation (to echo Said's description) in which 
the performing pianist, playing in the highly regulated, largely standardised 
environment of the late twentieth-century art music concert hall, can project a 
highly determined personal interpretation of the music in which almost the only 
unpredictable element is his own body. What is extreme is indeed the social 
isolation of the performer; and this reflects a striving for an ultimately unachievable 
ontological purity in the (re)presentation of the musical work as an object. 
The Musical Metaphor of Space and Movement 
I return now to the relationship of performance to analysis. Is there a 
fundamental level at which performer and analyst converge in their understanding 
of musical unity? If we take Roger Scruton's ideas as a starting point, it is arguable 
65 1 heard him perform in Frankfurt (Neue Rundfunksaal) in the early 1990s. The opening of the Z!:, 
Schumann op. 17 Fantasie flowed seamlessly - and to my modern ears utterly disconcertingly - out 
of a series of improvisatory arpeggios. The programme ended with a bundle of late nineteenth- 
century transcriptions and virtuoso pieces. One of the (half a dozen) encores was Tchaikovsky's 
lyric piece 'October' from 'The Seasons', in which the dynamic contrast between melody and 
accompaniment was daringly exaggerated, the phrasing so expansive that the piece practically came 
to a halt at several points. 
660f course Gould was considerably influenced by Schnabel. Schnabel's attitude to the performance 
occasion was to neutralise it, by emphasising a quasi-spiritual timelessness. 
One can read Gould's 
attitude to performance as confronting the impossibility of an 
ideal ist-inspired perfection in a 
mundane concert setting. Busoni's earlier theorising makes some striking paradoxical claims about 
both the nature of compositional genesis and performance. I 
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that there is. He quotes Nicholas Cook's definition of a musical culture as *a 
tradition of imagining sound as music. 67 One thing that distinguishes sounds from 
music in our culture is a willingness and ability to employ the spatial metaphor. In 
doing so we hear sounds as connected and contextually relevant to each other. Most 
of us do this for the most part unthinkingly: indeed, many would probabl\' doubt 
the metaphorical nature of musical space, so ingrained is this mode of 
understanding. Language itself, with its word classes of noun and verb, reinforces 
and through its very familiarity conceals the interpenetration of product and 
process, for which the metaphor of space and movement provides a further 
instance. In fact, the metaphor turns out to be complex: there is an illusory sense of 
movement within an illusory space, the 'gestures' of the music constituting its 
'character'. So we might say that whereas analysts are interested in mapping 
locations and paths through musical space, performers (and listeners) undertake 
actual journeys. Interpretations are a class of preferred routes. 
As an initial example of the pervasiveness of the spatial metaphor, drawn 
from the literature of performance pedagogy, consider Schnabel's approach to 
melodic analysis. He distinguishes between two types of melodic articulation, with 
one mode complementing the other: one type of analysis depends on an 'orientation 
note', around which the rest of the phrase is organised (this can be the initiating 
tone or 'point of departure', a climactic note or 'centre of gravity', and a 'final 
goal', or destination); the other examines the shape (rise and fall) of the line. If the 
latter describes a melodic 'space', the former stresses movement within it. 68 
The dialectic between product (object, event ... ) and process 
is equally 
visible across the range of analytical techniques commonly employed. Within 
analysis itself two tendencies can be discerned: those theorists who identify events 
(such as motives, or themes) and relate them to each other; and those who 
subordinate surface detail to descriptions of underlying processes, such as the goal- 
directedness of tonality. Reti is an example of the former, Schenker of the latter. 
67 Cook, Music-, Imagination and Culture, p. 223. Roger Scruton talks about the role of metaphor in 
understanding music in TheAesthetics qf Music (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997) in chapters 
I and 3. See, for example, p. 94-5. The quotation from Cook is 
found on p. 455. 
"0-, 
Events can of course be organised into transformation processes. just as processes 
need the materials events provide. Larger events (climaxes, episodes, transitions) 
can invite interpretation in the form of a narrative. itself essentially a fusion of 
process and event. 69 
The processual aspect is reflected in a spatial image which recurs in many 
different forms: the German word 'Tonleiter' means both 'leader' and 'ladder' of 
tones, combining metaphors of location and movement; Leopold Mozart talked of 
the 'filo 1), or 'connecting thread' holding the performance together-, nineteenth- 
century music uses the notion of the 'line' in various ways; the Schenkerian Urlinie 
and its 'composed out' levels has been an enormously influential in the way many 
musicians (theorists, performers, analysts) think about music-, more recently, 
performers have thought in terms of an 'intensity curve' shaping the flow of the 
piece. 70 If there is nuance ineffability, there is also 'nuance dependency'. The sense 
that a performance belongs in the here and now is generated by the way an 
performance details have consequences. To describe a performance as fragmentary 
or incoherent is to point to a failure on the part of the performer to persuade us of a 
quasi-causal thread holding everything together. 
68 Schnabel's theories of melodic articulation are to be found in Wolff, Schnabel's Interpretation of 
Piano Music, chapter 4, p. 30-4 1. 
69 From the extensive literature on narrative and music I would single out for mention here some of 
John Rink's analyses of extended works from the nineteenth-century piano literature, which link 
different kinds of surface event to underlying tonal and narrative processes. See for example his 
analysis of Chopin's 3 rd Scherzo in 'Authentic Chopin: history, analysis and intuition in 
performance'. Rink has taken this type of coordinated layered analysis a step further in his 
'knowledge structure' for performing Chopin's Nocturne in C sharp minor, Op. 27 No. I (presented 
in a paper at the Society for Music Analysis (SMA) Study Day in Southampton in October 1998). 
Here Rink distinguishes between low, mid and high level time scales, listing knowledge types 1b Z: 1 
within each level ('Form', 'Tonality' 'Main Tempos', 'Dynamics' and 'Plot' within the high level; 
'Pitch essence', 'Rhythmic essence', 'Texture' and 'Character' within the mid level; and 
'Articulation' and 'Technique' among the low level factors). See also John Rink, 'Translating 
Musical Meaning: the N in eteenth -Century Performer as Narrator' in eds. Cook and Everist, 
Rethinking Music, p. 217-23 3 8. 
70 Leopold Mozart's comments are reported by Paul Badura-Skoda in Interpreting Bach at the 
Kc 
, i, 
boarýl, p. 201, at the beginning of Chapter 9 of this book, entitled 'Rendering the Structure as a 
Whole'. For a further discussion of instances of the metaphor of the 'line', or 'unifying thread', see -I 
John Rink, 'Translating, Musical Meaning: the Nineteenth-Century Performer as Narrator', p. 217- 
238, especially p-218. 
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Music and Character 
Here I turn to a further instance of the dialectic of process and product, most 
evident in the pedagogical literature. Many teachers would admit that a performer 
may well be able to get by without a thoroughgoing knowledge of a work's 
structure; that a performer would attempt to perform something without having 
reflected on its character seems improbable. The two terms are linked together 
71 explicitly by Schnabel. We should try to separate them. 
Structure is objectified pattern in music. It is most easily recognised in 
notated form. Talk of a work's 'character' points in two directions. Firstly it refers 
us to its composed character. This is a question of its genre and the positioning of 
the work within the canon. As genre is understood in part against a stylistic and 
social background, it is to a limited degree open to reinterpretation. 72 The character 
of an interpretation or performance - what we might call 'performative character' - 
obviously depends in part on recognising composed character. This in turn allows 
the performer to formulate an intention to perform the work in character or against 
it. ) to exploit the 
fluidity built into the genre concept. The more encompassing the 
genre, the more scope there is for this kind of interpretative strategy. Titled 
character pieces from Couperin to Debussy allow the performer less freedom than 
Bach's preludes and fugues, perhaps even the dance movements of the keyboard 
73 
suites. 
To speak of the character of performed music is to employ an animating 
metaphor (though not necessarily for human animation): the work 'behaves' in a 
certain way, which is its mode of being, its manner. At the root of this is an 
acknowledgement that music itself is an intentional concept, the product of human 
71 Wolff, Schnabel'S Interpretation of Piano Music, p. 120-154. 
72 Further introductory comments on genre theory can be found in Jim Samson, The Four Ballades 
(Cambrid. ge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 69-72 and in 'Chopin and 
Genre', Alusic 
Anal), sis, 8 (1989), p. 21 3 3-23 1. 
73 Stephen Davies discusses this issue from a slightly different perspective, arguing that baroque 
music allows the performer greater freedom in the choice of tempo on the grounds 
that more of the 
music's meaning is contained in the purely structural elements of pitch and rhythm. 
Stephen Davies, 
Ilusical Alcaning and Expression (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), chapter 
7 ('Musical 
Understanding, '), especially p. 3334. 
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thoughts. Interpretation and performance both mediate and preserve intentions. The 
metaphor of music as language can play an ancillary 'anthropomorphi sing' role . 
74 
Character has a feeling tone equivalent, which we call mood. There is a parallel 
hierarchy of structures and characters in music: the character of a piece of music 
emerges out of the sum of its 'gestures', their 'shape' and *amplitude' (dynamic 
intensity). This is paralleled at the level of composed character by generic 
references or 'topics'. 75 
Although a performer is expected to respect composed character, there is 
obviously considerable flexibility within which composed character is perceived as 
plausible performative character. The space which interpretation once occupied has 
narrowed considerably. I will now attempt to illustrate this historical development. 
Consider Richard Taruskin's comparison of two recordings of Prokofiev's Gavotta, 
Op. 32, No. 3. The first was made by Prokofiev himself in 1932, the second much 
more recently by the Prokofiev 'specialist' Boris Berman. 76 Prokofiev's recording 
is loaded with nuances which bring out the skittish quality of the dance: there is a 
parodic element to the composition in any case, and the unexpected harmonic darts 
and veers invite a certain exaggeration. Berman's painstakingly literal approach to 
the text leads him to neutralise the piquant character of the music. Taruskin is 
interested not only in the issue of under or over-interpretation, but in demonstrating 
how in the half century which intervened between these recorded versions, the 
notated text has come to enjoy an apparently unassailable authority, even over the 
performance tradition the composer himself played (and composed) within. 
However,, we shouldn't be too carried away by Taruskin's polemic here, which I 
formances, and think misses an important point. These are recordings, not per 
Berman may indeed 'characterise' the music more potently in a live setting. (Or he 
may not: my only experience of Berman's pianism is from recordings and these do 
" See Stephen Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression, chapter 7, section entitled 'How Music is 
Like a Person' (p. 367-369) for further discussion. 
75 The notion of 'topics' is explored by Leonard G. Ratner in Classic Music: Expression, 
Form and 
SiYlc (New York: Schirmer, 1980). Topics are characteristic elements of a musical fabric which are 
recognisable because they have become part of the conventional code of expression. 
There is a 
striking similarity between this notion and the more familiar and widely used concept of genre. 
76 Richard Taruskin, Tcv and Act, p. 188-189. This essay is entitled 'Tradition and Authorltv' 
(p. 173 - 197). 
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not strike me as generally under-characterised in the manner Taruskin describes. ) 
This does raise the issue of whether a recording is fairly viewed as a repository of 
an interpretation (a matter beyond the scope of this discussion). For Prokofiev in 
1932, a recording is much closer to a live performance. Secondly. the neutral 
quality of Berman's playing strongly reflects the trend towards literalism - playing 
all the notes of the text in such a way that they can be unambiguously reported back 
by a skilled listener - as a condition of structuralism. This is especially apparent in 
recordings, which are by their very nature designed to be heard repeatedly. Over- 
characterisation may distract the listener who wishes to familiarise himself with 
'the text', rather than an interpretation of it. With this function in mind, a recording 
is closer to a rehearsal or 'rendition' than a performance: once one has heard 
Berman, (perhaps backed up by the score, though with such a literal approach this 
is barely necessary), the element of interpretation in Prokofiev's own performance 
will be immediately audible, and in all likelihood a revelation. 
The speed of a process is an important determinant of a music's character 
and this in turn rests on characteristics of human perception. At what point does a 
melodic oscillation between two notes become a trill, a repeated interval leap a 
Lisztian tremolando? There is presumably a perceptual limit here. The underlying 
structure in each case is an intervallic pattern, which is subjected to a performance 
process. Thus the single most important determinant of performative character is 
tempo and what is humanly perceivable as a 'pulse. By tempo I mean a flexible, 
but recognisable consistent measuring pulse. Metronome markings are a good 
informal indicator of the limits, which coincide fairly precisely with the extreme 
rates at which a healthy heart beats (i. e. between 30 and 200 times a minute). The 
normal range of metronome markings, from crochet = 42 to crochet = 208. 
coincides with extremes of pulse (heart beat rate) a healthy person can reasonably 
experience. Beyond the extremes, one inevitably finds oneself either subdividing 
between strokes or grouping strokes together into larger units. David Epstein's 
theory of proportional tempo investigates this relationship in some detai 1.77 
77 David Epstein, A fusic, the Brain and Performance (New York: Schirmer 1995). A good place to 
start is the summary on p.. 359-363. See also Jonathan 
D. Kramer, The Time of' Alusic. - New 
A Icanings, Nciv Temporalities, Veiv Listening Strategies (New York: Schirmer, 1988). 
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My example above illustrated a historical development, which we could 
simplistically express as the demise of character in interpretation and the rise of 
structure, or its leaner cousin literalism, in its place. It further hinted at the role of 
recordings. My second example demonstrates how a performer can manipulate 
tempo as a global characterising force both to give an interpretation a more 
personal stamp - to set it off from the neutral textual representation of the music - 
while at the same time exploring the limits of musical expressivity. For Glenn 
Gould, this interpretative strategy and motive for adopting it often coincide. This is 
particularly well documented in some of his concerto recordings. where the 
presence of a conductor encouraged Gould, who was in any case rarely at a loss for 
an explanation for his own behaviour, to justify his extreme tempo choices 
publicly. 78 Much thought has been put into the importance of tempo relationships 
and their effect on performance unity. Some performers have gone to considerable 
(not to say absurd) lengths to retain a consistent underlying pulse in multi-sectioned 
pieces. Gould provides a further interesting example (not of a performance, note. 
but of a recording) in his second version on record of the Goldberg Variations 
(made in 19 81), which pursues j ust such a unifying strategy. 79 
The struggle to humanise the abstract forms of absolute music does not 
always issue in a specific appeal to character. Heinrich Neuhaus, in his book 
entitled 'The Art of Piano Playing' talks of the 'artistic image' of a musical 
composition. He comments: 
I confess that the title [the artistic image of a musical 
composition] arouses some doubt in my mind, in spite of the 
fact that the conception it expresses is generally accepted and 
that everyone takes these words to signify something 
completely reasonable, understandable and real. But what is 
'the artistic image of a musical composition' but music itself, 
the living fabric of sound, musical language with its rules, its 
component parts, which we call melody, harmony, polyphony, 
" Two well-known examples are his recordings of the Brahms 
D minor concerto with Leonard 
Bernstein; and the Beethoven 'Ernperor' concerto with Stokowski. 
These are detailed in Michael 
C-emann, 
Glenn Gould, Leben und Werk (Munich: Piper, 1996), p. 207-210 and p. 256-260 Stecr II- 
respectively. 
79 See Kevin Bazzana's analysis in Glenn Gould. - The Performer in the Work (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 
1997), p. 160-20' 3. 
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etc., a specific formal structure, an emotional and poetic 
content? 80 
This desperate trawl for a unifying metaphor speaks eloquently of an insoluble 
problem. 
Some Speculative Conclusions 
My framework for discussing the nature of interpretation has been to 
examine the interaction of analysis and performance. Analysis is just one of the 
three forms of critical interpretation Danuser identifies (the structural), but the 
others, (the associative and stylistic) have made brief appearances in the discussion. 
It will be clear by now that this focus on, or search for, the growing emphasis on 
the structural in interpretation and performance reflects a historical trend. In a 
sense,, an interpretation is that element of performance which is structured (or 
fixed). Nonetheless it would seem that the relationship between analysis-as-critical- 
interpretation and performance -as-performative-interpretation is complex. It is 
certainly not straightforwardly causal. Nor would I describe it as ambiguous; I 
would prefer the morally loaded synonym equivocal. Performance practice is, after 
all, a practice among practices, subject to pressures and driven by convictions. 
I would like to offer a speculation on the nature of this equivocation. The 
key to understanding how performers can do without explicit formal analysis is, I 
believe, to be found in an elaboration of the spatial metaphor. 81 Consider the 
following points: 
80 Heinrich Neuhaus, The Art of Piano Playing, trans. K. A. Leibovitch (London: Kahn and Averill, 
1993), p. 7. 
8' The points I make below are compatible with the conclusions Stephen Davies comes to in his 
discussion of musical understanding. On his view, musical understanding is always linked to 
hearing music under a description. He distinguishes two broad categories of description, the 
technical and the metaphorical. His claim is that, while musical training and the acquisition of a 
technical vocabulary may enhance understanding, it is not strictly necessary: lay audience members 
may -,, am as much from the listening process as the technically initiated. I am claimin- that 
performers may also lack a certain kind of technical understanding and that this lack may not 
influence the performed outcome and even ultimately remain undetected. The additional point 
I 
make is that the technical understanding is itself in an important respect metaphorical. 
Da% ies, Z71 
,I hisical Alcaning and Exj)rcssion, chapter 
7. 
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1. Musicians learn to identify pattern, or 'shape' in music, through training to hear 
both intervals (successively as motifs and melody and coincidental 1ý'. as harmony) 
and rhythms (as rhythmic cells or figures). Scales consist of 'steps'. We can 
usefully distinguish between literal understanding of these proto-elements and the 
structures composers build out of them. The notes of a composition are reifications 
or 'objects' which can be used to build bigger objects. 
2. These basic geometric shapes can be related isomorphically to our general 
experience of the world around us, for example to human behaviour as bodily 
gesture/dance and speech or to some similarly interpretable environmental activitv 
(as in much programme MUSiC). 82 It is not a question of simply 'translating' 
metaphorical musical movement/shape into real movement: because music is non- 
referential, the possibilities are manifold. At the same time, our conceptual and 
verbal understanding of ourselves is limited, because language cannot ultimately be 
freed from its metaphorical underpinning. 83 The metaphors of space and movement 
within it imply a 'vehicle'. Here consciousness and the musical process become 
inextricably entangled. 84 
Instrumental teachers spend a great deal of time developing a currency of 
metaphors for interpreting musical movement in terms of other experience familiar 
to the pupil. 
3. Performing musicians appear to bypass these initial phases often, and instead 
concentrate on the emotions, moods and feeling tones that they perceive the music 
as expressing. (I will have to bypass the enormous literature on the nature of 
musical expressivity . 
85) While a 'bottom-up' analysis is possible, perhaps even 
desirable, many performers will be content to rely on their intuition here. Having 
decoded the literal content of the text,, they will experiment directly with nuance, 
testing the effects of one interpretative choice against another empirically. In this 
82 This rather vague term isomorphism is elaborated on by Peter Kivy in Sound Semblance: 
Reflections on Musical Representation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, second edition), 
p. 75-77 and in Laird Addis's recent study Of Mind and Music (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1999), especially in chapter 6 (p. 70-83). 
8' George Lakoff and Mark Johnson talk of 'emergent' metaphors and concepts. Metaphors 11"e Live 
By (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), p. 58. ZD ID 
84 Th is is the central topic of Laird Addis's book Of Mind and Music. 
8S Davies, Musical Alcaning and Expression provides a good starting point. II 
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they will be limited in part by their technical resources and, even more importantly. 
by their musical imagination. So as long as performers respect the 'literal' content 
of notation - play the correct pitches and recognisably correct rhythms - their 
interpretation, however it was arrived at, will imply a structural understand ing. 
though one which no listener could ever reconstruct. 
4. There is no limit to the metaphorical imagination in principle: there are no real 
limits to how local structure and global form can be understood associatively. They 
can be related to classes of biographical or historical event, or even to actual events. 
Although the reception of music in the nineteenth century often favoured such 
association, the trend has been away from such understandings towards a more 
severely 'structural' approach. But in the practice of musical production, this trend 
is largely invisible: just as we cannot divine an analysis behind an interpretation, 
nor can we ever know from a performance alone what metaphorical understanding 
the performer might have developed, let alone comment on its appropriateness. 
I have ignored the feedback provided by knowledge gained from other 
music, the matter of 'stylistic awareness' mentioned above, which is an important 
adjunct. The secondary source of information provided by stylistic factors and 
genre associations further helps us to identify form (i. e. shape over larger time 
scales). All three elements of critical interpretation - structural, stylistic and 
associative - are potentially present. 
To reiterate: in developing an interpretation, an instrumentalist (pianist) can 
work through some, or even all, of the phases outlined above, 
from literal decoding, 
then seeking out patterns at the level of detail, phrase, paragraph/section or 
large- 
scale form, before deciding how to weld them together into a sequence, 
from local 
patterns to general (contestable) associations. She can carry out cursory or 
detailed 
harmonic and/or thematic analysis. Or she can rely on 
her intuition (Informed or 
otherwise) and experiment directly on the 
instructions in the score with nuance, 




When musicologists comment that the score underdetermines the 
performance, it is nuance which is the primary additive. A fuller statement of this 
idea would be as follows: the score underdetermines the interpretation, ýNhich 
underdetermines the performance. Scores and interpretations are both types of 
musical representation. There is a risk/opportunity gap between each level, and an 
ideal listener (such as the expert performer) can identify the contribution of each 
level, the roles of accident and intention. The score is the most stable 
representation: to hear the invariant score through the performance is relatively 
straightforward. Being able to separate out interpretation from score requires 
considerable powers of musical discernment (and probably some familiarity with 
the particular work), which can be acquired only with practice. It is almost 
inconceivable that a listener, however expert, could claim to distinguish reliably a 
further level of analysis informing interpretation. 
Becoming an expert performer entails building up musicianship skills over 
a long period. Expert practice is often intuitive. There need be no direct line from 
analysis to synthesis in performance preparation, which contains both linear and 
cyclic elements. This is as true of the bigger picture as of the individual practice 
session. Nonetheless, analyses of various kinds - in particular the partitioning of 
the musical flow into units - play a major role in preparing an interpretation, 
though it is not always clear how conscious the analytical act is. 
Interpretations are nuanced versions of an ideal invariant notation. Nuance 
operates within a framework of tempo: both are partly responsible for the music's 
character, or mood. The exact nature of musical interpretations is indeterminate, as 
they are only accessible through performance, which is unique to each occasion. 
Interpretations can, however, achieve an audible identity from performance to 
performance. 
The notion of an interpretation as a fixed mental 'object 'or representation 
sits rather uneasily with the fact that an interpretation can only be heard as a 
process. The spatial metaphor which informs our appreciation of music tolerates a 
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degree of contrariness. Just as language contains grammatical resources for 
describing both location and movement (prepositional in English), so there are two 
aspects of the spatial metaphor, differently emphasised by performers and analysts. 
There seems to be a coincidence of some kind between the notion of musical 
movement and mental consciousness. Finally we can say that analysis plays a 
possible, not necessary role in creating a fixed (but not completely rigid) 
representation of the music in the performer's mind. 
Historically we can note the increasing influence of both literalism and 
structuralism on performance practice, a process of cumulative fixation. There is a 
point at which a law of diminishing returns comes into force. When interpretations 
become totally fixed, they become indistinguishable from performances and 
performance, devoid of interaction, loses its moral character. In accounting for 
these developments, a third type of musical representation - recording - begs our 
attention. In the final section of this chapter, I will examine the influence of the 
different categories of musical representation on each other in more detail. 
1 -1 
Part Three: Interpretation, Representation and Cultural 
Transmission 
In the last section I discussed interpretation in terms of the analysis of the 
notated musical text, arguing against a simple causal relationship whereby an 
analysis determined a performative interpretation. Rather, in arriving at an 
interpretation, performers draw on a range of metaphorical understandings of music 
- with the music-as-language image prominent among them - which illay 
ultimately be reducible to a common denominator of a musical 'space' containing 
C 86 objects' through which the 'vehicle' of consciousness moves . Certainly the fact 
that the art music performer works from a spatial notation constantly reinforces and 
naturalises this form of understanding. 
Metaphorical understanding implies a context. As a starting point for the 
next stage of the discussion, I propose to examine more closely the limitations of 
the musical text as a definer of what music is before moving on to examine the 
context of interpretation. 
The Musical Text 
This is the title of a recent article by Stanley Boorman. 87 The author is a 
Professor (New York) whose primary field of interest is in Renaissance music and 
the history of music printing. He is also the director of the Collegiurn Musicum. 88 
In other words, his activities straddle two potentially conflicting practices, with a 
suggestion of narrowness (his historical interests are primarily pre-modern) and 
breadth (he is a performer). I think his views reflect this: although he approaches 
the topic with academically inspired caution, commenting that 'the written or 
86 1 find myself in agreement here with Stephen Davies: 'I believe that the expressiveness of music 
depends mainly on a resemblance we perceive between the dynamic character of music and human 
movement, gait, bearing or carriage. ' Musical Meaning and Expression, p. 229. For a critique of this 
view, see Addis, Of Mind and Music, p. 112. 
87 Stanley Boorman, 'The Musical Text', p. 4033-42-3). 
88 See 'Notes on Contributors' in Cook and Everist, Rethinking I fusic, p. xl\,. 
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printed musical text is an object to be mistrusted at every tUM,. 89 his opening sally 
of questions invites radical answers. So although his essay is for the most part 
devoted to scrutinising the status of the notated musical text with a view to 
demonstrating its shortcomings, it is this group of framing questions \vIlich makes 
the essay of relevance here. 
Boorman asks three questions at the outset: 
1. Must a musical text be written down? 
2. Does a recording constitute a text? 
3. Can a performance count as a text? 90 
In a sense these are just instances of a bigger question about the ontology of the 
musical work: how do we define it? 
All the questions imply a distinction between text and context. If, in the 
past, musicologists have concentrated on the former, they have recently turned 
more and more frequently to the problem of theorising context. 91 By pointing to the 
fragility (ambivalence, arbitrariness, incompleteness etc. ) of the notated text, 
Boorman is inviting us to rethink context too. His conclusion is that 'the notated 
text is no longer the definer of a musical composition as we understand it' (the 
important implication being that it once was). 92 Later he calls the text a 'version' of 
the work. 93 
Having provided this partially negative answer, Boorman is a little hesitant 
about drawing positive conclusions from it. Nonetheless, he does give us a useful 
hint. The notated text is, he says, 'no more than a definer of a specific moment in 
the evolving history of the composition... '. 94 1 may be doing Boorman a disservice 
in taking this metaphor of evolution (barely hinted at in passing) so seriously. But 
89 Boorman, 'The Musical Text', p. 403. 
90 lbid, p. 403. 
91 Naorni Cumming talks of the change of root metaphor within the discipline of analysis from 
organicism to contextualism. See Jim Samson's reference to her work in 'Analysis in Context', 
p. 50. Samson poses the question of how to theorise context at the beginning of 'Chopin reception: 
theory, history, analysis'. 
92 Boorman, 'The Musical Text', p. 420. (My italics. ) 
93 Boorman, 'The Musical Text', p. 422 
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the image of the work-as-life-form, however appropriate it may be. does seem to 
inform his argument. Or at least the conclusions his argument implies lead 
inexorably in this direction. Indeed the image of the musical work as constituted by 
a multi-formed evolving life-form - which could be viewed as a thinly disguised 
extension of the organicist metaphor - has become increasingly popular. 95 
The first problem in pursuing the image of the musical-work-as-life-form is 
to find a potential common denominator for the different candidates for the status 
of 'text' - 'versions' of the work - Boorman mentions. These include not only 
notation, recordings and performances, but also 'readings', and 'understandings', 
by which I presume he means interpretations. 96 What notated texts, recordings and 
interpretations have in common is the fact that they represent music in different 
forms. 97 Performances are ontologically distinct, because they are ephemeral 
processes. I have argued that any real time process involving an agent, a text of 
some kind and an audience can qualify as a performance, so this potentially 
includes activities like reading and listening. Performances are realisations of 
representations. With this in mind, my answers to Boorman's questions above 
would be as follows: 
1. A musical text (i. e. representation) need not be written down, as there are other 
methods of storage. 
2. Recordings qualify as texts/representations precisely because they store music as 
a product. 
3. A processual performance is never the text itself. it is always of a text (or texts) 
and always more than that text, as each performance is novel and unique. It can 
only become a text/representation if it is stored in some form, implying some future 
retrieval and performance. 
94 lbid, p. 420. (My italics. ) 
95 Cook, Music: A Very Short Introduction contains provocative and pertinent comment on this topic 
(p. 73-74). 
96 Boorman, 'The Musical Text', p. 407 and 409. 'Readin, (); s' refers to recorded performances, 
'understandings' refers to critical interpretation. 
97 There is wide use of the term 'representation' in discussions of music theorý and aesthetics. 
See 
for example Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression 
for an overview; and Cook, Music. - A Veiýv 
Short Introduction, chapter 5 (p. 75-86). 
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To return to the question: how do we define a musical composition? The 
answer Boorman's text implies could be stated as follows: a composition (or better, 
C work) is a population of identifiably similar representations. I claimed in the first 
section of this chapter that the ontology of performance-as-process I have been 
advocating requires us to group interpretation together with other products which 
exist to store music. I proposed that we think in terms of a variety of products 
which represent music in different ways. The three basic categories I identified 
were: 
I- Spatial notation, including manuscripts, printed editions, and other notated 
versions of music. 
2. Audio recordings of various kinds (from mechanical music boxes, through piano 
rolls to analogue and digital disc and tape recording). 
3. Mental representations of music, which can be subdivided into critical and 
performative interpretations. 
These primary categories, which aim for comprehensive representation, shade into 
secondary categories, which include analyses, transcriptions, arrangements and 
quotations; recorded arrangements and excerpts; critical interpretations; and a host 
of dependent materials and codes connected with technique, instrumentation, 
movement and dress, many of which have been excavated by musical authenticists. 
There is no firm dividing line between primary and secondary categories, but rather 
a constant renegotiation of the integral, supplementary and inessential. All these 
taken together constitute what might be called the life-world of the work. At any 
given moment, a work exists as a product in various forms of storage, more or less 
stable; and it comes to life in various ephemeral soundings and readings which we 
group together as processual performances. 
Some might argue that this grand scheme simply transfers the problem of 
defining the work as such to defining 'representation', or at least to identifying 
what it is that entitles us to classify notations, recordings, and interpretations 
together in this way. The obvious common denominator is reýfication: the three 
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categories of representation all fix music in different ways. But how does this 
population of more or less stable representations renew or 'reproduce' itselp. A 
more sophisticated account of the cultural transmission of representations has been 
provided by Dan Sperber, to whose work I now turn. 
The Transmission of Representations: a Theory 
Dan Sperber's work on the theory of representations and cultural 
transmission is an offshoot of his work in linguistics. His important text on 
98 
pragmatics (entitled Relevance) was first published in 1985. In this work he and 
his co-author, Deidre Wilson,, offered a detailed review and critique of the 'code' 
model of communication, developing a pragmatic s-ori entated supplement to it 
which stressed the determining role of the relevance of information to a receiver. 
The traditional 'code' model was formulated in mathematics by Shannon and 
Weaver in 1949; it has been adapted to fit verbal (spoken) communication most 
notably by Jakobsen, whose model is widely referred to in semiotics. 99 Sperber's 
aim is to account for degrees and types of resemblance in communication. 100 In 
pursuing this topic, he concluded that the code-based theory was inadequate in 
some respects, for example when considering human psychology, but his goal was 
to complement rather than replace it. 
The theory of representations which Sperber has subsequently developed - 
which he calls an 'epidemiology of representations' - is thematically related. It 
attempts to analyse how culture, viewed as a body of 'representations', reproduces 
itself, and evolves. His approach is to examine culture in terms of replicating 
mechanisms, as opposed to a collection of genres, or schemata, such as laws, 
artworks, beliefs and so on. His theory is thus unusual in its attempt to examine the 
phenomenon of representation as such rather than to classify representations and 
98 Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1986, second edition 1995). 
99 An introductory account of Shannon and Weaver's model is available in Sperber and Wilson, 
Relevance, p. 4-5; and of Jakobsen's work in Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and 
Scmiotics 
(London: Methuen, 1977), p. 83. 
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consider them separately. To put it another way. the novelty is to pick out a 
different kind of generality - the mode of reproduction - as a starting point for 
analysis. 
His recent book Explaining Culture: a Naturalistic Approach (1996) 
consists in part of reworked articles dating back to the early 1980s. 101 He describes 
his project as contributing to a potential 'natural science of the social'. with a 
naturalistic approach to culture (and particularly anthropology, from which field his 
practical illustrations tend to be drawn). 102 By 'naturalistic' he means, I think, 
'rooted in human psychology'. Because this is a theory of replication, not of 
meaning, it does not have anything to say about uniqueness as a source of meaning 
and in this sense it aligns itself with the scientific endeavour in general and 
psychology (including music psychology) in particular. In the next section I will 
outline his theory in more detail. 
Types of Representation 
A representation is a stored/storable version of a cultural content of some 
kind. 
A representation sets up a relationship between at least three 
terms: that which represents, that which is represented, and the 
user of the representation. 
He goes on: 
A fourth term may be added when there is a producer of the 
representation distinct from the user: it is then a mental 
representation, such as a memory, a belief, or an intention. 
103 
Sperber classifies representations into different groups. There are two main 
categories: mental re resentations and public representations, the latter existing in p 
100 Dan Sperber, Explaining Culture. - .4 
Naturalistic Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 83. 
'0' See previous footnote for full reference. 
102 Sperber, Explaining Culture, preface, p. vI. 
103 lbid, p. -332. 
The idea is stated in a slightly different form again on p. 61. 
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the environment and available for general use. He also considers caltural and 
collective representations as special cases. 104 
Cultural representations are those mental representations that are constantlY 
in circulation, widely distributed and durable (e. g. the language of a communitv 
itself). Musical examples would be nursery rhymes, national anthems. and popular 
songs. The degree of durability and frequency of occurrence in the culture varies 
from item to item. So 'cultural representations... are a fuzzy subset of the set of 
mental and public representations inhabiting a given social group. '10ý One 
problematic category is collective representations: those representations wilich 
might be attributed to a group as a whole but which may never be represented by 
any single individual. 106 . Candidates for collective representations are musical 
ensemble works,, especially if there is no conductor, and group improvisations. 
Collective representations thus pose a problem of attribution - authorship - which 
echoes the problem of the ideal i st/P latoni st ontology of the musical work. About a 
collective representation we might ask: who is responsible for the performance? 
Whose performance is it? Whose intention does it represent? About a work: what, 
or where, is the work? Is it the score, the performance, or some amalgam? In both 
cases we feel driven to fill a psychological gap, positing an entity which is very 
difficult to substantiate philosophically: it amounts to a psychologically plausible 
convenience. 
Sperber is more generous than I have been in his application of the term 
interpretation, which he equates with representation. Specifically his category of 
mental representations are synonymous with interpretations, as I have discussed 
them. They are mental 'objects . Generally, though, 
Sperber defines an 
interpretation as '... a representation of a representation by virtue of a similarity of 
content. ' 107 The sense of this definition is not altered significantly if the terms 
interpretation and representation are reversed. Public representations certainly 
include the physical entities (printed texts, recordings) mentioned above, 
but 
104 lbid, p. 32-314. 
'05 lbid, p. 3333. 
106 lbid, p. 335. Sperber invites comparison with Durkheim"s term 
'collecti\, e representation' (p. 61). 
107 lbid, p. 34. 
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Sperber does not make the kind of hard and fast distinction between reifying forms 
of storage and retrieval processes I have advocated. 108 
Representations form populations and generate chains through time. 
Consider this example: someone encounters a public representation e., ý,;,. a score. 
and decides to perform it. So they learn the score (i. e. they form a mental 
representation of it) and then perform it in public (a public representation) which in 
turn creates the wish in some of the audience to hear the work again, they then 
purchase another kind of public representation -a recording - and over a period of 
time also form mental representations of the work. A critic might also have 
reviewed the performance, thereby creating another kind of public representation 
(the review article), which is in turn read by other members of the public, who 
discuss it with friends, who form mental representations... and so on. Although 
public representations (such as books) can be reproduced ad infinitum, mental 
representations cannot reproduce without entering the public domain at least 
fleetingly (for example as speech). 
What such a description makes clear is the need for a performative/critical 
distinction as employed in the discussion of interpretation above; and as with other 
conceptual boundaries, this will be contestable on occasion. 
The Epidemiology of Representations 
There is an analogy to be drawn between epidemics and cultural 
transmission: a representation spreads itself through a population like a disease. 
This idea is not new. 109 It has resurfaced, shorn of its associations of debilitation, as 
a fashionable analogy between cultural transmission and genetic replication. The 
biologist Richard Dawkins originally popularised the term 'meme' to rhyme with 
gene. 110 The limitations of this analogy have been much discussed. So 
Susan 
Blackmore, a stalwart advocate of the study of memetics, admits that 'genes and 
108 lbid, p. 61. 
'09 lbid, p. 82. The earliest attribution of this idea is to Gabriel 
Tarde, in the late nineteenth centur-N. 
110 Richard Dawkins, The Seýfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, revised edition 1989), 
p. 192. 
1-)o 
memes are both replicators but otherwise are different. "' I But even this overstates 
the similarities, because it suggests that the mechanism of replication is the same in 
both biological and cultural arenas. It is clear that genetic mutation is. compared to 
cultural transformation, very rare, occurs at a consistent, measurable rate, and does 
not normally enhance survival chances. 112 Sperber makes the point that 
communication has traditionally been thought of as the replication of one person's 
thoughts in the mind of another. In fact, 'strict replication, if it exists at all, should 
be viewed as just a limiting case of maximal resemblance, rather than the norm of 
communication. -)113 Hence communication is best viewed as invoking 
transformation, on a spectrum between exact duplication ('zero transformation 
replication') and total loss of information. The scale runs through shades of 
influence into unrelatedness and unrecognisability. 
In fact there is an important distinction to be made between the 'meme, 
model and the 'influence' model of cultural transmission. While both entail an idea 
of competition and 'success', 114 the 'meme' model provides us with the insight that 
Darwinian selection is not limited to biological material, but can apply to 
replicators of any kind. ' 15 The 'influence' model allows for the possibility that new 
representations may be the 'offspring' of not just one or two, but of a potentially 
unlimited number of parents. (This is the familiar 'blending' problem which so 
occupied the 'pre-genetic' generation of Darwinists. ) If we add to this the idea 
mooted above that the musical work is not itself one representation, but a whole 
series of complementary competing representations occupying an ecological niche, 
the analogy - or what is left of it - begins to make more sense. 
For example, 
consider what Sperber has to say about how sets of representations create self- 
perpetuating institutions. He says: 'An institution is the distribution of a set of 
representations which is governed by representations belonging to the set itself. 
' 116 
The Macintyrean view I espoused above (chapter 2, The Practice: (3) the 
''I Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 66. 
1 12 This is discussed at length in Blackmore, The Meme Machine, ch. 5. 
113 Sperber, Explaining CUlture, p. 83. 
114 Sperber, Explaining Cultum, p. 104-5. 
115 lbid, p. 102. 
116 lbid, p. 76. 
-) -) I 
Dialectic of Practice and Institution) claimed that institutions characteristically 
contain potentially conflicting representations and Sperber's definition implicitly 
endorses this. ' 17 
Mass mechanical reproduction of representations (which do not cross the 
public-mental threshold) does not in itself constitute cultural transmission. Mental 
representations are a sine qua non. Sperber claims that 'only those representations 
which are repeatedly communicated and minimally transformed in the process wi II 
end up belonging to the culture. '118 Individuals do not necessarily remember what 
they encounter exactly: they only bother to store information which they judge as 
potentially relevant for an unpredictable future (i. e. what aids survival or improves 
its quality, to put it crudely). The formation of mental representations also involves 
altering the structure of the material to fit the mind: human beings do not store 
information in 'raw' form,, but are forced to change it for storage and recall 
purposes. Newly minted representations are subject to the limitations of human 
psychology: perception and memory filter and transform. 119 Language is encoded 
in grammar, not remembered as discrete lists of sentences (Chomsky pointed this 
out). So the cognitive construction and reconstruction processes - the mental 
'bottleneck' - crucially affect the character and survival chances of representations 
both critical and performative. 120 The technologies of writing (and later recording) 
language and music obviously provide more stable means of storing representations 
117 Ibid, p. 76. 
'" Ibid, p. 83. 
119 A well-known example is provided by experiments involving the recall of narrative. Ibid, p. 74. 
120 One way in which Sperber has pursed this issue is by proposing an economy of representations. 
The individual will try to maximise relevance, and will do so in this way: 'Cognitive efficiency 
involves making the right choices in selecting which available new information to attend to and 
which available past information to process it with. The right choices... consist in bringing together 
input and memory information, the joint processing of which will provide as much cognitive effect 4: D 
as possible for as little mental effort as possible. ' (lbid, p. 114. ) He also suGgests that there are 
certain particularly attractive positions which representations will tend to move towards. Factors 
which play a part in the 'attraction model' include the form of the representation: what makes a 
form better or worse will depend, he says, on universals of human psychology on the one hand, and 
local cultural practices on the other. (Ibid, p. 106. ) Differentiating, between psychological universals 
and environmental factors takes him into discussions of innateness and the theory of the modularity 
of rnind. (Ibid, ch. 5 and 6). In this regard, his distinction between 
disposition and susceptibility is 
relevant: a disposition is a trait hurnans have been selected 
for, whereas a susceptibility is an 
accidental side effect of a trait. (Ibid, p. 67. ) This 
distinction is difficult to uphold because 
dispositions presumably start out life as susceptibilities: random mutation is accidental at 
base le\ el. 
See also chapter 5 of this study below (footnote 108). 
than other (transforming) minds: this has allowed more (and different) 
representations to be developed and communicated, as the internal memory store is 
supplemented by these external representations. Subjective perception and menlorý' 
play a more limited role and representations tend to preserve their structure more 
accurately. 121 In summary, we could say that 
... the most evocative representations are those which, on the 
one hand, are closely related to the subject's other mental 
representations (i. e. maximise relevance) and on the other 
hand, can never be given a final interpretation (i. e. invite 
further transformation). It is these relevant mysteries as they 
could be described, which are culturally successful. 122 
This strikes me as an eminently fitting description of art music practice: a 
population of representations is subject to continual minimal transformation in a 
potentially endless cycle which strives to avoid closure. 
Although Sperber does not allot the concept a position within his theory, I 
think the notion of processual performance slots fairly neatly into it. It simply 
describes the moment at which a representation is transformed (i. e. performed and 
changed). On the other hand, I think we can sense a limitation in the application of 
Sperber's ideas to the ontology of performance I have been pursuing: Sperber's 
theory operates at the general level of human psychology, not at the individual 
level. It doesn't take account of artistic uniqueness. 
What interests us is how the different representations which constitute the 
life-world of the musical work have interacted with each other and which have 
been most successful. I have already discussed the role of the score and its analysis 
as an influence on performative interpretation. Of the other categories of 
representation I listed above, it is the audio recording which begs for consideration 
and in this section I will make a few brief comments on this huge (but significantly 
under-theorised) topic. 
Ibid, p. 75. 
Ibid, p 73. Incidentally, this mechanism helps explain the success of representations \\h1ch 
have 
no basis in fact, such as superstitions. 
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The Ontology of Recordings 
For the moment I will put aside historical concerns and simplý, point to 
some of the features of recordings which distinguish them from performances or 
interpretations. 123 The first is that a sound recording, whatever technology it 
involves, is always mediated by that technology. 124 As a consequence. the 
conditions of musical performance which pertain in the concert hall are in most 
instances radically, in a few instances modestly altered. 125 For example, the 
'audience', such as it is,, will probably consist for the most part of professional 
technicians and advisors; and there is no necessary unity of time, place and action. 
Following on from this, the performer's intentions will be influenced by the fixed 
nature of the recorded product in many different ways. This has consequences too 
for the reception of recorded music. This differs according to many factors, 
prominent among which are the kind of reproduction technology available (is it 
"' A useful source of reference here is Michael Chanan Repeated Takes. - A Short History of 
Recording and its Effects on Music (London: Verso, 1995), though there is unfortunately no 
separate bibliography. Evan Eisenberg, The Recording Angel. - Music, Records and Culture ftom 
Aristotle to Zappa (London: Picador, 1987) is a wide-ranging, thought-provoking study. 
124 Two indispensable references here are Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction', in Illuminations; and Theodor Adorno, 'On the Fetish Character of Music and the 
Regression of Listening' (193 8), in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, eds. Andrew Arato and 
Eike Gebhardt (New York: Urizen Books, 1978), p. 270-299. The issue of mediation is fundamental, 
because it entails reification. Consider a few of the ramifications. Notation is itself a 'record' of a 
composition, but a spatial, not a sounding record. The details of the notational system -a 
technology - determine certain limits within which choices can be made. Recordings are parallel 
constructions using different technologies. The form of objectification - analogue or digital 
cylinder, wire, disc, tape - its modes of manufacture and physical storage are a further complication: 
a 'record' -a 12" 33rpm vinyl disc, for example - contains a certain amount of potential storage 
time (up to about 30 minutes per side). It both enables and limits the modes of access to the music in 
novel ways: for example, finding a particular bar of music on a cassette recording and playing it 
back repeatedly is in some respects rather trickier than on a vinyl or shellac disc, or a CD. 
Furthermore, recordings are not usually of works, though they can be, but of programmes or 
excerpts, played by one artist or many different ones. 
12 5 Even the oxymoronic 'live' recording is by no means as transparently unmediated as it might 
seem: there are numerous instance of 'live' recordings undergoing substantial subsequent studio 
editing (a certain amount of which must in any case take place). The story of Horowitz's 'live' 
recording of his comeback concert at Carnegie Hall in 1965 demonstrates this point as well as an\ 
(it turned out that the recording of the concert contained studio 'enhancements'). See Harold C. 
Schonberg, Horowit_-. - His Life and Music (London: Simon and Schuster, 1992). p. 217-220. 
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portable, for example? ), and the musical genre. 126 All of these differences (and this 
is by no means an exhaustive list) vary significantly at different historical points. 
and the variations follow largely predictable patterns. 
A recording is not a performance, then: more often than not it is a 
constructed,, 'ideal' event which represents not a single rendition of a ý, vork (or even 
a movement from a work) but a record of something which never took place in the 
form in which it is represented. 127 Even in those instances where a recording can 
fairly claim to be such a record of a continuous performance (as was the rule at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, at least until taping and splicing became 
established practice), the context in which it is reheard is different. Further, the 
notion that the performer is reacting to the performance situation, the sense of give 
and take between audience and performer, is not simply attenuated, it is destroyed: 
the performer cannot know exactly what the circumstances are in which his playing 
will be heard. The distinction between calculated nuance and those detailed 
swerves and jousts that arise in the unique flow of the moment - the distinction 
between the planned aspect of a performative interpretation and that margin which 
is dependent on feedback - is lost. This fact has implications for the role of skill in 
'live' performance, as the concept of skilful performance depends on their being a 
continuous, uninterrupted, immediate feedback loop between the acts of the 
performer and the sounds produced. Acts must cause sounds and be heard (and for 
pianists at least potentially seen) to do so. So a recording does not represent a 
performative interpretation, either. 
Rather,, a recording is a new kind of musical representation. It specifies 
tempi, timbres and nuances in a novel way. These are also 'idealised', in the sense 
that they are subject to a further level of mediation by the listener operating the 
sound reproduction technology. In the words of one commentator 
126 Simon Frith, Performing Rites: On the I'alue of Popular Music (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), p. 227. See also chapter 3 above (Narrowing the Focus: Theories and Descriptions 
of Musical Performance). 
1 27 This point is made by Evan Eisenberg, The Recording Angel: Music, Records and 
Culturefirom 
.4 ristotle to 
Zappa, chapter 8 'Phonograph-C, p. 89-13 1. I- 
'") -) 
[Recordings] constitute a fundamentally new sort of object of 
musical interest, distinct from both performances and 
compositions, and providing occasion for a new domain of 
musical artistry distinct from composing and performing. 128 
Recordings as Musical Representations 
The question of the status of recordings is rather akin to that concerning the 
status of the musical text. Notation,, though primarily a medium, a means to an end, 
is by no means always confined to this humble function. This is much more 
strikingly the case with the recording, which though nominally a medium -a 
'record' of an event - turns out to offer significant opportunities to construct a 
substantially new 'ideal' event with remarkable performative qualities. From the 
very beginning, the evolving technology requires constructive intervention. Like 
film,, it is a multi-authored form involving technical back-up staff. The recording 
itself soon comes to exceed the modest role of memento, eventually generating a 
radically new mode of musical consumption. This is far more evident in the fields 
of popular music and jazz (which also differ from each other in the uses they put 
recordings to) than in mainstream art music. My concern here is to show how art 
music recordings, as musical representations, have reinforced the rise of 
structuralism/formalism, which itself is a symptom of the tendency to freeze 
('objectify') music into a predictable, controllable product. 
Robert Philip has studied how recordings over the course of the twentieth 
century document important changes in performance style. He summarises a wide 
128 Aron Edidin, "Three Kinds of Recording and the Metaphysics of Music', in British Journal of I 
Aesthetics, 39 (1999), 24-39, (p. 38). I should say that Edidin is here referring specifically to his third 
category of recording. The three kinds of recording he distinguishes are: (1) recordings of 
performances; (2) recordings of compositions; and (3) record ing- artefacts. The thrust of his 
argument is that '... the ephemerality of performances as events is of little aesthetic significance' t) C) 
(p. 25) and that '[t]he domain of music is enlarged in scope and diversity by the three 
kinds of 
II 
recording... but it is not fundamentally fragmented. ' (p. 39) I need hardly say that 
EdIdin and I are in 
fundamental disagreement on the first of these points. Useful though his threefold division may be, I 
see his analysis as flawed because it fails to find a place for performative interpretation as a 
distinct 
and aesthetically meaningful element within what he calls the 
'domain of music'. He crucially refers 
to 'the' performance of a work as a reified entity even after admitting that performances are 
epherneral, time-bound events. (p. 25, p. 27) But the notion that the reproduced 
'soundings' of a 
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variety of such changes as 'a trend towards greater power, firmness, claritv. control. 
literalness, and evenness of expression, and away from informality. looseness. and 
unpredictability'. 1 29 Recordings from the early years of the century 
... give a vivid impression of being projected as if to an 
audience. They have a sense of being 'put across', so that the 
precision and clarity of each note is less important than the 
shape and progress of the music as a whole. They are intended 
to convey what happens in the music, to characterise it. The 
accurate reproduction of the musical text is merely a means to 
an end. 130 
Later he comments: 'If pre-war recordings are remarkably like live performances, 
-) 131 many late twentieth-century live performances are remarkably like recordings. 
Philip speculates that there were a number of reasons behind this 
development, each underpinning the other. For example, he cites the increase in 
rehearsal time for orchestras; one can assume a parallel increase in practice time for 
solo pianists, as performance from memory became obligatory. More significant 
perhaps is the fact that all recordings, including pre splice-era recordings of 
'performances' (or more precisely, integral play-throughs) can be listened to 
repeatedly, granting inaccuracies an intolerable ontological status. In live 
performance, the listener can be relied upon to sort intentions from accidents (and 
here the visibility of the proceedings helps): one can see the commitment with 
which a performer was attempting to realise an artistic intention, even when she 
fails. The failure might be interpreted in good faith as evidence that the performer 
was giving her utmost. 
The problem of errors on a recording being heard as integral to the 
'performance' it contained, rather than 'accidental' (in both a positive and negative 
sense) was identified early on by the first and second generations of recording ltý 
recording entail de facto the original performance (on those occasions when a single continuous ltý I 
performance was indeed recorded) is open to challenge, as my comments above make clear. 
129 Robert Philip, Early Recordings and Musical Style. - Changing Tastes in Instruinewal 
Peýfbrmance 1900-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 229. 
130 Ph iI ip, Earli, Recordings and A fusical Sti'le, p. 2 3 0. 
131 "I lbid p. 21 
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artist, such as Rachmaninoff and Schnabel. Inevitably it affected their playing and 
their attitude towards it. Schnabel commented: 
It is almost impossible to play with the mechanical exactitude 
which is required for a definitive, never-to -be -changed performance without sacrificing some measure of 
concentration and freedom. 132 
The inevitable conclusion - that a recording has significantly different ontological, 
aesthetic and intentional qualities from a performance - led to the next generation 
of recording artists making a virtue of necessity: technological innovation and 
aesthetic forethought eventually produced a radically different approach to 
recording. It was Glenn Gould,, foreshadowed by Toscanini's practice, N"ho 
articulated the new vision,, and to the chagrin of many concert-goers. 
simultaneously put it into practice. ' 33 
Gould marks a turning point in the history of recording. His theorising and 
practice - and the insights of Benjamin and Adomo before him - have been 
variously acknowledged, even as they are strenuously resisted or selectively 
ignored. Here are some examples. Alfred Brendel acknowledges 'two officially 
canonised sources of musical experience, concert performing and studio recording', 
adding that 'the studio demands control over a mosaic'. He also points out that 
'studio recordings have enormously increased the acuteness of detailed 
listening'. 134 Contrast Brendel's cautious optimism with Daniel Barenboim's 
views. He traces this increased attentiveness into the very moment of record' ing 
itself where its influence is decidedly negative: 'In the studio there is a tendency to 
bring out all the elements one has thought about and prepared in advance. " 35 What 
he is describing is a drive towards self-consciously complete performative 
132 Cesar Saerchinger, Artur Schnabel. - a Biography (London: Cassell, 1957), p. 224. 
133 Geoffrey Payzant, Glenn Gould. - Music and Mind (Toronto: Key Porter, 1984), ch. 3 entitled 'A 
HiGher Calling' (p. 35-50) discusses Gould's decision to give up performing in the concert hall. 
It) Ib Edward Said also comments on this in the first chapter ('Performance as an Extreme Occasion') of 
Alusical Elaborations. Taruskin is alert to the link between formalism, transcendentalism and the 
positive reception of Gould's recorded work. See Text andAct, p. 23. 
134 This is in the context of a discussion of 'live' recordings, which he claims stand between them. I 
'A Case for Live Recordings' in Afusic Sounded Our Essays Leclures, Inicri-lews, A. fierthoughts 
(London: Robson, 1990), p. 200-208, quotation from p. 200. 
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interpretation devoid of unpredictability, and hence of risks and opportunities too. 
Barenboim. is sceptical about the value of recording as a constructed. *ideal' eN, ent 
precisely because the ideal of control over the life process is chimerical: 
To me music runs parallel to nature, and in relation to what has been and what comes afterwards. The passionate wish to 
make the clock stand still is just not possible in life - it keeps ticking away. The naturalistic idea of music is the verý' 
antithesis of recording, and recordiný at best can only be the historical record of a given moment. ' 6 
Andras Schiff is equally critical of recordings as constructed artefacts. His 
argument is that they are a form of cheating and hence morally suspect: 
What I obj ect to... is the type of editing that goes on in the 
studios. You may hear some very good performances on 
record and you know very well that some of the pianists on the 
labels would never be able to play those works in the same 
way. The art of the musician is to play a work in its entirety, 
not in separate bits, doing continuously some repairs. I want a 
recording to represent what you are actually doing. ' 37 
There is however no serious doubt that recordings have transformed both 
performing and listening habits profoundly. The history of recording indicates that 
it took some time for performers to come to terms with the new medium and that 
this process is far from finished. Conflicting views as to its value continue to be 
articulated. The historical trajectory is nonetheless clear. More and more, it is the 
recording which has become the model by which live musical performance has 
come to be judged. Steven Connor has argued that there has been an 'inversion of 
the structural dependence of copies on originals' and the insight, more commonly 
associated with rock and popular music, is equally valid in the art music field. 138 
13 5 Daniel Barenboim, A Life in Music (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), p. 34. 
136 Barenboim, A Life in Music, p. 34. 
137 Interview in Journal of the European Piano Teachers Association, no. '36 vol. 12 (1991), 9-12. 
(p. 12). For a similar complaint from an earlier generation, see Denis Matthews. In Pursuit (? 1', 11zisic 
(London: Victor Gollancz, 1966), p. I 11. 
138 Steven Connor, Postmodernist Culture. - an Introduction to Theories of the Conteinporaly 
(Oxford: Blackwell, second edition 1997), p. 175. 
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The qualities of clarity and literalness which Robert Pliilip associates with art 
music performance and recording are in turn equally attributable to the influence of 
formalism,, itself an objectifying force: the two cultural factors are mutually 
reinforcing. 
Representations and the Reification of Performance 
I hope these brief comments are sufficient to show that recordings and 
performances are indeed ontologically distinct. To claim that a recording artist is 
performing is either to invoke a quite distinct notion of what performance is (as 
Said does), or to make a fundamental category mistake. Recordings. like scores and 
performative interpretations, are representations of music. 
Richard Taruskin's well-known critique of the concept of authentic 
performance makes a similar point with regard to the work concept and its uneasy 
relationship with performance: 
Turning ideas into objects, and putting objects in place of 
people, is the essential modernist fallacy - the fallacy of 
reification,, as it is called. It fosters the further fallacy of 
forgetting that performances, even canned performances, are 
not things but acts. 1 39 
There is a subtle irony in Taruskin referring here to 'canned performances'. 
Although he acknowledges that '... the advent of recordings has only exacerbated 
the difficulty of determining the ontological status of musical works', there is a 
suggestion that he has not quite thought the matter through to its conclusion, not 
just in this occasional oxymoron cited above, but in his discussions elsewhere of 
recordings as if they are identifiable performances. 140 
Taruskin, Tev and Act, p. 24. Taruskin's argument is, broadly put, that that the authent, ct, ID 
movement was a symptom of the same drive towards a reiýying formalism that is evident in 
perfon-nance that emphasises (or claims its *ustification from) purel" anaIN'tical knowledo'e. 
140 Taruskin, Text and Act, p. 14. I have examined the discussion in essa% 7 of recordlnýgs of a 
Prokofiev piano piece (see above ChA, pt. 2, Music and Character). 
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There is, perhaps, a danger in pursuing a stark opposition between 
representation - such as the recording as objectified commodity - and processual 
performance. The danger is that it may over-simplify what has become a complex 
interaction,, where the live, in the form of 'liveness', and the dead intertwine. 141 
Perhaps this is not as novel as we might think, as the practice of transcription 
indicates. Recordings, like transcriptions, interfere with the unitary concept of 
performance which links a text to an audience on a unique occasion in time and 
space. Indeed, recordings can be viewed both as a form of, and deviation from, 
transcription. 142 In a limited historical sense,, they even come to replace it. But 
whereas the transcription was designed to fit an extant piece to a new performer in 
a new setting, recordings allow players and listeners to do away with the public 
setting completely. The recording musician is freed from the obligation to perforrn 
the work continuously in a fixed location before an audience; instead he can 
construct at leisure a reified representation of the work. The listener is freed too of 
the obligation to engage with the whole of the work continuously in the stifling 
presence of an audience severely restricted in its possible reactions. Performance as 
a unified field of engagement and communication disappears. 
1 141 See Philip Auslander, Liveness. - Performance in a Mediatized 
Culture (London: Routledge, 
1999), which discusses this topic in detail; 
Connor, Postmodernist Culture, p. 172 makes this point. 
142 For an introduction to the topic of transcription and arrangement, 
see Millan Sachania, 
I 
"'Improvina the Classics Some thoughts on the "Ethics" and 
Aesthetics of Musical Arrangement', 
The Afusic Rci, iciv, 55 (1994), 58-75. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Introduction 
In this chapter my aim will be to review the arguments already presented 
and state, where possible, consequences and conclusions of the research project 
as it stands. It will immediately be clear that this standing is anything but 
complete. The method by which I intend to proceed is to re-examine key issues 
which have emerged in the discussion, roughly in the order of their initial 
presentation, drawing what general conclusions I can. The only divergence is 
one brief interpolation. The central topics in what follows will thus be the 
putative 'crisis' in performance studies; the Macintyrean notion of the practice 
and the role of virtue theory within it; the 'processual' concept of performance I 
have been putting forward; and the complementary notion of interpretation as a 
mental representation. 
There is one brief interruption to the scheme: after the discussion of the 
practice I have inserted a brief sketch. It initially touches on the question of how 
music can be defined, before moving on to a discussion of the topic of 
musicianship and musicality. This new material serves two purposes. Firstly, it 
is intended to bridge a gap between the highly abstract discussion of the ethos of 
the practice and the specifics of performance and interpretation; and secondly, it 
serves as a pointer to areas which invite further research. 
The Crisis in Performance Studies 
Two distinct 'crises' have featured in the course of the foregoing, one 
practical, the other theoretical. Although they are mutually dependent it 
is 
convenient, at least initially, to treat them discretely. So I will 
begin with the 
former. The historical tra ectory I proposed is of a 'double' practice with 
shifting allegiances. An early phase, starting with the establishment of 
the 
familiar Lisztian 'museum' model of the recital/concert, reaches an initial 
rapprochement in the figure of Busoni, who in weighing the rights of performer 
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and composer against each other makes their contradictory nature transparent. 
And it is his skill in a further area - as a writer about musical aesthetics - that 
grants this moment of history a special profile. Busoni is both synthesiser - 
simultaneously active as composer, transcriber, performer, aesthetician and 
critic - and the harbourer of massive contradictions, calling the musical work 
both earthbound and timeless, and granting performance the status of an artwork 
in itself, calling it a transcription. ' 
A subsequent phase of the history of musical Production and 
consumption sees the mediator - the performer - lose ground on a number of 
fronts. Consider this apparently positive fact: more and more of what was once 
conceived as music for domestic use, to be played, heard and enjoyed in a 
private, or semi-private setting, has gradually been appropriated for concert use 
and transformed in the process. The obvious gain in breadth of repertory has a 
downside. As a consequence, performers find themselves forced to project the 
sounds of music into much larger spaces than those for which they were 
originally conceived. A result of this has been changes both in instrument 
building practice (with an emphasis on even, 'bright' sounds and uniformity in 
all registers) and more rehearsed, less spontaneous attitudes towards 
interpretation. Hand in hand with this is the emergence of standardised, ideal 
public performance spaces, with large concert halls seating up to three thousand 
or more listeners the norm for orchestral concerts and solo recitals by star 
performers; and smaller spaces with seats for hundreds, rather than thousands, 
for chamber music and soloists of lesser repute. All this brings out the 
similarities of works in performance, at the expense of their uniqueness. 
Two further recent aspects of the transformation of practice deserve 
mention together. They are both closely tied to a perception that classical music 
can,, indeed should,, find a wider, 'popular' audience: it should be heard more 
widely, and pay its way. So attendance figures at concerts of classical music 
have been more and more closely scrutinised as state involvement in the 
funding of 'elitist' activities such as the performing arts has been called into 
question (with the substantial running costs of opera houses in particular a 
' See chapter 33, footnote 55. 
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potential source of embarrassment); and of course performers do not by anY 
means play to regularly full houses. At the same time, the concentration of 
power in the hands of agents who look after a vanishingly small number of star 
performers has also lead to a polarisation in the performer market. A fe',, N- stars 
command grotesquely large fees, while those at the beginning of their careers 
are condemned to play for minimal reward. Some commentators are -ýý, -illingy to 
read evolution as issuing in a crisis in practice at this point. ' 
To describe the 'theoretical' aspect of crisis, I have proposed t', \-o 
models. ' The first is of a closed system of concepts which attempts to shift 
towards a steady state of equilibrium - and the metaphor of (im)balance which 
permeates the description above endorses this - and the second describes a 
notion of proliferation and gradual complication (or its opposite). The former 
idea captures the polarisation of performer and composer in competing ideals of 
performance. Goehr's performance model is dialectical, according the work 
concept an ultimate determining role: the 'perfect performance of music' (i. e. of 
the work) holds the evanescent 'perfect musical performance' in thrall. As the 
twentieth century progressed the idealisation of canonised works tended to be 
reinforced by contemporary compositional practices which were for a long time 
increasingly radical, exploratory and professionalised, thereby alienating mass 
audiences, who looked ever more readily to the past. 
The metaphor of proliferation and complication is particularly apposite 
when we come to examine the enormous influence that recording technology 
has exercised over musical practices during the last one hundred years. Where 
once the work concept largely determined the relationship of composer to 
performer and audience, now recordings of various kinds have multiplied the 
number of cross relationships, forcing us to rethink and reformulate the 
conceptual net we use to describe this brave new world. In concrete terms, the 
appearance of recordings is an initially alien, later disruptive and complicating 
feature within musical practices. The single most important fact to note is that 
today practically all music heard is recorded or broadcast 
(or both). Although it 
II mentioned Norman Lebrecht in this regard. 
See chapter 2, footnote 63. 
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would be wrong to conclude that live music is dead, it is, in relative statistical 
terms at least, an endangered species. And of course the 'liveness' of 
performance in popular music practice has also been substantially eroded 
through the employment of various forms of electronic intervention and 
reproduction, such as amplification and simultaneous video presentation. 
Following on from this, consider how listening habits have acclimatised more 
and more to the literal repeatability of the recording; how listening to music in 
the form of recordings has encouraged the fragmentation of both the work as a 
processual continuity and as a focal occupant of consciousness; how the listener, 
equipped with new music-reproductive technologies, becomes able to employ 
music as an accompaniment, or 'soundtrack' for other activities; how the 
traditional concept of performance as an autonomous. individual act has lost 
significance as musical production becomes a collaborative act, with 
professional performers doubling as recording artists, aided by teams of sound 
engineers. 
All this has undoubtedly resulted in a transformation -a distortion, even 
- of the concepts of performance and interpretation. We must accept that 
listening to a recording is not by any means the same thing as listening to a 
performance, even when the recording claims to be 'live'. Interpretation too has 
changed. It is all too easily thought of as a fully determined, 'reified' take of the 
work, amenable to recording. Again, I argue that we should resist the equation 
of a recorded version of a work with a traditional performative interpretation of 
the kind one encounters in the concert setting. In short, recordings require a 
whole battery of new concepts to describe their fundamental novelty. 
In this discussion of crisis the practical and the theoretical are intimately 
intertwined. it is ultimately impossible to deal with them sequentially. I will 
now examine one aspect of their interaction. Although it could reasonably be 
ormance has suffered a loss of argued that the traditional practice of concert perf 
'significance', measured on one standard - the actual numbers of performances 
past and present - classical music does continue to 
be performed well and 
relatively often. Comparing absolute numbers of performances of 
key works 
today with those of fift. v or a hundred years ago would bear this out. 
To this 
extent at least, the aura of crisis surrounding practice may smack of paranoia. 
However, the influence of recordings on listening habits has encouraged and 
amplified certain demands made of performers. The thesis started xvith the 
contention that explorations of the concept of historical authenticitv were a 
symptom of performers' disaffection with a strenuously structurallst conception 
of the musical work; listening to recordings encourages a 'literalist' attitude. As 
the issue of historical authenticity has gradually in the last decades lost its moral 
tenor,, the musical performance market has segmented along stylistic lines: there 
is 'mainstream' performance positioned alongside various shades of the 
'historically informed'. Both of the resulting niche markets remain subject to 
the dominance of the work concept as before, while performers in both of them 
are subject to the same pressures to produce literal note-perfect IiVe 
performances. Other attempts to escape the dominance of the work concept are 
effectively at the expense of the practice: 'crossover' artists cross the boundary 
to the popular. Again, attempts to escape the pressures of literalism - for 
example by integrating recorded elements into the performance setting as is 
common practice in popular music - erode the concept of liveness. ' In all this, 
the element of uniqueness central to the performance occasion accedes to a 
desire for a predictable product. Performers become obsessed with risk and loss, 
rather than opportunity and gain. 
In a sense, then, the crisis is in part the unavoidable expression and 
outcome of attempts to align a 'primary' general category (the musical work), 
carrier of a 'secondary' category (the performative interpretation) with specific 
instances valued for their uniqueness (musical performances). This element is 
not new. It has not changed significantly since Busom. However, the gradual 
impingement of technological innovation - particularly recordings - on musical 
consumption has displaced the site of performance, along with the performer 
herself and the concept of performance both instantiate. What was once central 
is now marginal, incidental. This, at least, is one conclusion xN-e might 
draxv. 
' The has been a certain resistance to the use of simultaneous video 
in live classical music 
1: 1 ple, performed concerts, though experimentation is underway. 
Joanna MacGre2or has, for exam 
some of Conlon Naricarrow's player piano studies 
li\ e using prerecorded tape and video. 
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There is an alternative view. though it is one I have argued against. A 
consequence of the dominance of reified notions of music such as the current 
situation encourages - the 'structures' analysts uncover-, the CD, container of a 
digitally stored, jigsawed simulacrum of 'performance', repeatable infinitely 
often; the narrow 'literal' interpretations of performers anxious above all to 
avoid risk - is the tendency to accord musical perfbrmance itseýf the status of a 
reification. One might pursue this line of thought by arguing that the element of 
uniqueness in performance has shrivelled to mere contingency. All that is 
significant is representation ('re-presentation'). I regard this as a fundamental 
error of ontology. More than this, it wipes out a central motive in our listening 
experience: curiosity for the new. A 'reified' or product-orientated notion of 
performance, such as that proposed by Said, fails to capture the element of 
uniqueness we value in the performance occasion. Of course the opposite 
extreme poses its own problems. What we hear must be intelligible. We must be 
offered at least the straw of familiarity to clutch at. An over-identification of 
performance with process tends to take us outside the boundaries of art music 
practice into the area of experimental music (the later work of Cage, for 
example) often categorised and discussed as performance art. 
Describing the situation as 'critical' loads the discussion with moral 
values: it is only justified if we wish the traditional practice of processual 
performance to be preserved. Beyond this, there is the question of what we want 
'performance' to stand for in our musical culture. I have already argued that 
there is no essence of 'performance': it 'is' what the culture chooses to make it. 
A problem here - to which I return below - 
is that the concept of performance is 
now being used in such varied ways that its internal 
integrity is under threat. I 
have been at pains to establish a distinction between 'processual' and 
'reified" 
performance partly in response to this. Maintaining 
it certainly implies. indeed, 
justifies the description of the current situation as a crisis. 
So in our terms, calling the situation a crisis 
draws attention to a drift too 
far in favour of one or another extreme 
(the dialectical model). Or it signals a 
disorientation in locating practice in relation to these poles 




The term 'practice' has fallen into the discussion almost incidentally. 
Yet we cannot do without it. The reasons for this are clear. The work concept 
was for much of the twentieth century respected as a timeless Platonic entitv 
with a claim to universal validity. All music was divisible bý, the opus. Lydia 
Goehr's well-known discussion of the work concept redirects attention awav 
from abstraction towards human practice rooted in particularitýý, subject to both 
accident and intention, yet exhibiting paradoxically (Busonian) Idealist 
aspirations. This sea change in perspectives on the musical work necessitates a 
theoretical explanation of the nature of musical practices, whereby the plural 
form is further indicative of the fragmentation I spoke of at the end of the first 
chapter. It would seem that the 'schematic' notated musical work is now the site 
of a range of competing interpretative/performative practices, each in different 
ways attempting to fill in gaps of indeterminacy. Analytical practice is one such 
mode, performance practices (historically informed, mainstream, crossover... 
another. 
There are many ways of describing practices. In choosing to characterise 
conventional 'mainstream' art music performance in overtly ethical terms, I 
endorse an underlying similarity of perspective between Macintyre as a moral 
theorist and what I referred to above as the Idealist aspiration of this practice. 
Both share in a celebration of structured autonomous subjectivity. In the case of 
art music practice this occurs at the primary level of the composer's 
composition, the secondary level of the performer's interpretation and the 
tertiary level of audition. In applying the Macintyrean virtue-informed practice 
to the musical case I claim that the autonomous individual pursues the goods of 
the practice as ends in themselves at one or another of these three 
levels. One 
isteners might dispute the appropriateness of a moral category 
for composers or li 
(though I think a case - admittedlý, weaker - can 
be made here too). The former 
arguably place too high a value on creative originality, about which attempts 
to 
design an ethos are problematic. The latter 
have the thinnest of obligations, 
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which in any case can be fulfilled passively. They are free to listen as they xvish 
provided that certain conditions of propriety are met. The practice of art music 
performers is, however, amenable to the Macintyrean ethical description. 
because the obligations point in two directions. They are burdened ýý-Ith the 
Translator's responsibility, as Messengers always vulnerable to criticism or 
worse. 
The role of virtue as prior to any specific practice is an integrating force 
within the individual's narrative life. But it is not a decisive force in anything 
less than ideal circumstances. The individual's quest for a unified life-narrative 
within the Macintyrean conception of virtue-informed practice is fragile and 
threatened: just as it is in the art music practice I take as its exemplification. In 
Macintyre's model, a problematic area of second order virtues - flexibility, 
adaptability, integrity - points to both the potential for individual unity and its 
disruption. This potential is an ideal. A parallel with the uses and abuses of the 
concept of unity in music analytical practice suggests itself 
This brings me on to a second feature of the Macintyrean model which is 
particularly apposite, in view of my larger claims. Within our practice, the 
understanding of musical works is, I argued, peculiarly similar to our 
understanding of people. Identifying the animating metaphor of movement and 
gesture is at the heart of musical understanding. Music appears to us to 'behave' 
like a person and this is a key to its expressivity. It is also a major part of its 
appeal to performers in offering them opportunities to reframe themselves in the 
likeness of an ideal Other. 
Intense, passionate desire to re-animate or 'act out' the text is at the heart 
of art music performance. The problem I identified with Kingsbury's account of 
conservatory life is its presentation of performers as victims of an irrational 
system with a self-perpetuating power structure. His notion of a practice is 
grounded in an (anthropological) analysis of enacted power relations (and 
contrasted with rhetorical assertions which may run contrary to actions). It is, if 
you like, an institution- I ead analysis. But the question of individual motivcs is 
all too easily submerged by a stress on organisational frameNvorks. 
Wllý do 
people want to become performers? I suggest that aspirants are so stronglý, 
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drawn to the possibilities of subjective expression musical performance allows 
that they are prepared to endure considerable physical hardship and psychic 
abuse of the kind Kingsbury documents so well. Many welcome, or at least 
come to accept, the framework of principles I put forward. ' 
Thus for the performer, the practice entails a morality, a system of duties 
and obligations, rights and wrongs and it is a framework with a certain rigidity. 
Performers are prepared to be 'second class citizens' because they nonetheless 
prize the personal rewards highly. The musical work (in Goehr's sense) 
symbolises a certain notion of the autonomous individual, like the Kantian 
conception of the moral being, works invite treatment as ends- in-themse Ives. 
They resist a simple functional interpretation. Kingsbury's analysis goes to 
Wittgensteinian lengths to avoid the problematic mental world of beliefs, 
desires, intentions and abilities. So when he notes that talent is 'a concept 
frequently used to explain something that couldn't be explained otherwise', its 
invisibility is cited as cause for scepticism about its very existence. ' Yet 
performers apparently believe in this mental world and the morality it makes 
possible. Virtues are just such problematic inhabitants of the mental realm, and 
as such open to question. There is no doubt that talent is a key concept in the 
way performers think of themselves; whether they also think about themselves 
as 'virtuous' is a matter open to empirical test. If they were found to do so, it 
would be an indirect endorsement of the aesthetic of 'animation' I mentioned 
above. 
Not all musical practices embody such an ethos of individualism. It has 
been a common mistake of conventionally trained musicologists to carry over 
the concept of individual authenticity into areas where its appropriateness 
is 
contestable, such as popular music in general, and rock in particular. 
Nicholas 
Cook has argued persuasively that rock music practice is characteristically a 
collaborative enterprise which nonetheless markets 
itself as a purveyor of 
See Chapter 2, part 2, Virtues of Pianistic Performance. 
See chapter 2, footnote ") 1. 
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authenticity of SortS. 7 Perhaps we might think of the rock star's authenticity as 
iconic' rather than of the structured kind that virtue theory implies: a status 
conferred, nominal rather than earned. And the extent that the 'star system, has 
come to dominate contemporary art music performance circles is a measure of 
the failure of the traditional 'moral' performance culture. We may read this as 
further evidence of ongoing transformation, or - in a stricter moral vein - as vet 
one more respect in which the significance of the traditional performance 
culture is being eroded. 
Music, Musicality and Musicianship 
In focusing on virtues, I invite an analysis of the performer in terms of 
characteristics, traits, qualities or proper-ties. Virtues arguably represent an ideal 
secondary layer, rather distant from the pragmatic day-to-day concerns of the 
active musician. A major task for the theorist of musical practice is in bridging 
the gap between the ethos of the practice and a primary layer, its technical 
specifics. The notion of 'talent' is both too limiting - in its insistence on 
innateness - and too general, unless we add a disciplinary qualification. The 
question we will want to ask can be formulated in various ways. What is 
musical talent,, in its innate and learned guises? What are musicianship and 
musicality? If the question of how musicality and musicianship are linked to 
virtue has already received an answer, it is a partial one (the set of principles I 
proposed for performers is intended as a framework). In the following 
discussion I suggest how it might be extended. 
To decide what music is would seem, on the face of it, to be a 
straightforward matter. We simply list the common traits examples provide. But 
the search for musical 'universals' has not, on the whole, been fruitful. Suffice it 
to say that no identifiable element of 'music' is always present, though there are 
significant statistical regularities. For our purposes we will therefore 
have to 
' Nicholas Cook, 'Music minus one: Rock, Theory, and Performance', new formations. - a 
Journal of CulturelTheory,, Politics, 27 (Winter 1995-6), volume title 'Performance 
%latters', 
p. 23 -4 1. 
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remain practice- specific in our definition. If music is defined as a form of 
behaviour, and more narrowly in our culture as a performing art, the art music 
practice I have been discussing is narrower still in its reliance on a body of 
'works' notated in a highly deten-ninate partitioning system. Musicianship and 
musicality are what we need to make sense of this. 
Francis Sparshott has drawn attention to the problem of musicianship, 
linking it to the notion of musical understanding: 
[W]hat... is musicianship? What is musical understanding? 
The question has scarcely been asked, though few terms 
play more important roles in our critical chitchat than 
these. The ancient contrast between learned and practical 
music is one thing that has distracted attention from the 
concept. One can at least say that a perforiner shows 
musicianship by displaying a grasp of musical meaniiigs, 
both structural and affective, rather than Just following the 
score from point to point. And the meanings must indeed 
be musical meanings - the affective aspects must be those 
that are integral to the meaning of the music. Can one 
specify further? Presumably not: one is speaking rather of 
the level of understanding shown than of any specifiable 
matter to be understood. ' 
There have been efforts to elucidate the nature of musicianship and musical 
understanding - perhaps Sparshott misleads us here - but the former topic at 
least has not enjoyed great prominence in academic circles. Of course, it 
receives ongoing attention from the vast community of music teachers, though 
their interest is pragmatic rather than systematic in orientation; and 
psychologists have also investigated these questions. Sparshott's closing 
comment - that understanding music is measured 
in degrees, rather than 
definitively - is congruent with the conclusions 
I reached in the discussion of 
musical performance and analysis. In the following attempt to 'specify 
further' 
what musicianship and musicality might mean, we will encounter the issue of 
product and process in an intriguing parallel guise. 
Francis Sparshott, 'Aesthetics of Music: Limits and Grounds", p. 84. This passage is also 
quoted in part in Lydia Goehr, 'Tile Perfect 
Perforrilance of Music and the Pert'ect Musical 
Performance', in new formations. - a Journal of Culture/Theow 
Politics, 2- (Winter 199-5-6), 
entitled 'Performance Matters', 1-22, (p. 
13). 
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I begin with comments by Lydia Goehr. who implies that xve think of 
musicianship and musicality as roughly paralleling technique and style, which 
are in turn predicated upon rendition and interpretation respectively. She says: 
Certainly, correct rendition and faithful interpretation 
depend upon knowledge of the work, but performance is 
more than a demonstration of this knowledge-, it is also an 
act of musicianship. ' 
In lining up these oppositional terms - technique/rendition/action against 
sty I e/interpretati o n/kno wl edge - the question arises as to their psychological 
reality. It turns out that the evidence from cognitive science does indeed support 
these distinctions. Gilbert Ryle famously drew attention to the heterogeneity of 
knowledge, distinguishing between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' (NN-1th 
'know-how' as the colloquial noun stolen from the verb category to fill a 
semantic gap). " 
The cognitive scientist Allen Newell proposed that we think of know- 
how as a production system. The cognitive universals (i. e. common traits) 
which occupy production system modellers are as follows: 
1. Parallel consideration of possible actions. 
2. Serial executions of actions. 
3. Distinction between knowing that and knowing hoiv. 
4. Simultaneous learning. " 
It appears that the mental representation of objects and 
features is different in 
kind from the representation of rules. Evidence of this is provided 
by the fact 
that in spite of ignorance of rules, behaviour can be rule-driven. 
For example. 
people usually apply the rules of their native 
language correctly although they 
Lydia Goehr, 'The Perfect Performance of Music and the Perfect 
Musical Performance', p. 12. 
Ryle, The Concept of Alfind, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1990, first edition 1949) chapter 2, 
'Knowing How and Knowing That', p. 26-60. 
'' Newell's work is discussed by Christian Schunn and 
David Klahr in 'Production SN'sterns', in 
eds. William Bechtel and George 
Graham, .4 
Companion to Cogi? itive Science (Oxford: 
Black\vell, 1998), p. 542-55 1. 
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generally have little explicit knowledge of what those rules are. " The study of 
brain-damaged patients also supports this view. Much the same can be said of 
music: listeners do not have to be aware of the rules governing musical 
organisation (the rules of tonality, say) in order to make sense of it. " Listeners 
may acquire (unconsciously) rather than learn (consciously) these rules, to use a 
distinction familiar in linguistics. They may also at a later stage learn about 
what they have acquired (and the 'adult' discipline of formal musical analysis 
could be described in these terms). We might call mental representations 
'propositional knowledge' (or declarative knowledge' as it is stored in 
declarative memory) and production itself 'procedural knowledge', reflecting a 
ubiquitous perspectival difference between product (occupying space) and 
process (occupying time). 
Of course, perception and production cannot be divorced: they are in 
constant dialogue, with each new production dependent on the conditions 
generated (in part) by previous productions; hence production rules are 
expressed as 'if-then... ' forms. The description of performance as the 
management and maintenance of a pre-formed interpretation ('running repairs') 
captures this idea nicely. However, procedural knowledge - physical skill - is 
slowly learned and rather hard to modify because it is largely automatic. Hence 
a great deal of what occurs when we perform music is semi-conscious or 
intuitive. So there are serious limits to conscious management and monitoring in 
real time. This is a further reason why performances of interpretations tend to be 
context-dependent and, hence unique to the moment. We can link these ideas to 
Goehr's two categories of performance: in the 'perfect performance of music', 
the performer focuses as a priority on the reconstruction from memory of the 
work,, with the interpretation an 'emergent' element; in 'the perfect musical 
performance', the performer primarily directs attention towards the context in 
which the performance occurs. The complementary role intuition plays is 
skewed accordingly. 
Schunn and Klahr, 'Production Systems', p. 545. 
Malcolm Budd discusses this issue in 'Understanding Music'. The Aristotelian 
Socletv, 
Supplementary Volurne LIX, 1985, p. 23333-248. 
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With these considerations in mind, I propose that we think of the 
relationship between our key terms as follows: 
Musicality: the potential (the potential property of sound) in a musical 
representation (mental, public, or cultural) for music to emerge when 
musicianship skills are applied in performance (i. e. in real time). 
Musicality is thus a latency, an ideal, a value, capable of being more or less 
realised. It is a property of a representation, and hence can inhere in an external 
object (e. g. annotated composition, a recording) or an interrialised, mental object 
(such as an interpretation). As such it is a form of propositional knowledge, of 
'knowing-that': it is a form of product. 
It would seem that human beings have a very broad capacity to percei've 
musicality in sounds. This is to endorse the Cagean insight that we can hear 
music in almost any sounds if we so desire. However, it may require 
considerable patience and strain with opaque, complex materials: here a law of 
diminishing returns sets in. (There remains the question of sensory limits - of 
dynamic, duration and so on - which I will leave aside here. ) I have argued that 
we achieve this through metaphorical understanding, with the metaphor of 
movement/location of seminal importance in our practice. 
Musicianship: an individual's system ofproduction which applies (generalised) 
music-relevant rules to particular instances in the hope of achieving a perfect 
match. 
Musicianship thus involves many things, including perceiving, monitoring - in 
a sense even inventing - and realising (the degree of) musicality 
in musical 
production/performance. It is a form of 'knowing-how'. Further to this, \ý-e can 
say that musicality is only accessible (describable, analysable) through a 
performative act. Musicianship is that (enabling) quality which constitutes the 
performative act. In our practice it is primarily (but not exclusively) the sense of 
hearing - the ear - which is the conduit 
between musicality and musicianship: 
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between the mental and physical (i. e. notational) knowledge bases on the one 
hand and on the other the skills of manipulating the body appropriately. 
Thus the distinction between product and process I have used in defining 
performance turns out to be of value at the level of mind and action. A product - 
for example, in the form of an interpretation - has the necessary stability to 
sustain a performance. But it cannot constitute the performance itself which 
requires a process of reconstitution in real time. The process of reconstitution is 
always context-dependent and the result is that performances always differ from 
each other. 
Performance 
The link between practice and performance can be stated briefly. I began 
my chapter on performance by claiming that the former consists of series of the 
latter. But what is a performance? Let me recall Carlson's description: an 
'essentially contested concept', contested partly because it is so widely used. 
But although there is no ultimate agreement among users as to what 
performance 'is', a broad semantic framework is specifiable. At the outset of my 
essay I attempted to specify such a framework, in the awareness that the 
resulting discussion would contain an element of circularity. I wrote of 
performance of something, by someone, with the aid of something, for a 
purpose, in a setting, on an occasion, for an observer. Any definition I might 
propose for art music performance should include both all that is characteristic 
of practice as well as indicating an underlying congruity with other senses of the 
term in other practices. It should aim, in other words, for a circularity which 
avoids viciousness. To talk of musical production in the concert hall as 
'performance' is to relativise the meaning of the concept in a certain way. But it 
is also to point to a continuity with those activities we designate 'performance' 
in other domains, such as religious observance, speech acts. scientific 
experiment, and so on, all through the lengthy list I provided. 
In that broad framing gesture with which I began, I indicated the rather 
general level at which continuity is evident. We can summarise it in this way: 
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performances are particulars, particular instances. They occur at particular 
times, in particular places. But as I stated at the outset, they contain an element 
of the familiar, the recycled. A performance is always a performance of* 
something. In the case of art music practice, it is performance of several things 
simultaneously: of a score, of an interpretation and of a work (Xvhich is to say, in 
practical terms, of a composer's intentions as embodied in a score). The stabilm 
and specificity of the score lends art music practice a certain rigidity which 
provoked some of the objections we have encountered. 
It may be helpful in coming to terms with this rigidity to invoke Richard 
Schechner's 'axiom of frames', which, he claims, applies generally in the 
theatre. I do so with some hesitation: it provides a useful additional perspective, 
not a scientific law. The 'axiom of frames' states that the looser an outer frame 
is, the tighter the inner, or, conversely, the looser an inner frame, the more 
important the outer. " Add to this the notion of 'frame recursion' - Minsky's 
idea that frames can simultaneously function as part of the substance of 
performance - and we would expect to find looseness and tightness interleaved. 
It is possible to argue that this is indeed the case: the musical score has a certain 
tightness, as does the ritual setting of the concert, with its prescriptions of 
audience behaviour. Between them we find the mental freedoms the listener and 
the performer necessarily enjoy. Once the problems of reading the score literally 
have been solved, the performer, insofar as she has the resources she needs, 
really has no alternative but to arrive at a personal interpretation. And at the risk 
of over-refining the point here, we could claim that the performer also balances 
a rather specific, 'tight' notion of musicianship - such as the art music model 
implies - with a looser set of ethical values. 
The listener, prescriptions 
notwithstanding, is free to make of the music what he will. 
In the cases of both performer and listener there is no want of models 
and methods to describe how they go about their activities. For example 
Salter 
gives a detailed account of how listeners should (and 
doubtless often do) 
listen. " But to invoke such models is to reformulate our notion of what is 
14 Richard Schechner, PerfornhIll(v Theoýv (London: Routledge, 1988, re\ ised edition). p. 
14. 
15 See chapter 1, Review: (5) The Concert, again. 
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performed. In this sense, what counts as the perfon-nance is a matter of 
perspective. What are we taking as our text? Is it the score? A mental 
representation (the interpretation)? (These are the 'texts* I have focused on. ) Or 
a 'performance' of listening, such as a listener's attempt to reconstruct the 
musical content? (Here the 'text' might be specified in a theory or tý-pology of 
listening, such as Salter effectively provides. ) And what is the frame within 
which the text is being performed? Is it the concert hall? Or a domestic setting, 
listening to broadcast music, or a recording? Here I would refer back to the 
opening deliberations of this section. Defining performance requires answers to 
our framing questions concerning agency, setting and so on. 
Others might use Schechner to argue differently: that the balance (if 
such it is) between the loose and tight within our performance practice has been 
lost. Performance has degenerated into nothing more than a concatenation of 
reified 'texts'. (I argued against such a view on ontological grounds above. ) 
Where there is a text, there is a stable reference point and the possibility of 
judgement. Although his might seem to be a convincing rationale for musical 
competitions, it also renders them self-defeating. An accumulation of texts 
curtails the freedom of the moment, and the subjective value of musical 
performance is threatened. The value of Schechner's axiom - unnuanced though 
it is when stated as a bald opposition - is in reminding us of a need to balance 
control with freedom. The oppositional terms I have used in this study to 
characterise this balance have been between product and process. To what 
extent this pairing names a true opposition or simply relative degrees on a scale 
is unclear, particularly in the mental realm. 
Finally I would like to add a further comment on the 'text' itself The 
score - the performer's text - has a relatively stable 
identity. I have also argued 
against our regarding it as a performance, choosing instead to classify 
it as a 
species of representation. There is nothing to stop us making this recursiVe 
ramework accordingly. The score can move, however, provided we adjust our f 
be viewed as the outcome of a (series of) compositional 'performances', the 
product of what is normally a large number of engagements with various 
drafts. 
t-n 
each a kind of performance in itself. Individual musical gestures and 
details can 
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certainly be viewed as the 'texts' of a series of essentially private 'secretive' 
compositional performances. But to speak of such private acts as performances 
is,, as I implied above, to problematise the unity of time. place and action and 
the location of an audience within it. In this case we drasticallý, compress our 
notion of the performance frame and what counts as a unity of time, place and 
action along with it. 
Reverting to a much larger time scale - the scale of historical epochs 
binding genres into style - we can usefully think of the production of individual 
works as performative, as performances of schematic genres (the 'text'). 
rendered unique in each new composition. In this case, by contrast, we 
drastically magnify our notion of the performance frame and what counts as a 
unity of time, place and action along with it. Such an altered perspective allows 
us to see the musical text as consisting of materials which are the outcome of 
prior compositional performances, with the series of performances of 
performances stretching backwards (and forwards) in potentially infinite 
recursion. This enables us in turn to apply the performance model to the 
Adornian theory of 'mediation'. Musical materials, far from being neutral 
givens, contain a sediment of historical meanings. In performative terms, 
unpicking these meanings is a matter of separating individual performances 
from each other: it becomes an 'exfoliation' of previous representations. 
If such a project seems chimerical, it is because we can only chase down 
the 'text' of a performance where a material record survives. We cannot know 
precisely what was in a composer's mind when he was working on a particular 
composition or what models he consciously took as guides. From our 
perspective the question as to whether a generic reference was consciousl), 
intended or accidental is often unanswerable. We can only weigh the evidence 
of circumstance and 'reconstruct' on the basis that beliefs and 
desires - 
compounded as intentions - are common to all compositional endeavour. 
'149 
Interpretation 
A theory may require intentions - and the mental representations that 
underlie them - to exist, but determining their ontological status is a currently 
insoluble problem. What the evidence suggests is that the inhabitants of the 
mental realm are characterised by fuzziness in form. Memory is not a matter of 
immutable representation, but of reconstruction. As such, it is an unreliable 
process and we may vacillate between readings, particularly when we scrutinise 
our intentions closely, outside of the constraints of real time performance. 
The materials of a musical interpretation are fragmentary and unfinished. 
They need not be, or have been,, consciously pondered. What we might have 
once reflected upon may have long since disappeared below the threshold of 
consciousness. In other words, what we currently know as performers of music - 
what propositional knowledge we have of the music we play - may be rather 
limited. What is important in real time is not 'knowing-that', but 'knowing- 
how'. Hence the analytical knowledge a performer feels she needs varies: it is 
very much a matter of degree. Intuitive understandings which deny explanation 
are commonplace. A performer may find herself in much the same position as 
the non-specialist, unable to explain why a musical gesture has the effect on her 
it does: she may understand without being able to explain how she does so. 
What this implies is a need to reconsider what the umbrella of analysis covers. I 
suggest we think in terms of a spectrum of values, with detailed formal analysis 
at one end, partial, informal 'ad hoc' simplifications in the middle, and the 
various metaphorical understandings of music (including music understood in 
terms of virtual movement) at the other. 
For all that, the repertoire art music performers are centrally concerned 
with is designed to counter fuzziness and fragmentation. Dahlhaus argues this 
point persuasively, contrasting the solidified, quasi-spatial image of composed 
works with the moment-to-moment sensitivity to context that drives free 
, composition tends towards objectivitN-. improvisation. As he puts it: 
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improvisation is mere execution' . 
16 Interpretation only becomes possible xN-hen 
an executive encounters a compositional object. So interpretations aspire 
towards representation but nonetheless, in the moment of their realisation in real 
time - in performance - they retain an improvisatory element. An interpretation 
thus throws together an idealised aesthetic content with a psychological 
element. 
'The Music of the Music... ' 
I would like in closing to glance briefly at an idea presented by Edward 
Said, who derives it in turn from Proust. 'The music of the music, is, in effect, 
the concentrate of a musician's appreciation of music, an accumulation of 
individual associations, insights, manners and address: 
a... unique sound not only as a distinctive imprint, 
something like a signature or stamp of particular 
possession, but also as a special theme, personal obsession, 
or recurrent motif in the work of an artist that gives all of 
his work its own recognizable identity. " 
Said is suggesting that there are as many musics as there are (great) composers-, 
we might extend his notion to include performers, analysts, or indeed anyone 
whose involvement is deep and long-standing enough to acquire such potential 
resonance. Establishing origins is about finding commonality. We are 
contemplating the opposite end of the tree of musical evolution where it is the 
utter peculiarity of individual experience that counts. This essence of 
individuality is only accessible in private. Redolent of intimacy and solitude, it 
is, Said suggests, nonetheless an affirmation, a communion. 
Said's examples focus on 'melody, his translation of Proust's 'air de la 
chanson', and he pursues both the literal and figurative implications of the term. 
Most strikingly he manages to forge a link between the idea of the composer's 
personal imprint, a technical aspect of music itself and botli personal and 
16 Carl Dahlhaus, trans. Derrick Puffett and Alfred Clayton, Schoenberg and theNew, khIsIc, 
p. 223. 
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historical circumstance. So it is with the late works of Beethoveil (Diabelli 
variations), Bruckner (Ninth Symphony) and, most appositely, Richard Strauss 
(Metamorphosen), that he illustrates his argument. If we accept the idea that 
music is a potential which a listener realises - and each listener differently - it is 
of ethical, almost political, significance that Said, a listener (and performer) of 
eclectic tastes, should favour musics which, in the manner of 'Metamorphosen'. 
'exfoliate': 
... I am intellectually impressed by the richness of what I have called the alternative formation in music, in which the 
non-linear, nondevelopmental uses of theme or melody 
dissipate and delay a disciplined organisation of musical 
time that is principally combative as well as dominative. " 
There is a readily interpretable subtext to Said's sentiments here which I 
would like to put aside. However, the notion of layers of meaning implied by 
'the music of the music' is vividly suggestive. The musical performance I have 
been considering involves at least three individuals and contains at least three 
levels: the composer's composition, its interpretation by the performer and each 
unique performance it receives in front of an audience. The end point of 
encounter, the musical performance, is the vehicle of a recursive 'music of the 
music of the music... '. 
Edward Said, Musical Elaborations (London: Chatto and Windus, 199 1), p. 
92-3). 
Said, A fusical Elaborations. p. 10. 
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